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Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) play a key role in financial markets by helping to 
reduce informative asymmetry between lenders and investors, on one side, and 
issuers on the other side, with regard to the creditworthiness of banks or countries. 
This crucial role has expanded alongside financial globalisation and received an 
additional boost from Basel II which integrates the ratings of CRAs into the rules 
for setting weights for credit risk. Ratings adjustment tends to be sticky, lagging 
behind markets, and often overreact when they do change. This overreaction may 
have aggravated the recent financial crises, contributing to financial instability and 
cross-country contagion. Criticism has been especially directed towards the high 
degree of concentration of the ratings industry. Promotion of competition may 
require policy action at the international level to encourage the establishment of 
new agencies and to discover alternative rules or regulatory requirements in order 
to achieve promising results. 
 
The recent growth of Middle Eastern and North African countries (MENA) and their 
commercial banking system has increased the need of paying widespread 
attention to this region of the world. This thesis crucially identifies, and estimates, 
the robust determinants of credit ratings for MENA countries and their commercial 
banks, incorporating a set of bank level accounting and financial risk factors, as 
well as country-specific characteristics, including indicators for regulatory, 
supervision, legal and economic environments. The research contributes, firstly, to 
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the theoretical literature on credit ratings industry by reviewing extant 
methodologies specifically as they apply to banks and sovereign countries. 
Secondly, it conducts a systematic, cross-country empirical investigation using 
panel data econometric methodology for the purpose of estimating MENA 
countries sovereign and bank credit rating models. Thirdly, it provides tangible and 
statistically significant evidence on the different factors that determines the 
estimation of credit ratings and influencing bank's risk. 
 
The extant literature reviewed serves as a basis to achieve and develop the 
research aim, objectives and hypotheses of the thesis. The research then 
constructs an appropriate panel dataset from different sources, containing bank-
level and country-level information for a sample of 108 commercial banks covering 
13 MENA countries over the period 2000 - 2012. The methodological framework 
for estimating credit rating models (linear regression, logit and probit) is also 
reviewed and the procedures for panel data estimation are implemented using the 
econometric package STATA (version 13). All relevant data are drawn from public 
sources including Reuters, Bankscope, IMF and the World Bank. 
  
Using the random effects ordered probit and logit methodologies to estimate both 
sovereign (country) and bank level credit ratings models for the MENA countries, 
the evidence shows that real GDP growth, capital requirements, restrictions on 
banking activities and control of corruption all contribute negatively to the 
sovereign ratings. Furthermore, internal management and organisational 
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requirements is considered as an additional regulatory factor not studied in 
previous research. The statistically significant and inverse relationship of the latter 
is considered an important and interesting outcome of MENA countries’ sovereign 
ratings. On the other hand, GDP per capita, investment (as a percentage of GDP), 
political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law all reveal significant 
and positive impact on the sovereign credit ratings. 
 
In general, this research finds that improved macroeconomic conditions are 
correlated with higher ratings, while greater reserve regulations are correlated with 
lower ratings. The study also does find the significance of governance and 
regulatory variables plays a key role into the final credit rating. 
 
With regard to the impact on banks’ ratings, the results show that higher return on 
average assets and equity, larger bank size, more restrictions on bank activities, 
as well as higher official disciplinary power and higher standards of internal 
management, will yield higher credit ratings. Apart from having direct and positive 
impact on banks credit ratings, these variables are important for examining the 
risk-sharing incentives in MENA countries’ banks. In contrast, the estimation 
results indicate that net interest margin, net loans to deposits, liquid assets to 
deposits, capital requirements, deposit insurance scheme, liquidity requirements, 
unemployment rate and government effectiveness have an inverse and negative 




In general, this study also finds various financial, macroeconomic, and regulatory 
effects on banks’ credit ratings. To a much lesser extent than government ratings, 
various macroeconomic variables also helped predict banks’ ratings, including real 
GDP growth and the unemployment rate. 
 
The thesis concludes by arguing that the combined use of financial and non-
financial factors for estimating credit ratings models supports the relevant 
hypotheses examined and adds value to all stakeholders in improving and 
obtaining a better quality of credit ratings. This study also demonstrates that a 
diversity of bank-level and country-level factors influence the MENA sovereign and 
bank ratings differently, implying that policy makers, regulators alongside rating 
agencies should distinguish the different environmental factors between nations 
before any judgment and issuance can be model of the ratings. To conclude, there 
is no study which exclusively investigates credit rating models for the MENA region 
exploiting the richness of the data and methodology employed, and the current 
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The development of Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries is widely 
regarded as one of the biggest anomalies in the existing economics literature (Dahi 
and Demir, 2008). The region is renowned for a plethora of economics controversies. 
The existence of natural resources is not met with adequate levels of employment, 
growth or general development of the region. Several studies have provided a 
comparison of the growth pattern of MENA with other regions worldwide. (Makdisi, 
Fattah and Limam, 2003). 
 
Currently, MENA is one of the youngest regions of the world in terms of the average 
age of its population (Nabli, 2004). However, despite the increasing levels of 
education and higher expectations among young groups of the population, the 
current generation is frequently referred to as the “forgotten generation” (Nabli, 
2004). The level of economic development has decreased very rapidly compared to 
several centuries ago. MENA and specific areas within the region in particular used 
to attract higher levels of prosperity compared to their counterparts in Europe or Asia 
(Dahi and Demir, 2008). Furthermore, the current state of a banking system in the 
region is considered to slow down the economic development of MENA (Page, 2003; 
Yousef, 2004; Creane et al., 2007). Therefore, MENA countries and their banking 
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system would greatly benefit from the application and development of credit rating 
models. 
 
In recent years there have been sophisticated developments in the statistical 
techniques accompanied by availability of cross-country bank and country-level data 
which have generated increased interest in developing models to classify financial 
organisations into various credit rating groups. Additionally, researchers have always 
been building and updating statistical models to explain financial distress, and to 
estimate bond and credit ratings. 
 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) defines credit 
rating as “an opinion forecasting the creditworthiness of an entity, a credit 
commitment, a debt or debt-like security or an issuer of such obligations, expressed 
using an established and defined ranking system”, (IOSCO, 2004). 
 
This study aims to assess the impact of the economic environment and financial 
factors on bank’s and sovereign credit ratings for MENA countries. In analysing the 
impact of financial and non-financial factors on the banking sector efficiency, the 
study could provide useful policy information to obtain a better quality of credit 
ratings. 
 





1.2 History of Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Over the years credit rating agencies have played a key role in the financial literature 
and specifically in the study of credit ratings. There are a number of effective players 
in the credit rating industry, for example, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, Fitch IBCA, 
Thompson, Duff and Phelps, among others (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2004). Credit 
Rating Agencies (CRAs) originated in United States (US) in the 19th century. In 1841 
the first mercantile credit agency was founded in New York, which assessed the 
ability of merchants to meet their financial obligations. In 1909 John Moody initiated 
the securities rating business by rating US railroad bonds and then expanded his 
business to the rating of utility and industrial bonds.  
 
Other bond rating agencies soon followed, namely Poor’s Publishing Company in 
1916, Standard Statistics Company in 1922, both merging to Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P’s) in 1941, and Fitch Publishing Company in 1924 (Cantor and Packer, 1994). 
Since then rating agencies have also been established in other countries, yet the 
three US agencies, Moody’s Investor Service, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch 
ratings, have traditionally been leading the global rating industry and dominating the 
market share (Dittrich, 2007). 
 
The two leading US agencies, Moody’s Investors Services and Standard and Poor’s, 
assigned ratings on more than fifty sovereigns around the world. They use various 
macro-economic, social, environmental and political indicators in assessing 




These agencies first focused on US domestic industrial bond ratings but expanded 
their activities both product-wise and geographically after several decades. New 
rating products were developed such as bank loan ratings, bank financial strength 
ratings, issuer ratings and sovereign ratings. In addition, due to the increasing 
foreign demand, this led Moody’s and S&P’s to expand their services to rate 
European and Japanese domestic bonds. While domestic (non-US) rating agencies 
now also exist in other countries, both companies then proceeded to opening offices 
overseas and also acquiring local rating agencies (Dittrich; 2000, 2007). A so-called 
two-rating norm exists, usually issuers and issues are rated by both S&P and 
Moody’s (Cantor and Packer, 1994; Hunt, 2009). 
 
The responsibility of credit rating agencies is to analyse and evaluate the credit-
worthiness of corporate and sovereign issuers of debt securities. Also these 
agencies are responsible for assessing the credit risk for most banks and 
organisations around the world, and individual investors as well as regulators have 
extremely relied on credit ratings provided by these agencies for the object of quality 
ratings for financial instruments. Kerwer (2001) defined credit rating agencies as 
information intermediaries between investors and financial instruments since these 
agencies estimate and provide investors with ratings that describe the credit-
worthiness of borrowers. 
 
External rating agencies have been well established since the beginning of last 
century. Most empirical studies estimating bank or country credit ratings models 
generally use data on ratings assigned by one (or more) of the above agencies. The 
process of these agencies is based on quantitative and qualitative assessment 
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reviewed by a rating committee. In recent times, quantitative statistical models based 
on publicly available data have been used extensively in estimating credit ratings 
(Afonso et al., 2007; Pasiouras et al., 2006).  
 
Furthermore, credit rating agencies have different ways and policies in measuring 
banks and country’s ratings. Despite credit risk being an important factor influencing 
the investor's decision, other factors play a role, too, such as market price and risk 
preferences (Hunt, 2009). These ratings represent not absolute but relative 
probabilities of default, higher rated issuers and issues are supposed to be more 
creditworthy and default less frequently than those with a lower rating (Standard and 
Poor’s, 2009a; Hunt, 2009). The major agencies employ letter based rating scales 
for long-term debt in measuring credit risk; every rating scale in Moody’s has its 
counterpart in Standard and Poor’s and Fitch as illustrated in Table (1.1) below. 
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Generally, the above rating symbols have specific meanings regarding the grade, 
credit risk and credit quality. For example, an organisation that holds a symbol rating 
of 'AAA' based on S&P’s and Fitch or 'Aaa' based on Moody’s ratings denotes the 
highest rating and will be classified as an investment-grade, having the lowest of 
potential credit risk and the highest of credit quality. In contrast, an organisation that 
holds a symbol rating of 'C/D' indicates default and will be classified as a junk-grade, 
having a default or the highest credit risk with a default or the lowest of credit quality. 
Fitch IBCA rating agency as well as S&P additionally modifies the ratings from 'AA' 
to 'CCC' with a minus or plus sign, which allows for an expression of relative 
standing in the respective rating category (Standard and Poor’s, 2009b). 
 
Even though rating agencies have developed a diverse range of rating products, the 
basic ratings remain issuer and issue credit ratings, encompassing both short-term 
and long-term ratings. The analysis in this study will focus on the foreign long-term 
issuer credit ratings assigned by Fitch for MENA banks and by Standard and Poor’s 
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While rating agencies publish their rating methodologies, their precise underlying 
assumptions and weighting of factors remain undisclosed. Cantor and Mann (2009) 
believed that although the transparency in rating methodologies which could 
contribute to mitigate the adverse impact on the market, it never fully eliminates such 
problem. On the contrary, Holmstrong (2008) classified markets in two categories; 
markets for liquidity and markets for risk-sharing. He concluded that the 
transparency in credit ratings does not affect the market liquidity. 
 
However, credit rating agencies take a wide range of factors into consideration in 
their assessments. These not only concern characteristics of the rated entity itself, 
but are additionally related to the environment it operates in. Moreover, agencies 
recognise that financial firms differ from non-financial firms. Accordingly, their rating 
methodologies take the particular nature of banks into account (Le Bras and 
Andrews, 2004; Vuong, 2007). First, among financial factors particular weight is laid 
on asset quality (Shin and Moore, 2003). Second, the banking environment is 
attributed a key role for the operations and performance of banks (Le Bras and 
Andrews, 2004; Standard and Poor’s, 2004b). 
 
1.3 Overall Aim and Specific Objectives 
 
Any specific research requires planning through the identification of the research aim 
and objectives which extend hypothesis model approach that brings individual and 





Grunert, Norden and Weber (2005) explored the role of non-financial factors in 
internal credit ratings and found that the combined use of financial and non-financial 
factors leads to a more accurate prediction of future default events than the single 
use of each of these factors. Therefore, this study is aiming to combine the use of 
financial factors and non-financial factors to estimate credit rating models for MENA 
countries and their commercial banks. The combination of both factors will give an 
accurate picture of MENA bank’s credit risk assessment. 
 
Specifically, the aim of this research is to estimate credit rating models (linear 
regression, logit and probit) for MENA countries and their commercial banks over the 
period (2000 – 2012), incorporating a set of bank-level accounting and financial risk 
characteristics, as well as country-level indicators, including regulatory, supervision, 
economic environments and the worldwide aggregate governance. The specific 
objectives are: 
 
• Objective (1): Undertake a critical review of extant methodologies and 
evidence on credit rating models, specifically as they apply to banks and 
sovereign countries. 
• Objective (2): Conduct empirical analysis using panel data methodology 
for estimating bank and country credit rating models for MENA countries.  
• Objective (3): Analyse the policy implications with regard to the risk-
sharing incentives for MENA countries’ banks through an informed 




Thus, to achieve the above objectives, three general hypotheses are emerged from 
the literature review to be tested in the analysis of this research. The hypotheses are 
stated as follows: 
 
• Bank-level accounting/financial ratios have a statistically significant 
influence on MENA country banks’ credit ratings. 
• Country-level indicators for regulatory, legal and economic environments 
have a statistically significant influence on MENA country banks credit 
ratings. 
• Country-level indicators for regulatory, legal and economic environments 
have a statistically significant influence on MENA countries aggregate 
credit ratings. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The methodological framework is designed to apply panel data econometric 
methodology, using ordinary least square, random effects ordered probit and random 
effects ordered logit for the purpose of estimating credit rating models for a set of 
MENA countries and banks. In particular, the object is to consistently identify robust 
determinants of credit ratings incorporating, where appropriate, a set of bank-level 
accounting/financial ratios and country-level indicators for regulatory, legal and 
economic environments, which has not been undertaken before in a separate study 
for this region, and to assess the risk-shifting incentives of these countries’ banks 




The appropriate methodological framework for panel data estimation with limited 
dependent variable is examined by Afonso et al. (2007), and their setting allows for 
modelling unobserved country-specific effects that are correlated with the random 
error term, thus avoiding the use of more complicated instrumental variable 
estimation. Their estimation procedure is implemented in the econometric package 
STATA. Similar statistical package which essentially requires input of quantitative 
data will be utilised for the empirical analysis. 
 
In this study, a comprehensive datasets were collected for the available of MENA 
countries and banks over the period (2000 – 2012). The Bank-level variables 
represent the bank size and financial ratios, including profitability, capital strength 
liquidity and asset quality. The country-level variables represent macro-economic 
influences such as inflation and GDP, as well as regulatory, supervision and 
governance indicators. The majority of data are collected from several sources, 
these are; Central Banks of MENA countries, Bankscope database for bank-level 
financial ratios, Reuter’s database for the country and bank level credit ratings, and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the World Bank (WB) databases for 
country-level data. 
 
More specifically bank level accounting and financial data was drawn from 
Bankscope database, as used by Pasiouras et al. (2006). Their dataset for 12 MENA 
countries’ commercial banks and relevant country level regulatory variables is the 
starting point for this study, and this dataset will be extended with additional 
regulatory and governance indicators available from the World Bank (Barth et al., 
2001; Kaufmann et al., 2006). Also, Bankscope and other sources (Reuters) will 
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provide additional commercial bank level data and the credit ratings for MENA 
countries and their commercial banks. Hence, for the empirical analysis, the 
researcher has undertaken an extensive manual task of scaling the Fitch (for banks) 
and Standard and Poor’s (for countries) foreign long-term issuer rating information 
available in qualitative form by scaling it appropriately in quantitative form. This is 
done by linear transformation of these qualitative symbol data, so as to be suitable 
for both ordered logit, ordered probit and linear estimation. The rationale behind 
studying credit ratings and using the transformation scaling procedures are 
explained in chapter (5) for MENA countries and chapter (6) for MENA banks. 
Moreover, Islamic banks operating under “Sharia law” will be recognised from 
Bankscope and the central banks of each of the MENA countries, and will also be 
distinguished from others using the dummy variable approach.  
 
1.5 Importance of the Study 
1.5.1 The Pivotal Role of Credit Ratings 
 
Credit rating agencies act as information intermediaries. There are different functions 
of credit ratings; firstly, it can be used as a technology tool to alleviate asymmetric 
information problems between borrowers and lenders. Secondly, it also can attract 
investors with useful information at a low cost and allow them to take a calculated 
amount of risk. In other words, credit ratings can encourage investors to invest in 
corporate securities and get the potential of high return investments. Thirdly, credit 
ratings can improve and enhance the company’s brand image or market image, so 
when companies have high credit ratings, then they can enter the market strongly 
with high confidence, and this will enable them to raise funds at cheaper rates. This 
means that credit ratings have gained in importance as a regulatory tool, so fair use 
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of these ratings  will raise, motivate and strengthen the financial market and the 
economic growth as a whole (Kumar and Bhattacharya, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, Bank of England (2007) affirmed that CRAs help avoid asymmetric 
information problem in capital markets between companies and investors and ratings 
could deal with the problem of collective action between dispersed investors. Fridson 
(1999) had a similar viewpoint. He argued that these agencies help investors ''pierce 
the fog of asymmetric information from issuers''. Ultimately, credit ratings are 
incorporated into the financial system, and have become an essential feature of 
financial intermediaries. As a result, numerous pieces of research study the credit 
ratings and credit agencies. 
 
In general views according to Partnoy (2006), in the US legal context ratings are 
pivotal factors and it allows CRAs to be protected from civil and criminal liability. 
Moreover, Partnoy (2006) was inclined to think that CRAs are likely to be “gate 
openers” for both issuers and investors as it delivers sufficient and transparent 
information and reflects a clear picture of the firm's position. However, Cantor and 
Mann (2009) brought opinion that credit ratings are stable than “point-in-time” 
ratings. The characteristics “point-in-time” is temporary and based on short-term 
ratings; it also could skip some potential risk factors that can enhance the decision 
making for investments. Joint Forum3 (2009) pointed out five main purposes of credit 
3 The Joint Forum was established in 1996 under the aegis of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) to deal with issues common to the banking, 
securities and insurance sectors, including the regulation of financial conglomerates. The Joint Forum 
is comprised of an equal number of senior bank, insurance and securities supervisors representing 
each supervisory constituency. The Joint Forum (2009) received a total of 17 surveys from member 
authorities, representing 26 separate agencies from 12 different countries and five response 




                                                 
ratings including; determining capital requirement, identifying or classifying assets, 
providing credible evaluation of credit risk, determining disclosure requirements and 
prospectus eligibility. Such above targets re-confirmed the inevitable role of credit 
ratings in the financial market. Fridson (1999) noted that competent in the financial 
markets have enough knowledge to obtain the understanding of credit ratings but 
there are some less knowledgeable participants who are not specialised in finance 
need to understand the concept of these ratings as an insurance to avoid errant 
behaviour of their issuers. 
 
However, regarding the impact of credit ratings on financial markets and security 
prices, Cantor and Mann (2009) pointed out that rating downgrades could bring 
systemic effect to financial markets. Moreover, they also provided that there are two 
cases of credit ratings that could significantly affect security prices; firstly, the change 
of rating creates significant information about fundamental credit risk. Secondly, 
even without bringing new information, issuers can be penalised, for example, it is 
difficult for issuers to have access on credit. Similarly, Jewell and Livingston (1999) 
also assumed that the changes of ratings provide important information about the 
financial markets and security prices. In addition, Brunnemeier (2008) considered the 
systemic risk of ratings. He indicated that the downgrade of monoline insurers could 
lead to the downgrade of hundreds of insurance bonds and other products. 
 
The role of credit ratings was also confirmed by Gorton (2008), he assumed that one 
of the significant factors leading to crisis is lack of credit information between parties 
and thus, sufficient information of credit ratings are useful tool to solve such problem. 
Freixas and Shapiro (2009), Bolton et al. (2012), Mathis et al. (2008), Pagano and 
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Volpin (2008), Skreta and Veldkamp (2008) and Benmelech and Dlugosz (2010) 
present evidence that ratings (issuers choose CRAs to get the highest rating) plays a 
significant role in the financial crisis. Peyrache and Quesada (2009) also presented 
their point of view about shopping for good ratings. They ascertained that the 
competition between CRAs could facilitate for issuers to suppress their ratings. With 
a different opinion, Figlewski and White (1995) and Jorion (1995) assumed that such 
moral hazard in CRAs is not widespread because the purpose of these agencies is 
to protect their reputations. 
 
1.5.2 Rationale for Studying Credit Ratings 
 
The business of predicting credit ratings for banks and countries is generally very 
costly and normally done by international rating agencies (Huang et al., 2004). Credit 
rating agencies such as; Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s invest a huge time along 
with hundreds of employees from different departments for the purpose of making 
deep analysis for firms in order to predict credit ratings to satisfy the market’s needs, 
and to provide investors with comprehensive information, as they require these 
assessments and credit risk that reflects the real picture of firm’s (Huang et al., 
2004). However, because of the need in utilising employees’ skills for predicting 
credit ratings and because of the huge cost that involves in this situation, not all 
rating agencies or specific companies are able to update their ratings on a yearly 
basis, and if they are able to do so, they still not able to cover the required expenses 
of doing this job satisfactorily. 
 
Additionally, recent studies show evidence of differences in measuring rating scales 
across agencies, for example, an issuer which is being evaluated as high ratings by 
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Fitch, Duff and Phelp’s credit agencies, is also being evaluated as low ratings by 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s agencies. On the other hand, different studies 
such as (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Ammer and Packer, 2000) found similarities in 
estimating ratings by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s which have been issued for 
investment grade ratings. However, the changes in ratings are happening due to the 
fact that some credit agencies have included different variables in the estimation 
process than other agencies when they rate an issuer. Consequently, this study is 
therefore valuable and important to the practitioners, academicians, investors and 
the market itself on one side, also to the international agencies on the other side in 
order for them to re-evaluate and consider more effective explanatory variables to be 
included into their assessments for the prediction of ratings in the future. 
 
Doumpos and Pasiouras (2005) stated that researchers along with practitioners have 
constructed studies on the credit rating industry. The majority of these studies have 
focused on three different areas; external ratings of the large agencies by (Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch), bonds (Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; Belkaoui, 1983; 
Kim, 1993) and commercial papers (Peavy and Edgar, 1984; Chandy and Duett, 
1990). However, not as much attention has been given to extend some models in 
estimating and explaining the risk estimates of specialised and regional agencies 
(Laitinen, 1999), which this could be as a research gap within the literature review.   
 
1.5.3 Rationale for Studying Banks in MENA Region  
 
MENA is an economically diverse region that covers both the oil-rich economies in 
the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar and countries that are resource-
16 
 
scarce in relation to population, such as Egypt, Morocco and Yemen. Each of these 
countries has a long and rich history as well as strong individual characteristics.  
 
Different organisations define MENA as consisting of different territories (Dumper, 
Michael, Stanley and Bruce, 2007). According to the World Bank, there are 21 
MENA countries4, however in April 2013, the International Monetary Fund created 
new analytical definitions of MENA; these are called MENAP including Pakistan and 
MENAT including Turkey. These terms MENAP as well as MENAT have become 
widely used by businesses to formally consider in the list of MENA region (IMF, 
2013). 
 
The empirical analysis in this study will involve 13 countries depending on credit 
ratings data that is extracted from Thomson Reuters Eikon Database. Countries 
such as;  Algeria, Djibouti, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Malta, Syrian 
Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen have been 
excluded from this study, due to the unavailability of credit ratings data. We use data 
for a period as 13 years because of the limitations of available data, which means 
that study conclusions may be affected by the economic conditions of this period. 
 
The banking sector has been selected because it is an interactive environment, with 
dynamic changes and aggressive forces, such as competition. Besides, recent 
financial crises in the world have highlighted that banks may experience major 
4 The MENA region as identified by the World Bank Database covers Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, 





                                                 
problems which cause a potential threat to all stakeholders of the industry and lead 
some countries unpleasant and suffer with their economy. For example, Anzoategui, 
Peria and Rocha (2010) revealed that the competition within banking sector in MENA 
region is lagging behind other regions in the world. They suggest that the reason 
behind this is due to the poor credit information environment and low market 
contestability in the region, leading to a further threat on the banks safety and 
soundness. Furthermore, Elkhoury (2008) stated that the overreactions in credit 
ratings are known to have exaggerated the financial crises in the past and thus have 
contributed to financial instability. These overreactions can also be magnified by the 
current poor level of credit information that is present in the region. 
 
Due to the lack of competition between commercial banks within MENA countries 
and the lack of existing research that investigates the impact of bank-level and 
country-level factors on banks’ credit ratings in MENA region, this study is 
constructed to concentrate on those countries by re-evaluating the banking sector as 
a whole, and by estimating sovereign and banks credit rating models. Therefore, 
developing models that could predict the importance of factors on credit ratings of 
countries as well as commercial banks seem more important than ever to be 
investigated. 
 
The existing body of knowledge on the banks’ performance seems to be very 
fragmented with authors focusing on particular elements of the operations. For 
example, a study conducted by Pasiouras, Liadaki and Zopounidis (2008) confirms a 
direct relationship between technical efficiency and returns of the institutions. 
Another approach proposed by Gaganis and Pasiouras (2007) focuses on the 
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accounting and disclosure requirements and their impact on credit analysis. 
However, as pointed out by Grigorian and Manole (2002), an analysis of multiple 
functions performed by banks is necessary for a full assessment of their operations. 
 
Furthermore, the performance of commercial banks can be linked to wider 
implications including the economic growth and as such, the banking sector has 
attracted a significant amount of attention from academics (Grigorian and Manole, 
2002). The current state of banking sector is characterised by increasing 
deregulation and technological change yielding rapid innovations; however, the 
extent of these processes varies markedly between different regions. The current 
stage of development and financial performance of the MENA region will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
The banking sector in the MENA region is of particular interest to academics due to 
its unique nature. High concentration of the institutions combined with high market 
share of state banks is characteristic for the countries in the region. The study of 
commercial banks in this region is therefore to provide practical implications not only 
for investors and creditors but also to policy makers in order to maximise the 
effectiveness of the financial system and thus promote the economic growth in the 
countries. 
 
1.5.4 Contribution of the Study 
 
The literature that examines the impact of financial bank characteristics as well as 
non-financial indicators such as; country economic, aggregate governance and 
regulatory and supervision on banks’ credit ratings is in general limited. After 
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reviewing the existing literature, there is no study that been utilised the above 
variables to estimate sovereign and banks credit rating models especially for MENA 
region alone. Therefore, this research represents an advance on the current 
literature in the following respects: 
 
Firstly, it undertakes a cross-country analysis of 108 commercial banks from 13 
MENA countries over the period 2000-2012. No previous research on credit rating 
models for MENA countries has undertaken this comprehensive coverage. 
Furthermore, the data coverage for this study is most up-to-date. 
 
Secondly, the empirical analysis incorporates a comprehensive set of bank-level 
financial information as well as country-level economic data. The unique aspect of 
this study is the associated development of both bank and country based credit 
rating models for the MENA countries. 
 
Finally, while the research makes use of established econometric techniques (linear 
regression, logit and probit) commonly used in the estimation of credit rating models, 
the study is focussed on identifying a set of cross-sectional determinants influencing 
both bank and country credit ratings. To this effect, the study extends previous 
research at cross-country level by incorporating the influence of both regulatory and 
the world aggregate governance indicators on credit ratings for the MENA countries 






1.6 Outline of the Study 
 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive background to understand the research 
area, leading to the formulation of the objectives that will serve the general aim of the 
research; it also presented a brief discussion on the methodological framework and 
the data sources. Besides, it has sought to justify why this research has been 
undertaken to estimate the credit rating models for MENA countries and their 
commercial banks, and how the current work is expected to contribute to the existing 
body of knowledge regarding the literature review and methodology. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows; the second chapter includes two 
main parts, the first part overviews the history and development of MENA region and 
its economy, specifically it concentrates on issues such as; governance, regulations 
and structure reforms that are placed within MENA countries. This part also outlines 
the performance and competition of banks that operate under this region. The 
second part of this chapter reviews existing literature concerning the banking stability 
and risk-taking incentives. In particular, it investigates the impact of factors such as; 
bank’s characteristics, market structure, macro-economic, political and legal 
environment on the risk-taking incentives as well as stability of banks. 
 
The third chapter represents the theoretical literature review relating to the 
assessment of credit rating agencies as well as credit rating models that could be 
estimated through the impact of different factors (i.e. efficiency, macro-economic 
environment, corporate governance, regulation and supervision requirements) on the 
banks’ and sovereigns’ credit ratings. Therefore, the literature appears to have two 
strands of studies; the first strand covers studies that have evaluated and assessed 
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the role of credit rating agencies, and the second strand reviews empirical studies 
that have examined and estimated sovereign and banks credit/debt rating models. 
 
The fourth chapter offers an exhaustive coverage of the methodological framework 
for the estimation of rating models. This chapter initially discusses the related 
research methods (e.g. stages, approaches, validity and reliability) and identifies the 
dependent with independent variables for sampling the datasets. The next stage in 
this chapter deals with the data sources and research data collection process; firstly, 
collecting data for the dependant variable of banks and country’s credit rating 
symbols for MENA region over the period 2000-2012. Secondly, collecting data for 
the independent variables, this is related to the bank specific financial data and a 
broad range of country-level variables such as; macro-economic, governance, 
regulation and supervision. The last stage of this chapter gives explanations about 
an econometric techniques and the selection estimation models such as; linear 
regression (e.g. fixed effect, random effect and ordinary least square methods) and 
logistic regression (e.g. logit and probit methods) specifically as they apply for 
examining banks and sovereign credit ratings. 
 
Chapter (5) and (6) will present and discuss the empirical analysis of the thesis; this 
is the prediction of rating models for MENA countries and their commercial banks. 
Firstly, these chapters will start to construct the preliminary and descriptive analysis 
on both countries and banks datasets using appropriate testing of the hypotheses 
using econometric methods. Then, to locate the most significant variables that can 
be impacted on countries and bank’s credit ratings. The datasets concerning 
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countries and bank’s ratings will be analysed employing STATA version 13 
computer’s software. 
 
In particular, chapter 5 is the first empirical analysis of a detailed examination of 
country-level data on MENA country’s credit ratings. By using multiple linear 
regression (i.e. ordinary least square method) besides logit and probit methods for a 
balanced and/or unbalanced sample, this chapter will be a key part to 
comprehensively test the country level hypothesis for this study, to find out the 
determinants and relationships between the recognised variables and country’s 
credit ratings, and to discuss the evidence and robustness of the findings. 
 
Chapter 6 is the second empirical analysis to be constructed for the purpose of 
investigating the impact of bank-level and country-level data on MENA bank’s credit 
ratings. By employing linear and logistic regressions (i.e. ordinary least square, 
ordered logit and ordered probit models) for a balanced and/or unbalanced sample, 
this chapter seeks to analyse the key determinants that will influence bank’s credit 
ratings. In doing so, the hypothesis related to this part will be tested and specific 
objectives of the study will be achieved. 
 
Finally, the seventh chapter concludes the study by providing a summary of the main 
findings, offering some recommendations to avoid low credit ratings, and suggesting 
extra issues that could be considered for the estimation of countries and bank’s 
rating models in the further. Besides, this chapter is in charge of discussing the 
policy implications with regard to the quality use of credit ratings and the risk-shifting 
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incentives for MENA banks through the significant factors which would be affecting 



























OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FOR MENA 





The main purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of MENA countries and their 
commercial banks. Firstly, an introductory section covers the history and 
development of MENA region and its economy. Secondly, the discussion will move 
on to outline issues such as; governance, regulations and structure reforms that are 
placed under MENA countries and their banking sectors. Thirdly, the banking system 
that operates under this region will be discussed; this section will focus on the bank’s 
performance and competition within MENA countries. Then, this chapter will shed 
lights on the banking stability, banks risk and the impact of several factors including; 
bank’s characteristics, market structure, macroeconomic, political and legal 
environment on the risk-taking incentives as well as stability of banks. 
 
The current academic debate revolves mainly around three major topics; these are 
inward looking economic policies, lack of international integration, low development 
of financial sectors and lack of human capital development (Dahi and Demir, 2008). 
History and development of MENA and their commercial banks offers some insight 




The countries in the MENA region have adopted different models of development in 
1950s and 60s. The in-efficiencies of these models are becoming more and more 
apparent and a growing realisation can be found in these countries regarding the 
need for different development paths in order to achieve the national objectives 
(Nabli, 2004). Furthermore, the occurrence of large volumes of natural resources, oil 
in particular, suggests that the region could become a leader in the economic growth 
again. However, it is the large volume of natural resources that has ultimately led to 
the region’s economic downturn. The whole economies of particular countries and 
their growth are determined by the fluctuations in oil prices (Dahi and Demir, 2008). 
For almost four decades now, governments in MENA region have been forced to 
implement systematic changes in public policies in order to restore macroeconomic 
stability (Page, 2003). While the structural adjustment programmes supervised by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have achieved some success, 
some of the underlying issues are still present. 
 
The public investment in MENA has been found significantly higher than in other 
regions (Page, 2003) and no substantial changes have been recorded since the start 
of the structural adjustment programmes. Furthermore, Page (2003) concluded that 
the top performing economies in the region were actually reducing the level of 
worldwide integration. The isolation of MENA countries has been enhanced through 
the implementation of pervasive restrictions on imports and increasing tariffs (Page, 
2003). 
 
The inward looking perspective of MENA countries can be found in particular 
privatization strategies adopted. The privatization has started substantially later 
when compared to other world regions; however, the bigger problems arise from its 
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low effectiveness. For example, Tunisia has been one of the first countries in MENA 
to begin privatization efforts. The early momentum of the adopted programme has 
been however lost and the majority of the privatization projects are still not 
completed. Moreover, Page (2003) concluded that financial institutions lag even 
further behind the privatization efforts in other sectors. 
 
The long-term capital necessary for private investment projects is virtually non-
existent in MENA (Dahi and Demir, 2008) and thus limits the opportunities for 
growth. Academics have pointed out the necessity of a substantial reform in the near 
future (e.g. Yousef, 2004) in order to drive the economic growth of the countries. 
Furthermore, Yousef (2004) argued that MENA countries should aim for the 
development of the private sector, integration into the international trade and a lower 
dependence on oil. While the majority of these studies focus on the need to attract 
foreign investments, the concept of macro-economic stability and its impact on the 
economic growth has been emphasized by Jallab, Gbakou and Sandretto (2008). 
Despite the ongoing debate in the academia, no reforms have resulted in any 
substantial changes to the above described elements up to this date. According to 
Cardoso and Levine (1998), the reforms in MENA countries are particularly slow due 
to medium-nature of the problems and the occurrence of the oil shocks. 
 
It is worth mentioning that particular differences exist in the definition of the region as 
well as particular differences can be found within the region itself. The lack of a 
unified definition of MENA has resulted in the fact that various researchers and 
institutions tend to include particular countries that are not associated with this region 
in other studies. Two of the most controversial countries appear to be Turkey and 
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Sudan. While Turkey is often used as a positive example of the region, Sudan 
seems to be dragging the performance scores down. Particular differences between 
individual studies therefore need to be acknowledged. Furthermore, individual 
countries within the region vary significantly which limits the validity of general 
solutions proposed. Recently, Dahi and Demir (2008) distinguish between five 
groups of countries in MENA. A very brief comparison of the first group consisting of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 
and the last group consisting of Sudan and Yemen demonstrates the limitations 
associated with studies that consider MENA as a unified block. While the first group 
consists of oil rich states that import labour, the last group can be characterised by 
almost no natural resources. Obvious differences can be found in macro-economic 
indicators such as GDP or income per capita. 
 
Furthermore, Page (2003) made a distinction between the Gulf States and other 
countries in the study of economic growth, further differences can be found in the 
study of banks’ performance conducted by Farazi, Feyen and Rocha (2011). The 
latter study differentiated between countries in which state banks play a dominant 
role and those in which private banks lead financial intermediation. The distinction is 
very different from the one adopted by Page (2003) and goes even further by 
suggesting differences between groups of countries based on the role of state banks 
(negligible/intermediate). 
 
While several common features can be found in the history and development of 
MENA and their commercial banks, the performance of the region should not be 
generalised as there may be substantial differences between particular countries. 
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2.2 Financial Health and Status  
 
As background, the following Table (2.1) inspects four World Development Indicators 
commonly associated with the financial health of a given country. On the left is the 
year of the reported IMF indicator.  Every other year since 2005 was chosen simply 
for presentation purposes. 
 
Four indicators are reported. The first is debt forgiveness of reduction. The second is 
debt service on external debt, long-term. The third is domestic credit provided by the 
financial sector. The fourth is domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of 
GDP. There is some wide variation between these four indicators, which might 
provide some background insight into the reasons behind ratings differential. 
 
On the first – debt forgiveness or reduction – this measure could capture risk 
associated with actual default. As indicated, debt forgiveness or reductions do not 
happen often. For the countries shown, none occurred in 2005.  In 2007, Jordan saw 
$14,000 in debt forgiveness and Pakistan saw $1.3 million. The remaining countries 
experienced no debt restructuring. Interestingly, the data set comprises only two 
other instances of debt forgiveness or reduction. These two instances occurred in 
2011 in Turkey for $13.6 million and in 2013 in Jordan for $201,000. It would be 
unsurprising to find debt forgiveness and/or reduction as a significant factor in 
explaining ratings in that debt forgiveness or reduction represent the actual 
experience of default probability. In the case of Pakistan, the one occurrence is 




The second indicator is debt service on external debt, long term. This represents a 
measure of the debt burden for a given country. The indicator matters in that more 
highly indebted countries have a higher likelihood of defaulting on their debts. The 
most debt-laden country of those shown is Turkey at $56 billion in 2013, an increase 
of about $25 billion since 2005.  Pakistan has debt of $4.3 billion, about $2.2 billion 
above where the amount of debt stood in 2005. Unsurprisingly, given the amount 
debt expanded across the globe in response to the global financial crisis, the 
countries shown exhibit large expansions in debt service obligations. It will be 
interesting to watch how dealing with the massive debt expansion affects the political 
and ratings landscape in the years ahead. 
 
The third indicator shown is domestic credit provided by the financial sector as a 
percentage of GDP. As with debt service, this measure varies widely. In 2013, this 
measure ranges from a low of -8% in Saudi Arabia to 188% in Lebanon. Pakistan 
comes in closer to the bottom at 49%. This measure provides an indication of how 
fluid and active the financial sector is at providing credit to the domestic economy. 
 
The fourth measure is domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. 
This measure is presented as a gauge of a given country’s indebtedness and its 
availability to repay such debt. As with the two aforementioned measures, this 
measure varies widely as well, with a low of 16% in Pakistan and a high of 99% in 
Lebanon. Interestingly, of the countries shown, Pakistan has the greatest room to 
expand its debt burden if needs be, with a low debt per GDP, a reasonable amount 





Table (2.1): Selected World Development Indicators Related to Financial Health 
 
  Indicator Name 




Debt service on 
external debt, long-











(% of GDP) 
2005 Bahrain   42 44 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 2,142,667,000 98 51 
Israel   78 90 
Jordan 0 527,591,000 110 88 
Kuwait   62 58 
Lebanon 0 3,458,939,000 181 70 
Morocco 0 2,707,346,000 73 46 
Oman   28 31 
Pakistan 0 2,137,211,000 46 29 
Saudi Arabia   29 35 
Tunisia 0 1,872,590,000 64 58 
Turkey 0 31,045,411,000 46 22 
United Arab Emirates   43 44 
2007 Bahrain   48 53 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 2,741,706,000 84 46 
Israel   83 93 
Jordan -14,000 666,234,000 114 92 
Kuwait   69 66 
Lebanon 0 4,508,578,000 185 75 
Morocco 0 3,914,657,000 90 58 
Oman   33 36 
Pakistan -1,300,000 2,380,986,000 45 28 
Saudi Arabia   16 37 
Tunisia 0 2,330,435,000 64 58 
Turkey 0 42,016,835,000 49 29 
United Arab Emirates   60 56 
2009 Bahrain   71 71 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 2,828,134,000 75 36 
Israel   81 89 
Jordan 0 579,432,000 105 76 
Kuwait   87 85 
Lebanon 0 4,570,222,000 162 73 
Morocco 0 3,386,937,000 100 65 
Oman   40 47 
Pakistan 0 3,160,287,000 47 23 
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Saudi Arabia   1 46 
Tunisia 0 2,049,917,000 68 62 
Turkey 0 60,077,593,000 65 39 
United Arab Emirates   103 84 
2011 Bahrain   72 69 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 3,406,889,000 75 31 
Israel    89 
Jordan 0 790,104,000 107 74 
Kuwait   55 62 
Lebanon 0 5,234,085,000 174 90 
Morocco 0 3,193,571,000 111 72 
Oman   33 40 
Pakistan 0 2,448,770,000 43 18 
Saudi Arabia   -4 34 
Tunisia 0 2,583,268,000 83 76 
Turkey -13,614,000 50,670,397,000 72 53 
United Arab Emirates   84 64 
2013 Bahrain   79 69 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 3,320,529,000 86 28 
Israel     
Jordan -201,000 812,148,000 112 72 
Kuwait     
Lebanon 0 3,419,382,000 188 99 
Morocco 0 5,012,248,000 116 70 
Oman   36 42 
Pakistan 0 4,275,132,000 49 16 
Saudi Arabia   -8 40 
Tunisia 0 2,370,512,000 83 76 
Turkey 0 56,241,194,000 84 70 
United Arab Emirates     
 
2.3 Governance, Regulation and Structure Reforms 
 
All of the MENA countries and their respective banking sectors are characterised by 
a single supervisory body in the form of a central bank (Barth et al., 2002). The topic 
of regulatory structure in banking industry has attracted a significant amount of 
attention from the academics; however, the debate has failed to reach any clear 
conclusions and is still perceived as under-researched (Abrams and Taylor, 2001). 
The benefits of single regulatory body, usually in the form of a central bank, include 
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the ability to operate more efficiently, ability to avoid the gaps within complex 
financial companies (Briault, 1999) and the possession of more power to enforce a 
disciplinary action (Giddy, 1994). Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999) therefore 
concluded that a system in which the central bank supervises banks is more efficient 
as it can prevent and mitigate crises. Similar findings have been pointed out in the 
research conducted by Barth et al. (2002) who showed that banks tend to have less 
non-performing loans in countries where they are supervised by a central bank. On 
the other hand, the countries with multiple supervisory bodies have been found to 
have lower capital ratios and higher liquidity risk (Barth et al., 2002). Opposing view 
has been presented by Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) who have linked the 
supervision by a central bank with the pursuit of overly loose monetary policies and 
negative effects on the perceptions of the central bank. 
 
Generally, regulations put in place have been linked with both the banks’ efficiency 
and the likelihood of banking crises (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 1999). Despite the 
fact that a high level of regulation is frequently associated with a lower possibility of 
crisis, Barth, Caprio and Levine (1998) pointed out that this relationship may actually 
be reversed in the banking sector. Similar findings have been found by other authors 
(e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2005). Also, in a 
different study by Barth, Caprio and Levine (1999), they confirmed the above 
argument and argued that the existence of tighter restrictions placed on banks’ 
activities, the more inefficient banks become and are subjected to a greater 
likelihood of a crisis. As a result, the relatively low level of restrictions on the banks’ 
activities may actually strengthen the banks’ position (Boyd, Chang and Smith, 1998) 
rather than result in a crisis. Islamic banks present in MENA are very specific in this 
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aspect. The very basis of an Islamic bank lies in the bank’s investment portfolio that 
goes beyond the traditional view adopted in Europe and the US (Ali, 2011). 
Therefore, in line with the existing literature, the banking industry in MENA is 
supposed to be more efficient due to the looser restrictions placed on securities 
activities. On the other hand, MENA is characterised by substantial entry barriers 
which limit competition in the banking sector and as such have a destabilizing effect 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003). 
 
Until recently, a vast majority of the businesses in MENA countries were Family 
Owned Enterprises or State Owned Enterprises (Saidi, 2004; Institute of Directors in 
Lebanon). While some similarities can be found in the process of financial reforms in 
particular MENA countries, Naceur, Ben-Khedhiri and Casu (2011) failed to observe 
similarities in the outcomes of these reforms. The efficiency levels of banks in five 
studied countries namely; Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon and Tunisia were found 
to differ significantly. The MENA Regional Corporate Governance Working Group 
report produced by the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in 2003 
outlines particular differences between countries depending on the level of the 
sophistication of their financial sectors. Two corporate governance approaches can 
be found in the form of securities market (e.g. Egypt) and banking (e.g. Lebanon) 
perspective. According to the CIPE report, Jordan is one of the very few examples of 
the countries in the region that is currently developing the corporate governance by 
integrating with the rest of the world. These differences among particular countries 
were found to translate into the variations in terms of efficiency in the MENA stock 




Both domestic and foreign private banks operate in the region; however, their 
importance varies between particular countries. During the last three decades, the 
role of state banks has declined substantially in most regions world-wide (Farazi, 
Feyen and Rocha, 2011). Despite this overall trend, some countries especially in the 
Middle East, North Africa and South Asia can still be characterised by a leading role 
in financial intermediation taken by the state bank. While the strong presence of 
state banks has been associated with several advantages including the ability to 
address market imperfections stemming from information asymmetry, other methods 
addressing the same issues can be found in the introduction of credit guarantee 
schemes. Farazi, Feyen and Rocha (2011) went even further and argued that such 
schemes are actually more effective than the presence of the state banks. 
 




Banking sectors of MENA countries are very specific in terms of their characteristics 
of ownership, structure and growth potential (Turk-Ariss, 2009). The dominant 
position of state banks in MENA has slightly decreased over the last decade and 
their shares have been taken by both domestic and foreign private banks. The 
findings of the study conducted by Farazi, Feyen and Rocha (2011) quantify this 
structural change by comparing total market share of state banks in MENA. In 2001, 
41 per cent of the market share was operated by the state banks, while only 33 per 
cent was operated by the same in 2008. Farazi, Feyen and Rocha (2011) conclude 
that in some countries including Algeria, Libya and Syria, the state bank still plays a 
dominant role. Furthermore, the role of state banks is very limited in the last set of 
countries including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and 
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Oman. While the general trend would suggest a decreasing importance of the state 
bank, the situation in Gulf countries has been found to be very stagnant. The 
average market share of state banks in this particular region is fairly stable around 
28 per cent (Farazi, Feyen and Rocha, 2011). 
 
Nowadays, state and private both domestic and foreign banks operate in MENA 
region. The socio-cultural background of the region is dominated by Islamic culture 
and this aspect has been translated into the banking system of MENA countries as 
well. While the banks in Europe and other regions of the world operate on the basis 
of interest charge, this system is inapplicable to Islamic banks since the notion of 
interest is prohibited in Islam (Ali, 2011). The fundamental difference between 
Islamic and conventional banks lies in their respective portfolio of activities. Islamic 
banks tend to be more involved in the depositors’ and investors’ activities (Ali, 2011). 
As a result, the interest charge is replaced by other solutions that can be in the form 
of sharing the profits of the financed project, earning the profits by getting involved in 
the trade and/or in the form of a fee. While conventional methods dictate that a 
business owner can get a loan from the bank to purchase raw material and that the 
bank makes a profit by charging an interest, the Islamic banks would purchase the 
raw material themselves and consequently sell it to the business owner for a higher 
price and thus make the profit. Furthermore, the Islamic banks share their profits with 
their depositors and thus attract the public to the banking system. This incentive is 
conventionally provided by the notion of interest rate. 
 
The basic Islamic banking instruments are based on partnership agreements. Under 
the Mudaraba contract bank provides the loan (the rab al mal) and the entrepreneur 
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(the mudarib) contributes his skills and expertise. Profits are shared according to the 
ratios agreed in the original contracts, however, any loses are solely attributable to 
the bank. The entrepreneur has control over the business and manages the day to 
day operations but major investment decisions, including the investments from other 
investors need to be approved by the bank. Investors will be approved by the Islamic 
bank if they are Sharia compliant as the business is considered to be operated by a 
pool of funds and the disbursement of profits will be generated from that pool, which 
should be free from the interest based share of the economy. Another not so 
identical arrangement is the Musharaka contract, which considers bank as one of the 
investors in the business and the profit/loss will be shared among them. This is 
recognised in the balance sheet of the banks (investors) and the only difference 
between the conventional long term loans and Islamic loans and advances is that the 
rate of return is not fixed in Islamic Instruments and the profit/loss sharing concept 
applies. All the investors inject a share of capital as well as expertise into the 
business (Ali, 2011).   
 
The concept of lending money is strictly prohibited in Islam which allows the Islamic 
lending institutes (Islamic banks) to lend a physical asset to another person but not 
the money for that. Like the investments in the arrangements described above are 
considered to be money lending in conventional terms but in Sharia concept it is a 
share in physical business. It is also important to quote that the trade of derivative 
instruments and arrangements which derives their values from the value of another 
thing is not allowed and in fact prohibited in Islam. Murabaha contract is a leasing 
contract just like leasing in conventional banking. It involves purchase of goods for 
immediate delivery on deferred payment terms. The arrangement stays the same as 
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in the usual conventional terms where an asset is bought by the bank and leased to 
the client who keeps on paying the lease payments along with the interest charge. 
The interest charge is revised as the Inter Bank Offer Rate is changed (Ali, 2011). 
 
The objective of Islamic finance is not simply to earn profit but to be helpful for the 
economic benefit of the society such as full employment and growth which is more 
secure in financial terms as compared to conventional banks. The core of Islamic 
finance is businesses trading goods and investment in Sharia acceptable 
enterprises. Making money from money is deemed immoral in Islamic banking and 
wealth should be generated via trade or investments by institutes which are Sharia 
compliant and not indulged in any activity which the basic principles of Islam has 
refrained the Muslim Community. An important characteristic of Islamic Banking is 
that the financial transactions are based on the sharing of risk and reward between 
the investor and the entrepreneur. 
 
Riba (interest) is forbidden in Islamic finance and Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) enforced 
this ruling. The ban on riba is just an absolute. It is considered a curse on society in 
Islam. The reasons why it is considered unfair can be reviewed from three different 
perspectives; for the borrower, riba is inequitable for the borrower when enterprise 
makes profit which is less than interest payments thus turning his profit into loss 
which means the Profit Before Interest and Tax in the Statement of Profit and loss of 
a company is lower than the finance charge which is turning the profit into loss, for 
the lender riba is iniquitous as in high inflation environments when the profits are 
likely to be below the rate of inflation, for the economy riba can result in 
accumulating money for a handful of people and may contribute to instability of the 
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system and it will create monopolies, opening doors for oppression and fraudulent 
activities. Briefly, the distribution of wealth and specifically the circulation of money in 
all tiers of society are affected by the interest based economy ruled by conventional 
banks. In interest based economy, capital is directed to the borrower with high 
creditworthiness rather than the borrower who would make the most efficient use of 
the capital. 
 
Moreover, an agency relationship occurs, when a principal (owner of one thing) 
hands over the right of usage and/or decision making to the agent (person who is 
responsible for the usage/decision making of the Principal’s resource). This is an 
underlying relationship which is agreed between the depositors (investor) and the 
bank (institute) and between the bank (lender) and entrepreneurs (borrowers). 
 
However, in a Sharia compliant bank, the lesser (bank) is the owner of an asset who 
sells it off to the lessee on a deferred payment model with the price of an asset 
divided over the term of the lease period. This price will include the profit rate of the 
bank as well which will not vary, principally. Further, an important practical element 
to be shared is that in a conventional bank, the ownership of asset is transferred to 
the lessee with a financial charged created by the bank over the asset whereas in a 
Sharia complied bank, the ownership of asset rests with the bank and the lesser has 
the right to use that asset. Upon satisfaction of the terms of the contract the 
ownership will be transferred to the lesser. Till then, a financial charge over the 
bank’s asset will be created by the lesser. The financial charge refrain the owner to 
transfer/sell the asset to another party without the consent of the lesser. Similarly, 
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operating leases (Ijara) where a bank allows the lessee to use his asset against the 
payment of the rental fee. Bank owns the asset and lends it to the entrepreneur. 
 
Other instruments are Qard, which are like current deposits in the deposit side of the 
balance sheet treated as liabilities on the bank and saving accounts which 
participate in the profits of the bank (Ali, 2011). Banks can offer them bonuses on 
such accounts, which keep their financial interest in the Islamic bank in comparison 
with the conventional banks. Investment accounts on the other hand are nearly 
identical to partnership investments discussed above. 
 
Profitability of Islamic bank, on average, is 19% lower than conventional banks. It is 
mostly due to high expenses incurred by Islamic banks that they suffer from lower 
profits than conventional banks. In contrast to conventional banks, Islamic banking is 
more dependent on complex products and interfaces as compliance with Sharia law 
is subjective in nature and dependent on the Sharia board approval. However, this is 
not the case with conventional banks where things are interest based and the design 
is not dependent on religious compliance and norms. Islamic banking finds off 
shoring tough, deficit scale economies and usually conducts basic technologies 
while conventional banking abstain from these issues. In a credit cycle, Islamic 
banks face higher risk costs as their credit processes and portfolio concentration are 
uncertain as compared to conventional banks that have improved credit process. 
 
Conventional banks have enhanced quality of customer service, their products and 
distribution range allure most loyal customers while Islamic banks need to advance 
their quality of customer service and maintain loyal customers. Islamic banks find 
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themselves in a compressed and hard situation because of the constant need to 
increase profitability and upgrade their service offering. They are combating these 
problems by initiating cost and risk transformation programmes in order to attain 
stability of their cost position and provisions. In comparison with conventional banks, 
Islamic banks have not worked much into customer cross selling opportunities 
provided (Nazim and Ibrahim, 2012). 
 
Islamic banks can exhilarate products holdings per customer by forming a targeted 
and productive cross selling programme. Furthermore, Islamic banks can expand 
their revenue growth by proposing segmented values to affluent customers with 
focusing precisely on wealth management. Like conventional banks, Islamic banks 
will have to convey a segmented offering and they can offer this by deciding their 
segment propositions, service and relationship model and having a dynamic 
infrastructure. Many Islamic banks have disadvantaged cost base and a lot of them 
have launched adequate programmes to help with this disadvantage. Lean banking 
programme may be used by Islamic banks for end to end process improvement with 
focus on efficiency mixed with service quality, superior risk management and lead-
time improvement. The most common method of segmentation is income bands and 
banks have organised grouped customers into segments. With introduction to data 
warehouses, customer profiling and propensity modelling there is an advancement in 
gathering data and data analysis which has helped Islamic banking to enchant new 
customers, as well as get close to existing customers. 
 
However, in relation to the empirical literature for the comparison, the fundamental 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks can be found in their prohibition 
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from charging or paying of interest (Karim, 2001). In essence, the investors’ return in 
Islamic banks is directly associated with the return on assets financed by the 
investors’ funds (Karim, 2001). Chong and Liu (2009) challenged this theoretical 
assumption and argued that the profit-and-loss sharing paradigm is not translated 
into practice. The authors suggested that Islamic and commercial banks are not at all 
that different. Overall, the study conducted by Chong and Liu (2009) revealed that 
Islamic deposits are in fact not interest-free but they are closely pegged to the 
deposits. As a result, the growth of Islamic banking on a global scale can be 
attributed to the Islamic resurgence worldwide as opposed to the advantages of the 
banking system. 
 
The empirical study of Islamic and commercial banks and their credit ratings 
conducted by Cihak and Hesse (2010) concluded mixed results. While small Islamic 
banks were found to be financially stronger than their commercial counterparts, a 
contradictory finding was found for large banks. The complexity of comparing Islamic 
and commercial banks in terms of their credit ratings is further magnified by the non-
comparability of the financial statements of Islamic banks as reported by Karim 
(2001). 
 
An alternative model specifically designed to assess the operational soundness and 
creditworthiness of the Islamic banks has been developed by Muljawan (2007). The 
model is based on the CAMELS rating system (capital, asset quality, management, 
earning, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk) with several adjustments in terms of 
financial rations and managerial assessment. The key differences relate to the areas 
of value added distribution and identification of risks not affecting the conventional 
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banks. In terms of the managerial assessment, the model proposed by Muljawan 
(2007) builds on the Islamic values, such as adl (positioning of the personnel 
appropriately according to their competences), masuliyah (accountability in 
performing the tasks), intaj (high productivity), ihsan and fatanah (professionalism) 
and iman (clear objective in all levels of the management). Furthermore, Islamic 
banks are recognised to face a commercial displacement risk stemming from lower 
yields in comparison to the conventional banks. Muljawan (2007) provided empirical 
support for his model and concluded its higher efficiency in locating the problems 
compared to the traditional credit rating models used in the banking industry. 
 
In summary, a general lack of consensus can be found in the academic debate 
regarding the comparison of Islamic and commercial banks in terms of the bank 
rating models. While some of the authors suggest that the differences between the 
two types of the bank are only minor and do not have a significant effect on the 
validity of credit rating models, a more recent study conducted by Muljawan (2007) 
proposed a new bank rating model specifically designed to accommodate for the 
nuances of the Islamic banking system. 
2.4.1 Performance of Banks 
 
Two recent studies will be evaluated in a more detail in order to understand the 
performance of banks. Firstly, Kobeissi and Sun (2010) studied the performance of 
private and state banks in 17 MENA countries including Iran, Israel, Mauritania and 
Turkey, suggesting the adoption of a wider definition of MENA. The second study 
has been conducted by Farazi, Feyen and Rocha (2011) who focused more narrowly 
on the non-Gulf countries in the region since the distinction between private and 
state ownership has been expected to be crucial in these countries. Further 
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differences between the studies can be found in their focus, while Farazi, Feyen and 
Rocha (2011) used measures of performance to compare the state of ownership, 
Kobeissi and Sun (2010) used measures of performance for private and state banks. 
However, as pointed out by Heggestad (1977), profitability can be considered to 
represent a summary index of performance and thus these two studies arguably 
focused on the same aspect of the banking sector. The conclusions drawn in both 
studies are very similar. State banks were found to be significantly outperformed by 
their private counterparts. Substantial differences have been found in the ratios of 
operating costs to assets (Farazi, Feyen and Rocha, 2011) and higher returns on 
assets and equity (Kobeissi and Sun, 2010). These findings have been supported by 
a number of prior studies (e.g. Micco, Panizza and Yanez; 2004, 2007). 
While a state bank has been associated with the potential to contribute to financial 
and economic progress (Farazi, Feyen and Rocha, 2011), market imperfections lead 
to their lower profitability and higher costs compared to private banks (Micco, 
Panizza and Yanez, 2007). One of the crucial aspects affecting the performance of 
state banks is the presence of extensive political interference (Farazi, Feyen and 
Rocha, 2011) which have an impact on both credit and employment decisions. In 
other words, the mandates are very blurred and the governance structure is often 
found inadequate (Farazi, Feyen and Rocha, 2011). The study conducted by Micco, 
Panizza and Yanez (2007) pointed out that the gap between state and private banks 
widens during election years which is in line with the argument regarding extensive 
political interference. In essence, state banks not only fail to achieve the same level 
of performance as their private counterparts, their operating costs are much higher 
decreasing the profitability even further. Moreover, Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2004) 
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pointed out that state banks usually have larger non-performing loans compared to 
private banks which only confirm the poor performance of state banks. 
 
Building on the distinction of state and private banks’ performance, Micco, Panizza 
and Yanez (2004) provided a comprehensive analysis of bank ownership and 
performance based on three categories; these are state banks, private domestic and 
private foreign banks. Foreign banks have been found to be the most profitable and 
also to achieve the lowest costs. Similar findings have been concluded in the study 
conducted by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) with the differences being most 
substantial in developing countries. Furthermore, Kobeissi and Sun (2010) argued 
that the presence of foreign banks in the country affects the performance of local 
banks in a positive way. The basis of the theoretical argument behind this 
observation can be found in the increased competition and knowledge 
dissemination. Firstly, the higher level of competition forces local banks, both private 
and state, to operate more efficiently in order to outperform other rivals. Secondly, 
the best practices are easily transferred within the region and thus allow the existing 
institutions to enhance their performance. 
 
2.4.2 Competition between Banks 
 
In line with the argument proposed by Heggestad (1977), market structure affects 
competition and thus consequently influences bank profitability. Banking sectors in 
MENA countries are usually highly concentrated, however, their characteristics of 
ownership, structure and growth potential set them apart from other regions (Turk-
Ariss, 2009). Based on the revenue elasticity to input prices, three different market 
structures have been distinguished by Turk-Ariss (2009) and Isik and Hassan (2002). 
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The North Africa region shows signs of monopolistic conditions; however, remaining 
countries are mostly monopolistically competitive in their banking sectors with the 
exception of Turkey that is of an oligopolistic nature. 
 
To begin with, a monopolistic structure refers to the presence of a single competitor 
that has a dominant position in the sector and can dictate prices since the 
consumers cannot switch their provider of the good or service. Monopolistic 
competition is characterised by a larger number of competing companies, however, 
this market structure assumes the existence of particular factors that distinguish 
individual companies, such as branding or product offering. The products offered by 
different companies are therefore categorised in the same industry but they are not 
perceived as close substitutes. In other words, the performance of other rivals does 
not have any substantial effect on the given company. Finally, oligopoly assumes the 
existence of a low number of major competitors in the market. Due to the limited 
number of rivals, the competitors’ actions can be carefully monitored. The main 
limitation of this market structure lies in the potential of common agreements among 
companies. The competition is very limited and collaborative arrangements are often 
signed supporting the industry as a whole rather than benefiting a single company. 
 
Despite the differences in market structure of the banking sector in particular MENA 
countries, one major theme can be found in all parts of the region, this is lack of 
competition. In monopolistic structure, there is no one to compete with. A higher 
number of competitors in the monopolistic competitive structure would suggest a 
higher level of rivalry; however, since all companies are perceived very differently, 
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the products are not viewed as substitutes by the consumers which limit the 
competition in the market. 
 
Anzoategui, Peria and Rocha (2010) utilised the H-statistic and the Lerner indices in 
order to compare the banking sector competition on a global scale. The findings 
indicate that MENA region is substantially lagging behind other regions in terms of 
banking sector competition. Furthermore, the longitudinal nature of the study also 
revealed that the competition within banking sector in MENA has not improved in any 
significant way during recent years. Anzoategui, Peria and Rocha (2010) went even 
further in their study and aimed to explain the root cause behind the lack of 
competition in the banking sector in the region. Their findings suggest that the basis 
for this issue stems from the region’s poor credit information environment and low 
market contestability. 
 
Arguably, an imperfectly competitive banking system can actually lead to a worse 
result than if the country did not have any banks in the first place (Smith, 1998). 
While this is hardly the case in MENA, academic consensus seems to revolve 
around recommendations aiming to support the competition in the banking sector. 
Building on the proposed advantages of an increased bank competition, such as 
higher level of income and reduced severity of business cycles (Smith, 1998), an 
argument raised by Isik and Hassan (2002) to foster the banking competition in the 
region. Several years later, the same recommendations can be found in the work of 
Turk-Ariss (2009) which is in line with the lack of improvement observed by 
Anzoategui, Peria and Rocha (2010). 
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2.5 Banking Stability and Risk-Taking Incentives 
 
The country’s economy relies to a great extent on the banking sector activity and its 
leading role in their stabilisation. Banks performance and stability will also be 
influenced by a country’s economy, with regards to the banks which function within it. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) carried out an early study on banking crises, 
observing a weak macro-economic environment to increase banking crises risks. For 
example, low output growth, high inflation and high real interest rates are in 
particular related to bank instability. Likewise, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) 
conducted a study, and showed that inflation was associated with higher banking risk 
in a positive way, whereas GDP per capita was negatively associated with this risk. 
 
The banking sector strives in stabilising the financial system, through regulation and 
supervision practices, in order to prevent systematic crises overflowing into various 
other areas of the economy. A multitude of diverse inter-connecting factors impinging 
on banks can be identified in the regulatory environment. Nowadays, credit rating 
agencies play a crucial role in the financial markets since they reduce the informative 
asymmetry by providing information to lenders and creditors about the banks’ 
creditworthiness (Elkhoury, 2008). The lack of specific information that is present in 
the region can be associated with the low interest among lenders and creditors to 
invest their money in the region.   
 
The topic of banks risk-taking is closely related to their performance and stability. In 
general terms, risk-taking behaviour is frequently associated with the opportunity of 
achieving higher profits but increasing the chance of a failure on the other hand. The 
risk-taking behaviour can therefore result in better performance indicators, however, 
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may inhibit the banks’ stability and soundness. The economics literature recognises 
several internal and external factors that affect the extent to which the banks’ 
activities can be regarded as risk-taking. 
 
In addition, there are several factors and features within the banking sector and its 
environment influence the banks risk and risk-taking incentives. On one side, the risk 
of banks is significantly determined by bank characteristics that are reflected in their 
balance sheets. On the other side, a significant aspect regards the political and legal 
environment (e.g. regulation, supervision and governance) considerably determines 
the stability of the banking sector in a country and influence the banks risk-taking 
incentives. 
2.5.1 Bank Characteristics  
 
Barth et al. (2002) introduced a model of bank stability and soundness based on the 
CAMELS system. CAMELS stand for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management 
quality, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk. These elements are most 
commonly represented by the following ratios: 
 
• Capital adequacy: Ratio of equity capital to assets. 
• Asset quality: Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. 
• Management quality: Ratio of overhead costs to assets and non-interest 
revenues to total revenues. 
• Earnings: Ratio of net income to assets and net income to equity. 




The same study by Barth et al. (2002) utilised the above mentioned model in order to 
predict the effect of supervisory bodies on banks’ safety and soundness. Their 
findings suggest that countries with a single supervisory body in the form of the 
central bank, such as the MENA countries, score higher in the bank safety and 
soundness indicators. 
 
Moreover, capital strength within banks is significant and widely recognised, and has 
accordingly conditional on meeting the regulations which were set up by The Basel II 
capital framework, to provide international standards for minimum capital 
requirements in banks. Banks use capital to fender possible losses; therefore capital 
is valuable characteristic within the banking sector. Capital of satisfactory 
proportions, function as protection against financial condition and hence banking 
failure (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004). Capital specifically protects depositors and 
creditors against financial loss, created by shareholders (Ware, 1996). 
 
Banking supervision under the Basel Committee refers to the core of a bank's capital 
as Tier 1 capital. The fundamental areas within capital in the committee’s opinion are 
equity capital and disclosed reserves. They critically affect profit margins and 
competitiveness within banks. Accordingly, capital is characterised in two tiers for 
supervisory reasons. (Tier 1) consists of at least 50% of the bank’s capital base, 
defining the core element i.e. equity capital and published reserves, produced by 






With regard to the asset quality, it is an important factor for financial firms and vital 
for assessing bank risk. However, the presence of bad asset quality could be 
influential on bank’s profitability, by a lessening interest in income and an increase in 
provisioning costs, resulting in a decline of net profits (Pasiouras, Gaganis and 
Zopounidis, 2006). What is more, a significant determinative factor of the failure of 
banks, relates to bad asset quality resulting in large amounts of loss being too 
excessively large for absorption by the capital. It is extremely essential for borrowers 
of banks to be in a position where they are able to pay back loans (Ware, 1996). 
 
Furthermore, bank’s profitability essentially ascertains practicality on a long term 
basis. Banks in which have strong and flourishing constitutions are able to produce 
and sustain earnings, capable of providing a source of capital, resulting in 
strengthened growth, liquidity and protective covering against insolvency, economic 
and financial condition, providing an increased strong hold to combat untoward 
states of affairs (Vuong, 2007). However, because of reduced profitability, the 
vulnerability of banks increases, due to a loss in the ability to raise capital base and 
practicality (Arena, 2008). Substantial profitability enhances stability within banks. 
 
In addition to the profitability of banks, liquidity is also an important component to 
bank’s viability, i.e. to be in a position to fund any gains in assets, enabling banks to 
meet required obligations (BIS, 2000). However, Vuong (2007) highlights that banks 
could receive interruptions in funding sources such as; the running out of deposits. 
These interruptions can result in unexpected losses in asset sales; therefore the role 
of liquidity is to protect capital. Obviously any bank that maintains stable liquidity is 
less at risk than banks with low liquidity. 
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Besides, corporate governance is another bank characteristic which should be 
reckoned with. Corporate governance is the system of rules, practices and 
processes by which a company is directed and controlled. Corporate governance 
essentially involves many stakeholders in a firm; including its shareholders, 
management, customers, suppliers, financiers, government and the community. 
Corporate governance also provides the framework for attaining a company's 
objectives. There is a primary feature of corporate governance, which is the 
principal-agent-problem between owners and managers. This could have an impact 
on bank risk-taking. Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) discovered some support 
to back up the observance that banks where managers grasp a bigger proportion of 
the banks stock, seem to be inclined to higher risk-taking incentives. Adding to that, 
Laeven and Levine (2009) results display a trend within banks of an increased risk 
with more number of powerful owners.   
 
In addition, corporate governance is an important determinant of credit ratings since 
the rating agencies have a good concern of governance variables. The concern 
appears when good governance can sustain the financial position of the firm and 
lower its external financial cost, and also when weak corporate governance can 
weaken the firm’s financial position and higher its financial cost to end up with 
losses. Evidence on the impact of corporate governance on firm’s credit ratings was 
investigated by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006), using long-term issuer 
ratings compiled by Standard and Poor’s. They used such variables that mainly 
include firm characteristics and corporate governance measures. Employing ordered 
logistic regression, they presented evidence to explain the strength effects of 
governance attributes on firm’s credit ratings and that after controlling the firm-
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specific risk characteristics. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) also found that firm’s 
credit ratings are positively connected to the weaker shareholder rights in terms of 
takeover defences, the degree of financial transparency, the overall board 
independence, the board stock ownership and the board expertise. 
 
However, due to the difficulties in obtaining and accessing data relating to corporate 
governance, this study will rely on data extracted from the aggregate worldwide 
governance indicators that contain six dimensions of governance. These indicators 
are explained in chapters (4 and 5). 
 
Moving forward to the size of banks as another aspect of bank’s characteristics, the 
current academics debate revolves mainly around the impact of size of the bank on 
its risk-taking behaviour. Two contradictory perspectives can be found in the 
economics literature.  
On one hand, Allen and Gale (2000) argued that a low number of large banks are 
easier to monitor and thus the corporate control of banks will be more effective and 
prevent risk-taking behaviour. Moreover, larger banks are expected to achieve 
higher profits and higher value of the bank which reduce the incentive to engage in 
risk-taking behaviour (Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000). Further, it is larger 
banks that have stronger establishments than banks of a smaller scale. Larger banks 
can have increased abilities to handle change, conditions and geographic reach, 
resulting in decreased risk of concentration. Furthermore, size is connected with 
economies of scale, consequently larger scale banks have the ability to attain a 
larger efficiency in operating systems, and more advanced resources needed for 
fresh investments. Banks with a larger establishment can also be equipped with a 
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larger market share that could increase franchise values within banks (Moody's 
Investors Service, 2002 cited in Pagratis and Stringa, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, Alfred Magilton Best Company is a global credit rating agency 
which argues in (2009) the following view. It is in the belief of the agency that bank 
size influences on safety, soundness and performance are over estimated. They 
argue that although the perception is that larger banks are known to be more secure 
than smaller banks with a capability of featuring larger earnings power, the scale of a 
bank may not essentially be in any relation to diversification of risk, economies of 
scale or market power. In addition to this, there is a bigger exposure to risk, and 
accumulated leverage related with larger scale banks. Likewise, operation with 
increased leverage which is evoked by diversification is connected with larger banks 
that can also engage with riskier lending (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). 
Further example regarding the potential of larger banks to engage in risk-taking, 
Mishkin (1999) pointed out that large banks tend to receive greater net subsidies 
than smaller banks. The underlying reason can be found in the perception that the 
large banks are “too big to fall” (Mishkin, 1999). Banks crises in larger banks would 
have major implications for the whole economy and therefore, governments 
frequently support these banks when they experience difficulties. Example can be 
made of the UK banking sector following the collapse of the Northern Rock. Based 
on the “too big to fall” argument, Mishkin (1999) argued that the large banks are 
actually more likely to take excessive risks due to their limited liability. The topic of 
limited liability has been first introduced by Stiglitz (1972) who emphasized the 
importance of deposit insurances in order to prevent banks from excessive risk-
taking. The debate regarding the impact of size of the bank and its risk-taking 
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behaviour has failed to reach any clear conclusions. The most conclusive outcome 
has been presented by Boyd and Runkle (1993) who found an inverse relationship 
between size and the volatility of asset return, however, failed to find any evidence 
suggesting that small banks would be more likely to fail. 
 
2.5.2 Market Structure 
 
Another crucial factor affecting the banks risk-taking behaviour is the number of 
competitors. The MENA region has been associated with a highly concentrated 
banking sector that can be characterised by monopolistic, monopolistic competitive 
or oligopolistic market structure depending on the particular country. As a result, the 
MENA region can be characterised by a low level of competition stemming from the 
market structure of the banking sector. This environment does not provide any 
incentive for risk-taking behaviour and thus the economics principles suggest that 
banks will engage in risk avoiding behaviour which will consequently lead to an 
increased stability and soundness (Williamson, 1986). The risk avoidance is further 
supported by the policies adopted by Islamic banks (Ali, 2011). Majority of the 
investments aims to support the local economy and is frequently pre-agreed which 
minimizes the risk associated with the transactions. 
 
Furthermore, a relationship has been established between the market structure of a 
banking sector in the country and their both profitability and stability. Hellman, 
Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argued that higher the level of concentration of banking 
system, the higher the profits are and consequently the lower bank fragility is since 
the profits act as a buffer preventing the severity of the impact of adverse shocks. 
Similar findings have been concluded in the study conducted by Allen and Gale 
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(2004) who revealed that more concentrated banking sectors with a few large banks 
are less prone to financial crises. The previous section has outlined the market 
structure in the MENA region consisting of three types of structures; monopolistic, 
monopolistic competition and oligopolistic. All of these structures can be regarded to 
consist of several dominant players and thus the banking sector in MENA countries 
displays signs of a high concentration. The conclusions drawn by Allen and Gale 
(2004) have been supported by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine at the same year 
(2003). The level of bank concentration is found to have a stabilizing effect and thus 
diminish the potential for systematic banking crises. In essence, the large banks are 
better able to diversify their business portfolio and thus avoid crises (Williamson, 
1986). The academics and researchers have therefore pointed out the need for 
establishment of sound institutions and regulatory policies in order to provide an 
incentive for investors (Gentzoglanis, 2007) and ensure bank stability and 
soundness. 
 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) argued that countries with a higher level of 
competition in the economy are less prone to systematic banking crises. However, 
the prevalence of inward-looking policies minimizes the level of competition, 
especially in the international perspective and thus poses a threat to the bank safety 
and soundness. 
 
2.5.3 Political and Legal Environment 
 
The behaviour of risk-taking within banks may be influenced by policies adopted by 
different countries. However, researches regarding the impact of banking regulation 
on risk-taking incentives including; performance, stability and soundness have 
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produced a variation of mixed views. 
 
The stability of banking sector is also supported by political and legal environment, 
which Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) concludes from an analysis carried out, 
which identifies that a poor legal system with improper enforcement rules seems to 
add risk to banks. Similarly, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) discover improved 
property development rights and greater political openness could relieve the 
negative relationship between moral hazard evoked by deposit insurance generosity 
schemes, and bank fragility. 
 
A part of the regulation and supervisory environment of banks is deposit insurance 
schemes, which aim to accomplish stability within banks. Nevertheless, their affects 
remain a source of debate. On one hand, deposit insurance is established to secure 
depositors from failure in banks, and this prevents depositor runs, seemingly 
increasing bank stability. Alternatively, deposit insurance could also inspire bank risk-
taking as this creates hazardous moral situation (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
2002). Studies carried out by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998, 2002) unveil that explicit deposit insurance schemes augment 
systemic banking crises probability, that negatively affects bank stability. Still, an 
institutional, well established and powerful environment may counteract unsupported 
effects of deposit insurance (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). 
 
The supervisory agency may be respected by this powerful institutional environment. 
The strict power of discipline regarding supervisory authorities cites their ability to 
proceed with actions to deflect and find a resolution to difficulties which may develop 
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within banks, although strong supervisory agencies can boost stability within banks. 
Furthermore, they could also impact negatively on banking performance. Monitoring 
within banking sector is complicated and costly. Improper monitoring within banks 
results in a negative impact on stability and performance, and strong supervision 
could counteract. Adding to that, bank supervision may also extenuate risk with bank 
runs, and stop increased risk-taking behaviour, evoked by deposit insurance 
schemes. 
 
Furthermore, supervision may aggravate corruption, when supervisors abuse power 
(Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004). However, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) do not 
uncover a powerful relationship between disciplinary supervisory power and bank’s 
development and performance. Nevertheless, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) 
believe that when the presence of accounting and auditing requirements are lacking 
official discipline, this may bring down risk-taking in banks. 
 
In addition, concerning capital rules within banks, this has been under intense 
scrutiny from regulatory and supervisory bodies. The Basel II capital framework 
which fixes minimum standards for capital adequacy is the primary capital framework 
on an international level. Implementations for capital adequacy requirements are 
placed because of the value attributed with capital strength within banks. However, 
any positive results are not recognised worldwide. Rules concerning capital 
adequacy could alter and lessen risk-taking incentives of banks, as displayed by 
(e.g. Konishi and Yasuda, 2004). Hart and Zingales (2009) show that capital 
adequacy requirements could counteract with motivation in banks mistreating low 




On the contrary, other researches find that capital adequacy requirements increase 
bank risks (Blum, 1999). For example, returns regarding bank risks have limited 
boundaries with capital requirements. Portfolios of risk assets maybe set up, 
consequently because of decreased leverage which intensifies risk taking incentives 
(Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988 cited in Konishi and 
Yasuda, 2004). Needless to say Milne and Whalley (2001) conducted a study, which 
revealed no specific influence regarding capital requirements on bank risk-taking. In 
addition, neither does Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004). 
 
Further opposing argument on the bank safety and soundness has been presented 
by Besanko and Kanatas (1996) who argued that regulatory capital standards may 
not promote the bank safety. The argument stems from the notion that the ownership 
of a bank may become diluted as an end result of issuing equity and thus provides a 
limitation for expending efforts on the bank’s stockholders’ behalf. 
 
Moreover, there are various reasons for bank authorities to limit on banks activities. 
Interaction with a varied range of activities could consequently result in a moral 
hazard state of affairs, and conflicted interests. Adding to that, complicated and 
powerful banks may prove awkward to discipline and monitor. Even though, 
permitting a varied scope of bank activities, this may demonstrate a beneficial factor 
for bank stability, and less restraint on bank activities could raise the franchise value 
of banks, hence motivating more discreet behaviour. In addition to this, potential 
chances for economies of scale, and the diversity of income streams can bring forth 
further steadiness in banks (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004). Barth, Caprio and 
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Levine (2004) have discovered that restrictions regarding bank activities are 
pessimistically related to bank development and stability. Adding to this, Gonzalez 
(2005) demonstrated that regulatory restrictions lead to a decrease in bank’s charter 
value, which results in a creation of increased risk-taking incentives. Comparatively, 
Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) concluded that limitations can in fact decrease bank 
risk, when accounting and auditing requirements are inadequately developed. 
 
Furthermore, developed accounting and auditing requirements could be used as well 
as an instrument to control bank risk-taking. As soon as these requirements are 
implemented, banks expose further information to the industry, resulting in an 
increase in the market’s ability; applying bank discipline (Flannery and Sorescu, 
1996; Sironi, 2003 cited in Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005). In addition to this, 
Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) propose more rigorous disclosure requirements, 
which could strengthen the ability of the supervisors in disciplining managers, 
therefore gaining banks stability. Furthermore, they may change the potency of 
capital adequacy requirements for the better. Also, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) 
show that accounting and auditing requirements decrease banks’ risk-taking. In 
particular, auditing requirements can make up for risk-shifting incentives as a result 
of a generous amount of deposit insurance, as well as this, information disclosure 
can counterbalance risk-shifting incentives in banks that possess low charter values. 
Adding to that, their accumulations of findings imply that accounting and auditing 
system can complement the capital requirements; however, it can also be a 
substitute to the restrictions on banking activities and official discipline. 
 
However, local authorities in any country may set new regulations for access into the 
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banking industry to limit competition. Nevertheless, the significance of regulating 
bank access is open to academic debate. Advocates in charge of bank access 
restrictions emphasise the influential benefits of banking stability, particularly more 
competition may decrease the franchise values of banks, hence augmenting risk-
taking incentives (Keeley, 1990). In addition, competitiveness for deposits 
accumulates increased risk-taking incentives, because of high deposit rates 
(Niinimaki, 2004). So far oppositions of restrictions advocate the positive effects of 
competition (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004). Superior entry restrictions on foreign 
banks and ownership may magnify vulnerability within banks as demonstrated by 





The most vital disadvantage for banking sector in MENA region apart from the low 
rate of development and high levels of isolation is the poor credit information 
environment prevalent in the region (Anzoategui, Peria and Rocha, 2010). The credit 
rating agencies tend to overreact to financial crises even in the environment with 
excellent credit information (Elkhoury, 2008) and therefore, the impact of the credit 
rating agencies is expected to be further magnified in the MENA region. 
 
This chapter outlines several advantages of the banking sector in MENA region and 
these advantages can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Single regulatory body in the form of a national bank. 
• Risk-avoiding culture. 
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• Low limitations regarding banks’ activities. 
 
On the other hand, a number of disadvantages of the banking sector in MENA region 
have been identified as well. The severity of particular disadvantages varies greatly 
among particular sub-regions or individual countries; however, the general set of 
disadvantages includes the following: 
 
• Low rate of financial development. 
• Low level of competition in the banking sector. 
• Sector still dominated by state banks. 
• Inward-looking policies and isolation from the international trade. 
• Influence of the credit rating agencies. 
 
It needs to be acknowledged that while the above listed advantages and 
disadvantages apply to the banking sector in MENA region on a general level, the 
applicability of the issues depends on the perspective taken. In other words, some of 
the disadvantages may actually become advantages for foreign banks wishing to 
establish a presence in the MENA region and vice versa. An example of this can be 
made of the fact that the banking sector in MENA region is dominated by state 
banks. The study conducted by Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2004) revealed that 
foreign banks in the region are out-performing both private and public domestic 
banks which suggests the existence of a window of opportunity for foreign banks, 




Lastly, with respects to bank risk and risk-taking incentives, an environment factors 
concerning bank’s characteristics, market structure, macro-economic, political and 
legal, add to the stability of banking sector. A good shape of these environmental 
factors strengthens banking stability, especially those of environmental 
characteristics which impinge on the behaviour of banks risk-taking. The regulatory 
and supervisory environment takes a special place within this context. While 
supervision and regulation intend to reach soundness of banks, existing theory and 
empirical evidence make diverse repercussions available on banking risk. Capital 
adequacy requirements and deposit insurance schemes are put in place in order to 
intensify banking stability; however this could generate moral hazard conditions that 
increase bank risk-taking. 
 
As well as this, researchers and academicians have mixed views on the banking 
activities, some argue to support the restrictions on these activities and the others 
are pleased in permitting a larger range of activities for banks. Furthermore, the strict 
power of supervisory agency may establish advantageous benefits for banking 
stability. However, this may also magnify corruption. Requirements regarding 
accounting and auditing increase the industries and the supervisors’ capability in 
implementing disciplinary, resulting in bank risk reductions. What is more, opposing 
opinions exist regarding competition, access restrictions within the banking sector, 
and the impact of these on banking stability. Putting into consideration the various 
theoretical opinions and empirical evidence, the impact of such factors on bank’s or 




























































This chapter will provide an overview of the literature relating to the objectives of this 
research. It will first outline the assessments of credit rating agencies and it will focus 
on studies that investigated the estimation of sovereign and banks credit rating 
models. 
 
The literature review regarding credit rating research has been addressed two 
strands of studies. The first strand examines the impact of initial credit ratings and 
changes in the credit ratings on stock and bond prices. The second strand of studies 
investigates the determinants of credit ratings (Poon and Chan, 2007). Since this 
research concentrates on estimating credit rating models in MENA countries and 
their commercial banks, the literature review concentrates on two groups of studies. 
The first group includes studies that have evaluated and assessed the role of credit 
rating agencies; the second group reviews empirical studies that examined and 
estimated sovereign/countries and banks credit rating models. 
 
The determinants of bond and credit ratings have been examined by many scientific 
scholars and researchers. For example, Altman et al. (1981) constructed an early 
application to bond ratings and other financial analysis. They used different statistical 
techniques, including multiple regression analysis, Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
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(MDA), unordered and ordered logit models and probit models. This study uses 
similar models, including linear regression, analysis of variance, and ordered logit 
and ordered probit in estimating sovereign and banks’ credit rating models. The 
following Figure (3.1) illustrates the main determinants for the existing research. The 
left box represents MENA bank’s credit rating, a dependent variable in the 
regression performed in this study. The right box indicates MENA countries’ ratings, 
the second dependent variable in the regressions. The middle portion represents 
linearization of the banks’ and countries’ ratings, while also encompassing factors 
that predict banks’ and countries’ ratings. The top and bottom boxes represent the 
factors used to predict ratings, which includes financial factors such as loans as a 
percentage of total assets, GDP growth, and a government’s attempt to control 










Figure (3.1): Key Determinants for the Current Research 
 
3.2 Credit Rating Agencies 
 
3.2.1 Evaluation of Credit Agencies 
 
The problem credit rating agencies have been facing is that their contents are badly 
misunderstood. Credit rating agencies, which affects the cost of annual issuance of 
approximately US$600 billion in unsecured bank debt in Europe alone has to been 
observed in detail. The models and criteria for risk rating assessment should be 
reviewed closely (European Central Bank, Working Paper 2012). Banks ratings are a 
particularly important determinant of issuance cost of senior unsecured debt. Senior 
unsecured debt remains the largest source of long term funding for banks (Wyman, 
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2011). Secured debt accounted for less than 30% of total bank debt issuance in 
2009; this figure had risen to 40% in the first half of 2012, according to data from 
Dialogic (European Central Bank, Working Paper 2011). Further, publicly funded 
recapitalization and guarantees on deposits and debts put pressure on the credibility 
of sovereigns’ signatures. Agency relationship is the main area of concern when it 
comes to the rating. The financial investors (rating consumers) who are paying for 
the exercise and the banks (institute under review of the credit riskiness throughout 
its cycle) can easily lobby the agencies for a positive rating. 
 
Another risk associated with the credit rating is the self-interest which could easily 
affect the quality of ratings. The larger the potential future business, the larger would 
be the agency’s incentive to inflate things. As Calomiris (2009) highlights that the 
short term profits and high leverage could lead to the collusion between rating 
agencies and security investors. This explains why during an economic crisis, large 
quantity of collateralized assets could be seen on the bank’s balance sheets. 
Another debate is that the credit rating varies during the economic cycle. The reason 
is that the rating quality decreases in the boom phase of the economy and increases 
in the trough phase. It is more difficult for potential investors to assess the rating 
quality. Further, our research explains that the rating of financial institutes specially 
the banks depends upon the models used for estimating the ratings. Based on 
evidences, it can be said that the credit ratings are good indicators of the bank’s 
credit riskiness during crisis period. 
 
A strictly ordinal method used for credit rating of banks has been deployed by the 
European Standard bank which suggests that the bank’s credit rating depends upon 
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two factors. Bank’s ratings firstly depends upon the credit ratings provided by the 
rating agencies and secondly the risk of being defaulted two years later. The 
difference between these two is termed as Ordinal Rating Quality Shortfall. This 
provides a good measure of relative rating error as it does not require the bank’s 
rating to be absolutely correct. 
 
Further, if Moody’s expected default frequencies were used as source of ratings, it 
precludes arbitrariness in modelling choices. The findings of the European Central 
Bank are interesting to be mentioned here. As the information content of credit rating 
is higher during banking crisis, the ordinal rating in quality turns out to be 
countercyclical which further shows that the theoretical literatures were correct in 
predicting that the net benefit of rating agencies of providing good quality ratings are 
lower during peak business cycle. The credit rating agencies find an overlapping 
business which restrains them from providing negative ratings to the banks. Ratings 
are also biased when the banks are huge in size no matter their default could be 
observed in the coming years. 
 
3.2.2 Informational and Reputational Value 
 
While rating agencies make their fundamental rating methodologies available to the 
public, the specific assumptions and rationale of the rating assessment process is 
not disclosed. In general, agencies assess a company’s industry characteristics, 
competitive position, and management quality to appraise its business risk and 
financial characteristics, financial policy, profitability, capital structure, cash flow 
protection, financial flexibility as concerns the company’s financial risk. Most credit 
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rating agencies employ both quantitative models and qualitative analysis performed 
by rating analysts. However, some small agencies primarily conduct quantitative 
analyses (Frost, 2007). Generally, profitability, leverage, cash flow are regarded as 
central quantitative measure in the rating of entities (Shin and Moore, 2003). Robbe 
and Mahieu (2005) show that the relative new rating agency KMV that follows a 
quantitatively oriented, market-based approach achieves a timelier insight into 
changes of a firm’s credit quality than Standard and Poor’s. S&P is more qualitatively 
oriented and pursues an accounting-based approach, e.g. financial statements that 
are published at the most quarterly are essential to their analysis. Additionally, their 
review process is conducted once a year and takes a longer time (Robbe and 
Mahieu, 2005). 
 
Credit rating agencies play an important role in overcoming asymmetric information 
situations on the market between borrowers or debt issuers and investors or lenders, 
and thus create reduced information costs. A credit contract between issuer and 
investor can be seen a principal-agent-relationship, being subject to issues such as 
hidden information, adverse selection and hidden action. Furthermore, a low credit 
risk issuer will have difficulties to get credit due to low returns. Credit ratings 
contribute to the facilitation of the principal-agent-problem by lowering informational 
asymmetries and revealing hidden information, which will lead the investor to 
demand a lower risk premium. What is more, credit ratings enable monitoring during 
the issuer-investor-relation. As a result, moral hazard and hidden actions issues are 
alleviated (Dittrich, 2007). In effect, credit ratings can enhance the efficient allocation 




In the current study, information asymmetric is readily present. the presence of 
information asymmetry shows up in the difference between governments’ and banks’ 
ratings, where, for instance, financial ratios and regulatory variables are important 
predictors of banks ratings, while macroeconomic conditions and governance are 
more important predictors for government ratings. The difference lies in the amount 
of information asymmetry between the two. 
 
The informational value of credit ratings is subject to considerable debate. While 
some argue that ratings bring new information to the market (e.g. Ederington et al., 
1987; Baker and Mansi, 2002; Schweitzer et al., 1992), others hold the view that 
ratings have little informational value (e.g. Partnoy, 2002). If the rating of bonds 
possesses significant informational value, then rating changes should lead to a 
change in security prices. Schweitzer et al. (1992) pointed out two mutually exclusive 
points of view. First, rating agencies have solely access to public information. This 
would imply that if a market is semi-strong efficient, then a rating change should not 
lead to a change in price as it does not express new information. Second, rating 
agencies have access to inside information because of the rating process that 
involves direct contact with company and management. Thus, rating changes will 
convey new information to the market. Furthermore, if investors believe that rating 
agencies are able to supply information at lower cost, the information that causes a 
rating change may be new for the market (Schweitzer et al., 1992). In their study, 
Schweitzer et al. (1992) found that the rating of bank holding companies can convey 




Nevertheless, an earlier study by Ederington et al. (1987) investigated the 
informational content of bond ratings. Their study found that the financial market 
relies on Moody’s and S&P’s ratings, they continue to argue that these two are more 
consistent in their data than other agencies and that by viewing ratings as equally 
reliable measures of an issue’s creditworthiness. 
 
However, examining the informational content of domestic credit ratings on stock 
returns of the rated companies in China, Poon and Chan (2007) conducted research 
using Xinhua- Far East’s long-term issuer ratings. They applied multiple regressions 
in analysing pooled time-series cross-sectional ratings data of 170 companies during 
the period 2002-2006. Their empirical findings show that Xinhua-Far East’s transmits 
information and its ratings do have significant effects on the stock returns and the 
decisions of investors. 
 
Even though there is a correlation between credit ratings of agencies and default 
rates, critics still doubt of the agency’s informational value and take the view that 
ratings reflect solely information that is already in the market price (Partnoy, 2002). 
 
Another crucial aspect of credit rating economics includes the reputation mechanism. 
Credit rating agencies themselves are subject to moral hazard since they do not 
have a personal stake in the objects they rate, and thus lack incentives to provide 
high quality service (Dittrich, 2007). According to the reputational capital model, a 
well-functioning reputation mechanism will produce high-quality ratings. A reputation 
for high-quality ratings will bring value to the business of a rating agency, e.g. 
reputation becomes a return producing capital asset (Hunt, 2009). Low quality 
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ratings would result in a loss of reputation, thus rating agencies are seen to have an 
incentive to assign ratings that are of high quality. There are disagreements 
concerning the validity of the reputational capital model. While market imperfections 
such as limited competition, conflicts of interest and implications of rating-based 
regulation do exist, some conclude that the reputational capital model does not work, 
whereas others argue that the models works despite these imperfections (Hunt, 
2009). Moral hazard could certainly be present in the current study, in that banks and 
countries request ratings based upon a perceived, or likely, outcome. Testing for 
moral hazard is difficult given the interpretation required in evaluating the empirical 
evidence. 
3.2.3 Quality of Ratings  
 
The quality of credit ratings is of vital importance for the proper functioning of the 
ratings market. It is also a heavily discussed topic. In particular, the rating agencies 
were heavily criticised for their assessment of the quality of new financial products 
such as asset backed securities, which many argue to be a vital factor in the origin of 
the subprime crisis. Kuhner (2001) discusses rating agencies' incentives to 
misrepresent the quality of issuers in times of enhanced systemic risk. Roch (2005) 
studies motivational factors that may impact on performance. In the qualitative 
analysis part professional analysts will personally review the business by visiting the 
company and talking to the management. While a qualitative analysis may enrich the 
assessment of a company's creditworthiness, it also gives way for personal 
influences and incentives. Another point of the criticism concerns the agencies' 




Moreover, the payment structure of agencies is seen as a source of conflict of 
interests. Initially, the rating agencies generated financial resources through the sale 
of publications and other materials. However, when these revenues were not 
sufficient anymore in the face of increased demand for rating services, the agencies 
started to charge issuers for ratings. This may create incentives for the agencies to 
assign higher ratings in order to satisfy their clients (Cantor and Packer, 1994). Still, 
a proper functioning reputation mechanism should counteract these incentives. 
 
In support with the above argument, credit ratings have gained another function of 
serving as a regulatory tool in the context of rating-based regulation (Dittrich, 2007). 
In particular the Basel II Revised International Capital Framework amplified the 
dependence and reliance on ratings agencies (Frost, 2007). However, the 
incorporation of credit rating agencies into the regulatory framework may add further 
value to the ratings. The demand for ratings is then not directly linked with quality, 
which in turn impedes the working of the reputation mechanism and may lead to 
agencies assigning low quality ratings (Hunt, 2009). Moreover, Jackson (2001) 
illustrates another problem of rating-based banking regulation. Credit rating agencies 
tend to raise ratings in times of growth and to lower them during downturns. This 
however implies that during the boom times, banks are allowed to have lower capital 
reserves than in downturns, which is “the opposite of what financial economics 
suggest being the optimal approach for capital standards” (Jackson, 2001). 
 
The above argument is present in the current study, which shows the statistical 
significance of macroeconomic factors and reserve regulations. In general, the study 
finds that improved macroeconomic conditions are correlated with higher ratings, 
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while greater reserve regulations are correlated with lower ratings.  This potentially 
non-optimal approach to ratings suggests that the qualitative analysis behind ratings 
agencies’ quantitative analysis may involve some moral hazard. 
 
An argument concerning the timeliness of credit ratings is valid since credit rating 
agencies are faced with conflicting requirements due to opposing interests of issuers 
and regulators on one side, and investors on the other side. The former demands 
stable ratings that reflect a long-term perspective, while the latter requires timely 
information that reflects any changes in an issuer’s credit risk (Frost, 2007). A 
widespread criticism of ratings agencies is a lack of timeliness of their ratings. In 
particular, criticism concerns the failed anticipation of corporate defaults such as in 
the case of Enron and WorldCom and the Tequila and the Asian crises in 1997 
(Robbe and Mahieu, 2005; Alexe et al., 2003). However, concerning their accuracy, 
studies seem to suggest that credit rating agencies have assessed corporate bonds’ 
relative credit risk and distinguished between companies of bad and good credit 
quality fairly well (Baker and Mansi, 2002; Robbe and Mahieu, 2005). 
 
For example, a report completed in 2004 in relation to the credit ratings and 
investors, Toby Nangle, the director of fixed income and currency at Baring Asset 
Management, stated that investors should rely on several sources and use credit 
ratings as one of these sources. He also added that credit ratings would be most 
useful if they were accurate and estimated well by rating agencies. Another point of 
view by a senior fellow and lecturer with Wharton’s management department, 
Stephen Sammut, noted in the same report that in theory it is up to the investors to 
decide whether that ratings are accurate or not by rating agencies. 
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In addition, Elkhoury (2008) stated in his paper that more stable ratings are better 
ratings. According to the argument made by Bhatia (2002), measured "failures" are 
based on ratings stability. For that, stable credit ratings by all the agencies are 
needed not only to deliver better ratings but also to predict that ratings. 
 
Furthermore, the issue of unsolicited ratings is controversial one and subject to 
debate. The majority of ratings assigned by the agencies are so-called solicited (non-
shadow) ratings, when the issuer explicitly requests to be rated from an agency. 
However, the agencies also assign unsolicited (shadow) ratings that have not been 
requested by the issuer but based predominantly on publicly available information 
(Cantor and Packer, 1994; Poon and Firth, 2005). The credit rating agencies run the 
risk that its ratings are not accurate when unsolicited ratings based on public 
information and differ to the type of information that solicited ratings is produced 
(DOJ, 1998). Some argue that unsolicited ratings prevent issuers from requesting 
ratings only from agencies that are known to assign more favourable ratings. Others 
claim that these ratings coerce issuers to pay for a proper rating when they feel that 
the unsolicited is too low due to the sole use of public information (Baker and Mansi, 
2002). Poon (2005, 2009) finds evidence that unsolicited ratings are systematically 
lower than solicited ones. However, Dittrich (2007) concludes that while the threat of 
unsolicited ratings is real, it seems to be overestimated. 
 
3.2.4 Differences across Agencies 
 
There are many ways in evaluating and comparing between credit rating agencies. 
Generally, researchers start to focus more on the differences between these 
agencies, and that due to the unexpected failure for some of these agencies in 
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predicting bank’s and country’s credit ratings. However, rating agencies should put 
into their considerations to include more specific variables and effective indicators 
that can affect significantly or reflect positively in estimating bank’s or country’s credit 
rating. 
 
Credit ratings do not always correspond across the major agencies. First of all, rating 
scales are not identical. Besides, differences across agencies are observable. A 
number of empirical studies have investigated the disagreement between 
international rating agencies to examine whether banks are more opaque than non-
banks firms. For example, Morgan (2002) examined bank opaqueness using split 
ratings between Moody’s and S&P’s rating agencies to assign different rating from 
these two agencies to a bond issue. By utilising data on new US bonds issued during 
the period of 1983-1993, his analysis finds that Moody’s and S&P’s agencies have 
disagreement in ratings over banks firms than over non-bank firms. Another finding 
in his study suggests that bank assets and capital structure give explanations for the 
disagreement between the two leading agencies. 
 
Another supporting study in the disagreement between rating agencies was 
presented by Iannotta (2006). He followed the above study of Morgan (2002) to 
analyse bank relative opaqueness by investigating whether S&P’s and Moody’s 
disagree over bank bonds than over non-banks firms and also to examine the effect 
of bond seniority on the disagreement between rating agencies. His sample includes 
2473 bonds issued by 248 firms in 14 European countries during the period 1993-
2003. Employing ordered logit regressions, his empirical analysis shows three main 
findings; first, he concluded that fewer bank issues have split ratings, and when 
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controlling for risk and other issue characteristics, the predicted probability of a split 
rating is higher for banks than non-banks firms. Second, he confirmed that bank 
opaqueness increases with financial assets, bank size and capital ratio while bank 
opaqueness decreases with bank fixed assets. Third, lower bond seniority increases 
opaqueness and disagreement between rating agencies. 
 
However, Cantor and Packer (1994) consider the differences between agencies to 
be “common, unavoidable and desirable” since in their view disagreements promote 
better understanding. However, these differences cause problems for the regulatory 
ruse of ratings (Cantor and Packer, 1994). The use of credit ratings in regulation 
implies the assumption that agencies’ rating scales are equivalent. Still, according to 
Cantor and Packer (1997), there are agencies that systematically assign higher 
credit ratings than other agencies and in their study they conclude that the same 
letter grades represent different levels of default risk for individual agencies. In 
another study of theirs regarding sovereign credit ratings, they conclude that while 
the agencies show similarities in their rating categories, they appear to weigh factors 
differently (Cantor and Packer, 1996). 
Another study by Shin and Moore (2003) focused on national differences in credit 
risk assessments by examining differences between the credit ratings of US and 
Japanese rating agencies. They examined the credit rating of 26 Japanese financial 
firms and 66 Japanese non-financial firms by using US rating agencies (Moody’s and 
Standard & poor’s) and Japanese rating agencies (Rating & Investment Information 
and Japan Credit Rating). The purpose of their investigation is to provide evidence 
on the US agencies that they ignore special corporate governance features of 
Japanese firms (e.g., Keiretsu affiliation). Employing ordered probit estimation model 
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for each of the above four agencies, their results indicate that ratings by the US 
agencies assign lower ratings to Japanese firms than Japanese agencies in 
examining the financial and non-financial Japanese firms. They also find that ratings 
by Japanese agencies have very high rank correlation comparing with those of US 
agencies, and they assume that a general home bias explains these differences. 
This means that the differences between US and Japanese agencies support the 
investigation to show that US agencies (Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s) pay no 
attention to the special nature of Japanese governance. 
 
Furthermore, a recent study by Hill, Brooks and Faff (2010) investigated the 
differences between particular sovereign credit ratings provided by the three most 
renowned agencies - Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. The examination was 
based on a longitudinal study (1990-2006) and included a total of 129 countries. 
Overall, while individual credit rating agencies tend to disagree about credit quality; 
these differences are relatively minor and usually confined to up to two notches on 
the scale. A more in-depth evaluation of this phenomenon conducted by Alsakka and 
Gwilym (2012) revealed three particular reasons for the differences in credit ratings 
provided by individual agencies. First, different economic factors and different 
distribution of weights on the factors is used by the agencies. Secondly, there is a 
lack of a consensus amongst credit rating agencies about more opaque issuers. And 
thirdly, the smaller rating agencies tend to favour issuers based in their home region. 
Moreover, a certain degree of lead-lag relationships across credit rating agencies 
has been uncovered by Alsakka and Gwilym (2010). The authors highlighted that 
while Moody’s tends to introduce the credit rating upgrades as the first agency, these 
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changes are consequently followed by all major agencies with the exception of 
S&P’s which can be characterized by its least dependence on other agencies. 
 
With regard to the time differences between agencies, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick 
(2004) did a comparison study between the biggest leading rating agencies Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s to examine if there were any timing differences of the 
single and joint rating changes and whether these changes had an impact on the 
country’s stock market. His study covers a period from 1975 to 2002, and focuses on 
Moody’s bonds and notes ratings with Standard and Poor’s foreign currency ratings. 
From the initial 100 countries in both agencies and from countries that associated 
with joint ratings, Moody’s included eight countries, namely, Chile, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan and Thailand. Standard and Poor’s 
included six countries, namely, Argentina, India, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan and 
Turkey. His findings pointed out that those rating changes do not offer any additional 
information to the stock market or investors. Additionally, a remarkable finding shows 
an impact of the joint rating downgrades on the stock market only when these in-
between the announcement dates for both agencies but the case for rating upgrades 
is not the same. However, for the cumulative abnormal returns in dealing with both 
agencies Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2004) found that Standard and Poor’s discloses 
that joint ratings have a higher impact than the single ratings, but Moody’s are higher 
for joint downgrades than the single ratings after 10 days of the announcement 
second rating change. 
 
Furthermore,   Moody’s downgraded the Swiss Bank Corporation from AAA in 1992, 
whereas S&P downgraded them only in 1995 (Valdez, 2007). An earlier study on 
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Moody’s assigned ratings was presented by Lucas and Lonski (1992); they 
demonstrated that number of firms that downgraded in ratings has gradually gone 
over the number of firms that upgraded in ratings over time. They also suggested 
that the reason beyond the issue of downgrading and upgrading in firm’s credit 
ratings is either the quality of these firms has declined from time to time or the 
standards and requirements of credit ratings have become more rigorous. 
 
A report completed in 2004 by Moody’s top Russia analyst, John Schiffer and 
published by Wharton school of the University of Pennsylvania explained that “if a 
country defaulted within a year of investment grade; that would be viewed as a 
wrong call. You should be prescient by at least a year”. Early in 1998, Moody’s 
downgraded Russia two times – just a few months before Russia crashed. “We 
moved before the others (S&P’s and Fitch’s)”, John Schiffer added. 
 
Another report made in Wharton finance and written by Professor Franklin Allen 
pointed out that credit rating agencies did not give a sign of the Argentinean’s default 
until their government is about one month of proclaiming bankruptcy ahead of peso 
devaluation. He believed that credit rating agencies should have called the default of 
Argentina much earlier than they did. In addition to that, Toby Nangle confirmed by 
saying “I honestly don’t know why rating agencies didn’t move earlier in tandem with 
Argentina ratings. Maybe they were conscious of the potential feedback and didn’t 
want to worsen the situation on the ground”. However, rating agencies aim to not get 
caught out but they may have been caught out in Argentina and they were caught 




Further evidence on the failures of rating agencies has been reported recently by 
Elkhoury study in 2008. He analysed the impact of credit rating agencies on 
developing countries and assessed the deficiencies of credit rating agencies. He 
explains in his study some of the failures which caused by Moody's and Standard 
and Poor's; as they failed to predict the Mexican and Asian financial crises and this 
failure was due to the fact that credit rating agencies ignore things like contingent 
liability and international liquidity considerations into their estimations. Another failure 
has been reported by Standard and Poor's during the Russian and Argentinean 
crisis; and Moody’s failed to predict the Russian crisis but not the Argentinean one. 
 
Recently, the shortcomings of the current models of credit rating agencies have been 
highlighted in studies conducted by Polito and Wickens (2012) and Polito and 
Wickens (2013). While Polito and Wickens (2012) focused on the examination of US 
data from 1970 to 2011, the later study (Polito and Wickens, 2013) is based on the 
examination of European countries in the period of 1995-2012. Both studies 
highlighted that the credit ratings should have been downgraded prior to the debt 
crisis. 
The practical difficulties that arise from the arguments proposed in the existing body 
of research however prevent any significant development in this area. While Veron 
and Wolff (2011) recognised the inadequacies in the sovereign credit ratings, the 
authors highlighted the complex issues in improving the quality of ratings. The 
delegation of the task of providing sovereign credit ratings to public authorities is also 





3.3 Estimation of Sovereign and Bank’s Ratings Models 
 
3.3.1 Studies on Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
In recent years, we have witnessed ongoing research on investigating sovereign 
ratings and risk assessments that are assigned by credit rating agencies. 
Additionally, studies on examining the determinants of sovereign ratings and the 
impact of these have been increasing in recent years to estimate credit rating 
models. 
 
Studying sovereign ratings is a good advantage and an important determinant in 
estimating credit rating models since its crucial influences on a country’s institutions 
and policies are central to the foundations of financial market and economic 
development. It is plausible that financial sectors across countries are different in 
developing and sustaining good economic. Thus, the major differences in financial 
sector developments across countries will raise the need of independent rating 
agencies, to reconsider their assessments for how they may influence the financial 
development (Kim and Wu, 2008). 
 
For example, recent empirical study on the determinants of Standard and Poor’s 
assigned ratings, Kim and Wu (2008) investigated the influence of sovereign credit 
ratings on various measures of financial market developments in a panel of 51 
emerging countries (including 7 MENA countries) over the period 1995-2003. Their 
panel regression estimations find strong evidence on sovereign rating measures to 
have an impact on financial sector developments and capital flows. By employing 
country economic variables and aggregate governance indicators, their findings 
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stated that sovereign credit ratings are critical determinants of financial development 
in different financial sectors within emerging markets. 
 
Kim and Wu’s (2008) study is similar certain findings in the current study, which 
addresses the effect of governance on ratings. This study confirms many of the 
findings of Kim and Wu, in particular the effect rule of law, corruption, and political 
stability have on ratings. 
 
However, Afonso et al. (2007) stated that there are many reasons which explain the 
importance of investigating sovereign credit ratings; firstly because it is a key 
determinant of the interest rates that a country will face in the international financial 
market and its borrowing costs. Secondly, sovereign ratings possibly will face an 
impact on the ratings assigned to domestic banks or firms. Thirdly and most 
importantly, some institutional investors have lower boundaries for the risk they 
predict in their investments and for that they are expected to choose their bond 
portfolio considering the credit risk perceived by the ratings symbols which will show 
the real situation of their investment. 
 
Since economic factors are essential determinants of sovereign credit ratings, 
research conducted on these ratings may give some indication to the importance 
attributed to economic factors by the rating agencies. In the first systematic study on 
the determinants of sovereign credit ratings, Cantor and Packer (1996) used ratings 
that assigned by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s for 49 countries as of September 
1995. Applying Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to a linear representation of 
the ratings, they found distinct economic factors to be significant in the determination 
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of a country’s rating: per capita income, GDP growth, inflation and external debt. 
Cantor and Packer’s model can explain more than 90 per cent of the cross-sectional 
variation in ratings and their methodology was followed by Afonso (2003), Alexe et 
al. (2003) and Butler and Fauver (2006). Similarly, Canuto, Santos and Porto (2004) 
identified a small number of variables that explain differences between the ratings of 
different countries, these are; per capita income, economic growth, inflation, external 
debt/current account receipts ratio, and central government gross debt/total fiscal 
receipts ratio. The findings of these studies are generally confirmed in this study, 
which finds that per capita income, economic growth, the amount of debt, and other 
balance sheet variables significantly impact a country’s credit rating. 
Later on, Butler and Fauver (2006) followed the same methodology as in Cantor and 
Packer (1996) to examine cross-sectional determinants of sovereign credit ratings on 
a sample of 86 countries (including 13 MENA countries)5. They found that quality of 
the legal environment is among the most significant factors explaining the country’s 
credit ratings. The legal environment was also found to be statistically significant in 
the current study, and in particular on government credit ratings, more so than 
banks’ ratings. 
 
Cruces (2006) investigated a study on the statistical properties of institutional 
investor country credit ratings. Employing 173 countries in 11 portfolios based on 
location and special characteristics, he contributed by modelling the rating transitions 
of expected repayment capacity, and by testing empirical implications using series of 
sovereign credit ratings. His main findings were that ratings effectively displayed 
volatility clustering and asymmetric adjustments, their revisions are serially 
5 In 2006, Butler and Fauver have included 13 MENA Countries in their sample; these countries are: 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia and Turkey. 
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correlated during most of the sample, and region and other characteristics capture 
common persistence in the ratings. In his analysis, he concluded that it has three 
implications of interest to investors; a country’s current credit rating is not necessarily 
the best forecast of its long term sovereign risk, the forecast function is different 
across countries at a given point in time, and this function should be reassessed 
from time to time. The current study also found serial correlation issues in the ratings 
and other variables, although the serially correlated-adjusted results did not change 
any of the conclusions. 
 
Cruces (2006) mentioned in his article that linear regressions of country credit 
ratings on macroeconomic variables as in the following studies (Cantor and Packer, 
1996; Feder and Uy, 1985; Lee, 1993; Haque et al., 1996) suggest that a higher 
fundamental volatility implies a higher rating volatility. However his analysis suggests 
that countries in the default range would have higher variance of credit revisions 
even if all countries had the same volatility of repayment capacity. 
 
More empirical studies on the assessments of credit rating determinants have been 
analysed econometrically for mature and emerging markets (Cantor and Packer, 
1995; Haque et al., 1996, 1997; Reisen and Maltzan, 1999; Juttner and McCarthy, 
2000; Bhatia, 2002). These studies found the following variables explain 90 per cent 
of the variation in the ratings, these are; GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, 
default history and the level of economic development, the ratio of non-gold foreign 




Specifically, Haque et al. (1996) presented a comprehensive study that examines the 
correlation between country credit ratings and macroeconomic variables. They 
covered over 60 developing countries observed during the period (1980-1993). 
Employing linear regression analysis, they found that all the following variables; the 
country’s foreign reserves holdings, output growth, and the current account balance 
in the year before the rating was published  are domestic determinants of credit 
ratings. They also reported that the international’s worsening scenario will reduce the 
effect of credit ratings by a sizable amount on local fundamentals.Similar findings are 
present in the current study. 
Contrary to the OLS estimation techniques used by Cantor and Packer (1996), 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) employed an ordered response model to analyse the 
determinants of sovereign credit ratings. The purpose of his study is to measure the 
significance of the economic variables6 in the determinants of the rating for each 
country. He examined a sample of 95 countries covering the period from December 
1995 to December 1999, and used data provided by international agencies, Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s. His findings indicate that financial variables alone do not 
determine sovereign ratings. In addition, he concluded that there is a different level 
of importance between economic variables for the sample of high rated countries 
compared to the low rated countries. Of the economic variables used, he found that 
GNP per capita and inflation are key economic indicators and they trigger the same 
importance in the forecast of the sovereign ratings over the years and between the 
agencies. In addition, Bootheway and Peterson (2008), consistently, identify GDP 
6 The economic variables which are used by Bissoondoyal-Bheenick’s study in 2005 are: GNP per 
capita, inflation, government financial balance/GDP, government debt/GDP, real exchange rate, 
foreign reserves, and net exports/GDP. He used the unemployment rate and unit labour cost to 
capture the measures for the 25 high rated countries. In addition, net export/GDP is replaced by 




                                                 
per capita, real GDP growth rate and inflation as key macroeconomic factors. 
However, they also discover regional variations in the determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings. This study does not address regional variations, rather focusing on 
certain Arab countries.  As mentioned, the current study does find the significance of 
GDP per capita and other macroeconomic variables as statistically significant in 
predicting credit ratings.  Also consistent with Bootheway and Peterson (2008), 
governance and regulatory variables also factor into the final credit rating. 
 
However, Afonso et al. (2007) estimated models for sovereign (country) credit 
ratings assigned by three rating agencies; Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch 
ratings for a panel of 130 countries (including 14 MENA countries)7 from 1995 to 
2005, using a variety of economic indicators. In contrast to logistic models, they 
employ augmented linear regression and ordered probit models that explicitly 
account for country-specific fixed and random effects. Their setting allows for the 
modelling of unobserved country-specific effects that are correlated with the random 
error term, arguing that this is the best procedure for panel data as it considers the 
existence of an additional normally distributed cross-section error term. More 
importantly, their limited dependent variable modelling approach allows for the effect 
of an explanatory variable to be distinguished between the short-run (immediate) and 
long-run effect. Although this approach might be useful in future research on the 
credit ratings covered in this research, no attempt was made at distinguishing 
between short-run and long-run effects. Such a distinction would also be difficult 
given that the data set only includes at most 13 years of history for each panel 
member. 
7 In 2007, Afonso, Gomes and Rother have included 14 MENA Countries in their panel data; these 
countries are: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates. 
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As sovereign ratings comprise not only economic risk, but also political risk as well, 
research conducted on sovereign ratings may reveal important political factors 
considered in the rating process in this context too (Cantor and Packer, 1996; 
Bootheway and Peterson, 2008). Moreover, studies have explicitly examined the 
influence of political factors on the banking system as well as on banks ratings. 
 
Bootheway and Peterson (2008) show that property rights and corruption 
significantly influence sovereign ratings. This relationship also holds in the regional 
subset of Western Europe and North America. Alexe et al. (2003) make use of the 
World Bank Governance Indicators to examine political stability, government 
effectiveness and corruption as determinants of sovereign ratings. The additional 
inclusion of these political factors leads to better classification results than the mere 
consideration of economic factors.  The findings of Bootheway and Peterson (2008) 
are confirmed by this study, which finds that non-financial factors such as political 
stability and absence of violence and terrorism, government effectiveness, rule of 
law, and control of corruption influence the final credit rating. 
 
3.3.2 Studies on Banks Credit Ratings 
 
While the above studies focus on sovereign (country) credit ratings, Poon, Firth and 
Fung (1999) conducted multivariate analysis for a sample of 130 banks covering 50 
countries, using Moody’s assigned ratings. Employing logistic regression models, 
they found significant effects of three bank level factors representing loan provisions, 




In a different study, Poon and Firth (2005) have developed a model to explain 
differences in bank ratings and to assess bank rating determinants, using an 
international sample of 1,060 banks assigned by Fitch’s Bank Individual Ratings 
(FBRs) across 82 countries (including 12 MENA countries)8. They have employed 25 
financial variables9 of the sample banks for all statistical tests and models, these 
ratios are extracted from the Bankscope financial database (Bankscope). They used 
a treatment effects model based on Heckman’s two-step estimation method for the 
purpose of taking an account of any possible sample-selection or selectivity bias. In 
terms of the bank rating differences, their results asserted that there is a significant 
difference in the distributions of solicited and unsolicited ratings. Poon and Firth 
indicated that banks that received shadow ratings are smaller, lower and have 
weaker financial profiles than banks that received non-shadow ratings, which means 
that unsolicited ratings are lower than soliciting ratings. With regards to the 
assessments of bank rating determinants, their findings suggested that bank size, 
profitability, asset quality, liquidity and sovereign credit risk are important variables in 
determining Fitch’s Bank Individual Ratings (FBRs). 
 
8 In 2005, Poon and Firth have included 12 MENA Countries in their sample; these countries are: 
Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and 
United Arab Emirates. 
9 The financial variables that used in Poon and Firth’s study are as follows; Profitability Ratios: Net 
Interest Margin (NIM), Net Interest Revenue/Average Total Assets (NIMA), Pre-tax Operating 
Income/Average Total Assets (PROA), Return on Average Assets (ROA), Return on Average Equity 
(ROE), Dividend Payout (DPO) and Cost to Income Ratio (CTI). Asset Quality Ratios: Loan Loss 
Reserves/Gross Loans (LLR/GL), Loan Loss Provisions/Net Interest Revenue (LLP/NIR), Loan Loss 
Reserves/Non-Performing Loans (LLR/NPL), Non-Performing Loans/Gross Loans (NPL/GL), Net 
Charge Off/Average Gross Loans (NCO/AGL) and Net Charge Off/Net Income before Loan Loss 
Provisions (NCO/BNI). Liquidity Ratios: Interbank Ratio (INTERBANK), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), 
Loans/Customer and Short-Term Funding (LTD), Loans/Total Deposits and Borrowings (LTDB), 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding (LATD) and Liquid Assets/Total Deposits and 
Borrowings (LATDB). Capital Adequacy Ratios: Tier 1 Capital Ratio (TIER1), Capital Adequacy 
Ratio (CAP), Equity to Total Assets (ETA), Equity to Loans (ETL) and Equity to Customer and Short-




                                                 
Further international evidence on the determinants of (Fitch assigned) bank ratings is 
provided by Pasiouras et al. (2006) who employed ordered logistic regression on a 
sample of 857 commercial banks covering 71 countries (including 12 MENA 
countries)10. Their set of variables include bank level accounting and financial 
characteristics as well as country-specific regulatory, supervision and market 
structure indicators, and their general findings reveal significant support for both sets 
of variables on bank credit ratings. More specifically, they concluded that the less 
cost efficient banks with higher than average levels of provisions relatively to their 
income and lower liquidity tend to have lower ratings. Larger and more profitable 
banks tend to obtain higher ratings. Higher equity to assets ratio results in higher 
ratings only when we do not control for bank supervision and regulations. Hence, in 
a multivariate environment capital strength may be given less weight in the overall 
credit analysis that might be expected. With regards to the non-financial bank 
specific characteristics, they found evidence that banks with more subsidiaries and 
more institutional shareholders obtain higher ratings. For the country-specific 
regulatory and supervision variables, they found that banks in countries with lower 
capital requirement, restrictions on bank activities, official displinary power and no 
explicit deposit insurance scheme obtain higher ratings. Banks in countries with 
higher deposit insurer power, liquidity and diversification guidelines entry 
requirements, fraction of entries denied and economic freedom are also assigned 
higher ratings. Disclosure requirements and foreign banks entry have a significant 
impact on ratings only when we simultaneously control for the regulatory 
environment and market structure. Finally, they said auditing requirements have 
significant impact only when we control for the regulatory environment alone. 
10 In 2006, Pasiouras, Gaganis and Zopounidis have included 12 MENA Countries in their sample, 
these countries are: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates. 
91 
 
                                                 
Regarding the market structure variables, Pasiouras et al. (2006) found that banks in 
markets with higher share of assets in foreign banks obtain higher ratings, while 
banks in markets with higher concentration and share of assets in government 
owned banks are assigned lower ratings. However, the influence of concentration 
and government owned banks are not robust to different specification of the model. 
More precisely, they have mentioned that the share of assets in government owned 
banks becomes significant when we control for the regulatory and supervisory 
power, while concentration becomes insignificant when we examine whether the 
market is a developed one. 
 
In a recent study Ioannidis, Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2010) instead of trying to 
explain Fitch’s bank credit ratings, they use Fitch ratings as a basis to develop a 
model to assess the soundness of banks. Their classification of bank soundness 
provides better results when incorporating country-level data, covering the regulatory 
and institutional environment, banking sector features and macroeconomic factors, 
compared to models with financial variables only. Furthermore, in order to analyse 
the relationship between compliance with Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank 
Supervision and bank soundness, Demirguç-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) 
measure bank soundness with Moody's bank financial strength ratings. 
 
Moreover, the influence of non-financial factors on bank ratings has not been studied 
sufficiently. There are but a few studies that analyse the impact of both financial and 
non-financial factors on bank credit ratings. With regard to the internal rating systems 
of banks; Grunert, Norden and Weber (2005) explored the role of non-financial 
factors in internal credit ratings, using four German commercial banks. Their set of 
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variables includes quantitative and qualitative data such as; market structure, 
profitability and liquidity. Employing logistic regression, they found significant results 
in showing that the combined use of financial and non-financial factors leads to a 
more accurate prediction of default events. 
 
Regarding the assessment of state of the economy, Les Bras and Andrews (2004) 
point out a bank’s financial performance is vitally affected by the economy the bank 
operates in. Accordingly, important economic indicators are utilised to determine the 
economic risk a bank is subject to. Among other features these generally comprise 
GDP, GDP growth, inflation, unemployment rate, exchange rates and interest rates 
(Les Bras and Andrews, 2004; Vuong, 2007; S&P, 2004a, 2004b). 
 
Another study by Pasiouras, Gaganis and Zopounidis (2006), utilised the Economic 
Freedom Index as a proxy for the overall state of the economic environment and 
policies. They found that banks in an environment of greater economic freedom 
receive higher ratings. Hence, lower corruption, government bureaucracy and better 
quality and enforcement of the legal system may be seen as conducive for banking 
stability. 
 
Furthermore, the banking environment is attributed a key role for the operations and 
performance of banks (Les Bras and Andrews, 2004; Standard and Poor’s, 2004b). 
Rojas-Suarenz (2001) investigated a research on what lessons should credit rating 
agencies learn from financial indicators. He found that capital-to-asset ratio is the 
indicator that most used of banking problems in industrial countries, and this ratio 
has performed poorly as an indicator of banking problems in emerging markets such 
93 
 
as Latin America and East Asia. Furthermore, Rojas-Suarenz sheds light on the 
selection of effective indicators to examine bank’s performance and to avoid banking 
problems in emerging markets. He believed that “indicators work where markets 
work” and external rating agencies would be better off by concentrating more on 
effective indicators for the reason of assessing bank’s financial risks and thus 
providing investors an adequate measurement of that risks. 
 
The current study also finds various financial, macroeconomic, and regulatory effects 
on banks’ credit ratings. In particular, this study finds that important financial ratio 
predictors of banks’ ratings are net interest margin, return on average assets, return 
on average equity, net loans to total assets, net loans and liquid assets to total 
customer deposits and short-term funding, and total assets. Statistically significant 
regulatory predictors of ratings include such things as capital requirements, deposit 
insurance schemes, and internal management and organisational requirements. To 
a much lesser extent than government ratings, various macroeconomic variables 
also helped predict banks’ ratings, including real GDP growth and the unemployment 
rate. 
 
However, credit agencies recognise that financial firms differ from non-financial firms 
when assessing their creditworthiness by considering unique factors to banks (e.g. 
Les Bras and Andrews, 2004; Vuong, 2007). While measures of profitability, cash 
flow and leverage are important variables in the ratings of both financial and non-
financial firms, rating agencies lay special weight on asset quality when rating the 




Empirical study exploring the effects of innovation activity on firms credit ratings was 
presented by Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004), using Credit reform as the largest German 
rating agency. Their study has a set of three innovative measures; Research and 
Development (R&D), patent stock and the share of sales with newly developed 
products, as well as data that covers the period from 1992 to 1998 of Western 
German firms from the manufacturing sector. Employing ordered probit estimation, 
Czarnitzki and Kraft found the above measures have significant impact on credit 
ratings when they are used separately. They also discovered an inversely 
relationship for all three variables with internal optima. The optima show that credit 
ratings will increase when a rather high level of innovation is reached. Czarnitzki and 
Kraft (2004) verified that too much innovation activities on firms would be negative to 
the credit ratings because it is always subject to possible failures. They also 
confirmed that credit ratings would be improved with the increase of firm size, value 
added per employee and with firm age. In other words, younger firms are likely to 
have a bad credit rating because they have not obtained enough experience or 
history, besides that when a value added per employee within a firm is higher, the 
credit rating would be much better. 
 
Another study by Amato and Furfine (2004) examined whether credit rating agencies 
are extremely procyclical by analysing the impact of the United States’ business 
cycle on firms’ credit ratings. Their datasets include US financial and non-financial 
firms assigned by Standard & Poor’s ratings during the period 1981-2001. Their 
analysis presented a variety of variables that measure the business risk, the financial 
risk and macroeconomic indicators to analyse how these factors in US firms have an 
impact on credit ratings. Employing an ordered probit model to predict firms’ credit 
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ratings; they found no evidence to show that credit ratings have an excess sensitivity 
to the business cycle. Adding up, when the time they limit their samples to include 
only investment grade firms or initial ratings and rating changes, they document to 
find evidence of procyclicality in credit ratings. 
 
Several theories use credit rating transitions phenomenon in predicting default 
events. For example, some of the academicians and practitioners applied 
homogeneous Markov chain model, the first study by Jarrow et al. in 1997 was 
proposed to illustrate the dynamics of credit ratings (Parnes, 2007). 
 
The study of Parnes (2007) provided an alternative approach to track credit rating 
transition probabilities. His internal correlations model tracks time-series movements 
within credit rating entries rather than cross-ratings correlations. He used Comustat 
database reports on 130,559 quarterly S&P’s long-term credit ratings for 4510 
industrial companies during the period 1985-2004. Parnes tested the non-
homogeneous dynamic through Dickey–Fuller test and found to be statistically and 
economically significant. 
 
Recent study by Feng, Gourieroux and Jasiak (2008) explored the dynamics of credit 
rating matrices from a different perspective. They proposed a factor probit model for 
modelling and prediction of rating matrices that are assumed to be stochastic and 
driven by a latent factor. The unobservable latent factor model in their study divulges 
the significant business cycle effect on credit rating transitions. Feng et al. (2008) 
provided evidence in support of the PIT (point-in-time) rating approach since 
discussion concerning two alternative credit rating philosophies; these are “point-in-
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time” (PIT) and “through-the-cycle” (TTC), the latter philosophy disregards the 
economic cycle effect and offers higher values of cross-sectional correlations than 
the PIT. Feng et al. (2008) concluded that the banking supervisory authorities 
support and encourage the use of a factor probit model because it can be used in 
predicting a portfolio’s future ratings. Also, there is an advantage of a latent factor 
model and that when it allows for computation of default correlations and the 
CreditVaR. Their results confirmed the link between credit quality changes and the 
underlying state of the economy. 
 
On the other hand, Doumpos and Pasiouras (2005) investigated the development of 
credit rating models for the purpose of replicating the credit ratings of a regional 
agency. The analysis of their study is based on the credit ratings issued by Qui 
Credit Assessment Ltd., using a multicriteria classification method and focused on 
testing the out-of-time and out-of-sample effectiveness of the models. They used a 
sample of 500 non-financial companies operating in the UK, followed over the period 
1999-2001. Doumpos and Pasiouras classified those companies into five risk groups 
as follows; Secure groups, Stable groups, Normal groups, Unstable (caution) groups 
and High-risk group. 100 firms from each risk group were randomly selected from the 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database of Bureau van Dijk’s, according to 
their QuiScore for the year 2001. Their results indicated that it is possible to replicate 
the credit ratings of the firms with a satisfactory accuracy by using publicly available 
financial data. Also by using a total of 26 financial ratios and 13 variables 
representing annual changes as evaluation criteria in the analysis, they found that 10 
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significant ratios11 cover all aspects of financial performance to be significant in all 
years. 
 
A comparative study in analysing credit ratings for the United States and Taiwan 
markets was proposed by Huang et al. (2004), applying new statistical techniques, 
namely, the learning theory Support Vector Machines (SVM) together with the highly 
performance method Back propagation Neural Networks (BNN). The purpose of their 
study has taken a place to provide a new model that serves credit rating predictions 
with better explanatory power. However, they used two bond rating datasets; for 
Taiwan, they obtained 74 cases with bank’s ratings and 21 financial variables that 
covered 25 financial institutes during the period 1998-2002. For the United States, 
they acquired 265 cases of 10-year data that covered 36 commercial banks. By 
using BNN statistical method as a benchmark, they achieved prediction accuracies 
just about 80% for BNN and SVM methods for both markets. Results of Huang et al. 
(2004) indicate that, firstly SVM analytical method achieved better accuracy in 
prediction credit ratings than BNN method. Secondly, models that use a small set of 
financial variables perform better and even offer good results (in some cases) than 
other models that employ a large set of the same variables. 
 
For the support of non-linear models and in contrast of the above result by Huang et 
al. (2004) regarding Neural Network technique, the following study introduced the 
effectiveness of non-linear models as compared to linear ones in forecasting credit 
11 The financial ratios that were found significant (at the 1% level) throughout 1999, 2000 and 2001 by 
the study of Doumpos and Pasiouras (2005) are as follows: Current ratio, Quick ratio, Solvency ratio, 
Net profit margin, Return on total assets, Interest cover, Creditors payment (days), Gross profit 
margin, EBIT margin and EBITDA margin. 
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ratings. Kumer and Bhattacharya (2006) did a comparative study between non-linear 
and linear models to predict corporate credit ratings. They compared Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANN) model against Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) model, using 
Moody’s long-term ratings. They employed 25 financial and accounting ratios on a 
sample of 129 companies covering various sectors over the period 2003-2004. Their 
results clearly indicate that ANN is more robust in dealing with missing data and 
complex data sets and it does not require various assumptions like linearity and 
normality, for that, they confirmed that ANN works better and it may be a good 
approach than LDA in corporate credit rating forecasts. 
 
There are a few empirical studies that have attempted to estimate the determinants 
of municipal bond ratings such as; Farnham and Cluff (1982, 1984), and Loviscek 
and Crowley (1990). An early study by Gentry, Whitford and Newbold (1988) 
predicted industrial bond ratings using n-chotomous multivariate probit model with 
funds flow components and financial ratios. The main objective of their study is to 
employ cash flow components in order to classify and estimate industrial bond 
ratings for new offerings and reclassified bond issues. The model they use to identify 
funds flow measures was developed in 1982 by Erich Helfert; they redesigned that 
model in their previous studies (see Gentry, Newbold and Whitford; 1984, 1985b) to 
include 12 major components12. Besides these components, six financial ratios13 
from Pinches and Mingo (1973) were used in classifying and estimating bond ratings 
12 Twelve funds flow components that redesigned by Gentry, Newbold and Whitford (1984, 1985b) 
and used in their study in (1988) are as follows: operations (NOFF), accounts receivable (ARF), 
inventory (INVF), other current assets (OCAF), accounts payable (APF) and other current liabilities 
(OCLF), financial (NFFF), fixed coverage expenses, i.e., interest and lease payments (FCE), capital 
expenditures (NIFF), dividends (DIV), other asset and liability flows (NOTHER), and the change in 
cash and marketable securities (CC).  
13 Gentry, Newbold and Whitford (1988) adopted six financial measures from Pinches and Mingo 
(1973), these are as follows: (1) subordination, (2) amount of the issue in dollars, (3) debt ratio, (4) 




                                                 
in 1983 and 1984. They used Moody’s assigned rating for all industrial bond 
offerings as Moody’s rated 127 new issues in 1983 and 155 new issues in1984. In 
addition, all industrial bonds that were reclassified by Moody’s in both years were 
included in their sample. The main findings of Gentry, Whitford and Newbold (1988) 
show that five out of twelve funds flow components, namely; inventories, other 
current liabilities, dividends, long-term financing, and fixed coverage expenses are 
significant in predicting the bond ratings of reclassified issues. They also show the 
probability tests pointed out that financial ratios and funds flow components have 
significant and positive impact on enhancing the n-chotomous multivariate probit 
model to classify new and revised bond ratings. 
 
Another study is constructed by Badu and Daniels (1997) who employed ordered 
probit model, to investigate the determinants of municipal bond ratings in Virginia for 
the cross-sectional data of 1993. They have included several explanatory variables 
that represent four general categories as used in the international rating agency 
(Moody’s), these categories are as follows: (1) debt factors (2) financial factors (3) 
administrative factors, and (4) economic base factors. Their model correctly predicts 
over 70% of the original sample and gives attention to the important factors that 
determine bond ratings. Their findings signify that the economic base variables 
(capital expenditures to the revenue ratio, the real estate tax rate and the revenue 
per capita) are crucial determinants of municipal bond rating in Virginia, and they are 







As mentioned before, credit rating agencies publish their rating methodologies, yet 
their underlying assumptions and weighting of factors remain undisclosed. While this 
chapter has covered a variety of studies that have assessed credit rating agencies 
on different perspectives, e.g., Morgan, 2002; Iannotta, 2006; Cantor and Packer, 
1994; Shin and Moore, 2003 and Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2004. 
 
This study adds to the literature by confirming previously known factors that predict 
banks’ and countries’ credit ratings, while also providing an interesting insight into 
which factors influence banks’ ratings compared to factors that influence countries’ 
credit ratings. The two differ significantly at times. 
 
Moreover, this chapter includes several empirical studies that have developed 
models to estimate sovereign (country) ratings. For example, an early study by 
Cantor and Packer (1996), examined the determinants of sovereign ratings. 
 
This chapter has also reviewed a good number of empirical studies that have 
analysed and estimated the determinants of bank credit ratings. Poon, Firth and 
Fung (1999) examined Moody's bank financial strength ratings, focusing on bank’s 
characteristics. Further studies by Poon (Poon, 2003; Poon and Firth, 2005; Poon, 
Lee and Gup, 2009) concentrated on the subject of unsolicited ratings, but includes 
assessments of bank rating determinants as well. Pasiouras, Gaganis and 
Zopounidis (2006) analysed non-financial factors, namely bank regulation, 
supervision and market structure, in addition to bank characteristics as determinants 




From the above explanations, a multitude of diverse factors have an impact on 
bank’s and country’s ratings respectively. Factors that affect sovereign ratings may 
be considered influential for bank credit ratings, since economic indicators for banks' 
credit ratings are derived from sovereign ratings (Le Bras and Andrews, 2004). In 
addition, Poon (2003), Poon and Firth (2005) and Poon, Lee and Gup (2009) found a 
significant positive relationship between sovereign ratings and banks ratings. 
 
Evidently, not only bank-level variables but also indicators in the bank’s environment 
have a crucial influence in assessing the creditworthiness of banks. Financial ratios 
express banks' viability. A good financial position enhances banks' credit rating. 
Profitability, liquidity and asset quality in particular fundamentally affect ratings. 
Moreover, studies support the positive influence of bank size on ratings. Concerning 
the banking environment, banks that operate in a strong institutional, 
macroeconomic and political environment are attributed a higher creditworthiness by 
the agencies. Particularly output, economic growth and inflation shape the sovereign 
ratings of countries, and consequently also determine the rating of banks. With 
reference to the governance indicators, bank ratings would be influenced positively 
when countries having strong political and legal environment that is well developed 
and in a stable situation without any conflict or political crises. Furthermore, features 
of the regulatory and supervisory environment add to the soundness of the banking 
sector and affect the assessment of creditworthiness. 
 
Additionally, Grunert et al. (2005) found significant results of the combined use of 
financial and non-financial factors which leads to a more accurate prediction of 
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default events. In addition, the conclusions drawn by the studied focusing on 
financial variables were contradicted by Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) who revealed 
that financial and economic variables on their own are insufficient to determine 
sovereign ratings. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Gonis, Paul and Wilson 
(2012) who argued that the inclusion of non-financial variables provides a better 
explanation for the credit rating. Building on these conclusions, the study conducted 
by Butler and Fauver (2006) emphasised the quality of legal environment as the 
most significant factor predicting credit rating of a country. Concerning existing 
literature on credit ratings, the combined analysis of financial bank variables as well 
as non-financial indicators such as; macroeconomic, political and regulatory and 
supervisory lacks sufficient studies. 
 
There is no study has been exploited the above variables in one study for MENA 
region. So far, there has been only one study (Pasiouras et al., 2006) in the literature 
that employed non-financial factors including; regulatory and supervision, and market 
structure along with the bank-level accounting and financial characteristics to 
estimate the determinants of Fitch assigned bank ratings. Most of other studies 
reviewed have used the country economic variables along with the bank-level 
accounting and financial characteristics to estimate sovereign and bank rating 
models. Therefore, this study will make use of the following variables (financial bank 
characteristics, country economic, aggregate governance and regulatory and 





Finally, there is no study has been predicted together sovereign and banks credit 
ratings for MENA region alone. However, the following studies (Butler and Fauver, 
2006; Afonso et al., 2007; Kim and Wu, 2008) have contained a few countries of 
MENA region in their panel data to assess the determinants of sovereign ratings 
assigned by different agencies. Other empirical studies such as (Poon and Firth, 
2005; Pasiouras et al., 2006) include some countries within MENA region in their 
samples to analyse the determinants of banks ratings. The majority of all the above 
studies are focusing on European countries, the USA and the UK for the purpose of 



































This chapter is designed to evaluate the research methods, statistical and 
econometric techniques that are going to be employed in examining the importance 
of bank level and country level data on the credit ratings of MENA over the period 
(2000 – 2012), in order to find suitable models for the estimation. 
 
The research design of this study requires careful consideration. It can be defined as 
a general plan of how to approach finding the answers to the particular research 
questions of the study (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). This chapter provides 
a description of the research philosophy, stages and approaches as well as the 
types of research data collection methods. Then it outlines an overview of the 
dependant and independent variables that were identified as potential determinants 
for the estimation of credit ratings models. Finally, it discusses of the statistical 
procedures (e.g. linear regression, logit and probit) that are going to be used for the 
estimation. 
 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
 
Research can be implemented in systematic and certain ways, but the subjects of 
investigation are varied, and the differences between these subjects need to develop 
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systematic approaches that lead to appropriate inference based on results and 
outcomes. There are different types of approaches to research methodology, which 
do not necessarily have to be followed separately. In this context, the deduction 
approach denotes the testing of theory; the induction approach refers to the building 
of theory (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). 
 
An early study by Perry (1998) explained these major approaches, which concluded 
that positivism paradigm is deductive approach which means adopting and 
developing academic theories through testing and examining those adopted 
theories; in other words, a proposition is made in the research which is then tested 
for its truth. Whereas, inductive paradigm involves the formation of theory, this could 
be described as generating an un-existing theories and building new theories during 
the research process by depending on the research area and its circumstances. 
Furthermore, Jennings (2001) described positivism as the scientific system is being 
guiding and controlling the world which clarifies the performance of casual 
relationships. 
 
Explaining the relationship between bank/sovereign ratings and diverse variables is 
the focus of this study. For this purpose the previous literature has been scrutinised 
and subsequently a number of variables were identified to be the potential 
determinants of ratings. With the theory thus established, data has been collected 
and accordingly will be analysed in order to investigate the impact of these variables 
on credit ratings. To accomplish the aim and specific objectives of this research as 
previously discussed, the theory testing as a perspective of this research will be 
required; therefore it will include a deductive approach. 
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4.3 Research Stages 
 
“A research design is the framework for getting from here to there where here may 
be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered and there is some set of 
conclusions (answers) about these questions” (Yin, 2003). There are many different 
research strategies to select from when writing a thesis. However, the choice of 
strategy should be depend on the research objectives or questions (Yin, 1994). This 
section intends to discuss and shed light on the techniques for estimating credit 
rating models. 
 
Each type of study has its advantages and limitations, depending on what the 
researcher wants to examine, the choice of study also may differ. On the other hand, 
Yin (1994) classified the research into three basic purposes:  exploratory, descriptive 
and explanatory. The latter kind of study aims to discern casual relationships 
between variables (Yin, 1994; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). This study may 
be called explanatory because of the relationship between bank-level and country-
level data and bank credit rating which is going to be examined. 
 
4.3.1 Exploratory Stage  
 
A research is designed to allow the researcher to understand the whole aspects of 
research area with respect to some phenomenon. In addition, an exploratory 
research approach allows for continuous adjustment for more understanding of the 
subject which was generated. The research should be as flexible to provide 




4.3.2 Descriptive Stage 
 
The aim of this stage is to develop accurate descriptions of patterns that were 
investigated in the exploratory research. The purpose here comes out with 
intersubjective descriptions (e.g. empirical generalisations) which will lead to theory 
development in the long run. 
 
4.3.3 Explanatory Stage 
 
The purpose of this stage is to develop theory clearly which could be used to explain 
the empirical generalisations that emerged in descriptive stage (Reynolds, 1971). 
Moreover, Yin (1994) explained that the explanatory research is a casual research; it 
should be used to illustrate a certain set of events and explain how the investigation 
may apply to other investigations. 
 
However, based on the research objectives involved and accordingly the overall 
purpose of this study will go through the process of these three stages; exploration, 
description and explanation. The researcher is going to explore what the purpose 
brings up, to describe what is brought up with the research objectives and to explain 
since when the conclusion to be drawn by analysing  the related data in choosing the 
best models. 
4.4 Research Data Collection Process 
 
In research a distinction is made between primary and secondary data. The former 
refers to the collection of new data for the purpose of a particular research, whereas 




4.4.1 Primary Data Sources 
 
Primary data collection is necessary when a researcher cannot find the data needed 
in secondary sources, however, usually primary data is collected for a particular 
purpose and should be collected in conjunction with secondary data (Saunders et al., 
2007). 
 
According to Yin (1994), there are several primary research strategies in the social 
sciences; questionnaires, interviews, experiments, surveys, archival analysis and 
case studies. Which of these strategies that is most suited for any particular study, 
depends on the type of research question, the degree of control, and whether the 
study has its focus on contemporary events. 
 
Furthermore, Yin (1994) stated that a case study approach should be used when 
how or why questions are being posed about existing events over which the 
researcher has little if any control. He further explained that documentation in case 
studies is essential because the overall documents results support and corroborate 
evidence from other sources to the research, although, systematic searches for 
appropriate documents are important in data collection. Also, Yin (1994) confirmed 
that archival records are essential and could be in the form of service and 
organisational records, charts and lists, surveys and personal records, these and 
other archival forms can be utilised to support case studies analyses. 
 
However, the application of an experiment is not appropriate in this study because 
we have no intention to investigate cause/effect relations, which an experiment is 
often used for. Another reason for not selecting experiment is that it demands control 
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over behavioural event, which is not possible in a study like this. However, a survey 
is also not suitable since it would have limited the investigation because the 
researcher would not be able to study the selected area in details. 
 
4.4.2 Secondary Data Sources 
 
Secondary data comes in various forms. Data regarding the market and its trends 
can be available from the external sources. Internal data provides information about 
the organisation, its type, its culture, employees and ethics. According to Saunders 
et al. (2000), secondary research includes two types of data, raw data and published 
summaries but the pitfall of using  raw data is that a researcher has low control over 
the data collection process, while published summaries does not provide the process 
of data collection and hence explanation of the analysis will provide the results. 
 
There are some benefits of using secondary data, this summarised as follows; it will 
save time from collecting raw data, it is economical as it will save travelling 
expenses, it will help in the better understanding of the basic objectives of the 
research and it will provide a wide choice of data collected by various researchers in 
any field. 
 
The use of secondary data could be utilised based on related articles, official 
websites, annual reports, historical and official documents, newspapers, archival 
records and published statistics which will provide most of the important secondary 
data. Tellis (1997) indicated that not all sources are essential in every research, but it 
is important to use more than one source of data to enhance the research reliability, 
meanwhile Yin (1994) emphasised that “A major strength of case study data 
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collection is the opportunity to use many different sources of evidence”, also data 
may not be available in previous and historical studies which persuade researchers 
to develop their own method to gather and organise investigative data (Rowley, 
2002). 
  
Due to the nature of this research, the secondary data will be extensively used such 
as the online data which is partly available on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and The World Bank websites. A number of reasons justify why this research relies 
solely on secondary data; first, the credit ratings themselves are a product of the 
rating agencies. Second, country-level data that concerns the macro-economy, 
regulation and supervision and governance have been compiled by international 
institutions. Also, Bank specific data includes financial figures and ratios; these are 
processed by the banks themselves, and recorded in the financial statements as part 
of their annual financial reports. Because this research is of secondary nature it does 
not face specific ethical issues. The study relies on published and publicly available 
data and does not utilise confidential information. Furthermore, it involves neither 
sensitive issues nor vulnerable groups or individuals. 
 
4.4.3 Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
 
The best research method to use for a study is based on the research problem and 
research question (Yin, 1994). According to Saunders et al. (2009), two different 
methodological approaches are used in the social sciences; these types consist of 
qualitative method which denotes the generating of non-numerical data, whereas the 
generating or use of numerical data is classified as quantitative method. Both of 
these methods have different approaches, tools and techniques. Moreover, data 
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collection techniques and data analysis procedures in a research can be categorised 
into different groups.  
 
Some researchers have indicated that the research strategy which is based on a 
case study requires using qualitative method of research (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 1994). 
Using a qualitative approach is appropriate of getting a deep knowledge about the 
topic, but since the social world in business is complex and unique then it is difficult 
to theories in the same way as the physical science (Saunders et al., 2000). On the 
other hand, a quantitative research is considered the only method that gives an 
objective truth, because it converts information into numbers, and represents the real 
facts about the research objectives, so this method should be used when the 
researcher conducts investigation that contains many units (Reynolds, 1971). Also, it 
is important to apply this method when there are some measurement dimensions 
which need to be investigated by quantitative tools (Saunders et al., 2000). 
Moreover, Ghauri et al. (1995) noticed that once comparing qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, the qualitative one is much more elastic and unstructured. 
 
Since part of the data in this research deals with qualitative shape, this requires 
transforming these information into values in order to make the analysis possible. In 
support with this, Sekaran and Bougie (2010) recommended that the researcher 
should transfer any kind of data to a much easy form once it is gathered, so that the 
findings can be produced easily clearly and accurately. It is worth to mention here 
that this research implies using both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect 




In details, credit ratings reflect the rating agencies’ opinion of creditworthiness. In 
particular, they depict a relative ranking of creditworthiness, expressed in letters. 
Ratings, thus, may be described as a qualitative ordinal measure (Afonso, Gomes 
and Rother, 2007). Furthermore, the assessment of creditworthiness of a bank is not 
only of quantitative but also of qualitative nature. While rating agencies process 
quantitative financial data amongst others, they additionally consider aspects such 
as management and strategy, which is a rather subjective evaluation (Les Bras and 
Andrews, 2004; S&P, 2004a, 2004b; Vuong, 2007). It is however, not in the scope of 
this work to analyse this qualitative aspect of credit ratings. What is more, records 
used for the regulatory and supervisory environment were only available in 
qualitative form since they had not been quantified in their initial survey which formed 
by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). These qualitative data (regulatory and 
supervision variables and ratings from international agencies) needed to be 
transformed into quantitative values, in order to be analysed and reflected their 
influence on estimation rating models. The transformation of these variables is 
explained further in a later section.  
 
Furthermore, with regards to the quantitative data collection techniques and data 
analysis procedures, there are different types of quantitative data (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2009). The majority of explanatory variables that are going to be 
examined as factors of ratings in the analysis are numerical data, covering e.g. 
banks’ financial ratios and macroeconomic data. 
 
Nevertheless, sole quantitative data contains little meaning. Thus, there are 
quantitative analysis techniques such as statistics to examine relationships between 
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variables, which enable the conversion of data into information (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2009). This is why in the analysis i.e., the relationship between bank-level 
and country-level data on one side and bank credit ratings on the other side will be 
statistically analysed in order to assess the impact of these factors on ratings. 
 
4.4.4 Validity and Reliability  
 
According to Jennings (2001), “Validity refers to the extent to which an empirical 
measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration”, 
also Jennings (2001) stated that there are several types of validity: 
 
• Face validity which means that the subject is being measured appropriately. 
• Criterion – related validity: it is connected with founding measures that will 
expect future results in association to specific criteria; it is used when 
determining performance or ability.  
• Content validity refers to employment of actions that integrate all of the 
meanings connected to the study, so, the data collected should contain high 
content validity.   
• Finally, construct validity evaluates the summaries of collected data 
depending on several indicators, which are based on valid theories such as, 
Maslow hierarchy to obtain various motivation indicators. 
 
On the other hand, Judd et al. (1991) clarified that “Reliability entails consistency and 
freedom from random error of the scores obtained by a measurement technique”. 
When researchers engage in a study particularly involves quantitative method and 
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data analysis process, they should involve reliability to include low frequency of 
random errors to avoid any replicated results. 
 
Credibility is always essential in a qualitative and quantitative research. Researchers 
are required to seek for valid and reliable data in order to minimise defaults and 
errors. However, there will always be a doubt of reliability in case of secondary 
research, and there will also be concerns and risk that the application of data is 
outdated and no longer valid. Therefore, for secondary data research a health check 
should be made on the validity and reliability of the research data for the purpose of 
presenting more sensible, accurate and transparent results. In doing so, the best 
efforts will be made and care is going to be taken to ensure that the data used in this 
research is authenticated, collected from reliable sources, valid and up to date. 
 
4.4.5 Presentation of the Data 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) described data analysis activities “Consisting of three 
concurrent flows of activity, data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing 
verification”, these are presented as follows: 
 
• Data reduction 
It is a major process of the analysis, which assists and organises the data in order to 
present an explained conclusion by reducing and transforming the data collected, so 
in this research, the data collected is compared by the existing literature which will 






• Data display 
In this stage, the summarised data is displayed in organised manner, which will 
provide further assistance for data reduction. 
 
• Conclusion drawing verification 
In this stage, the researcher will be able to analyse, interpret and draw conclusion 
based on deeper understanding of the data collected. 
 
4.5 Identification of Variables and Research Sample 
 
This section will briefly explain the initial sample of this study and outline the sources 
of collecting the required data; however, the detailed samples for the estimation will 
be discussed later in Chapter (5) country rating models and chapter (6) bank rating 
models. Due to the inclusion of country-specific indicators in addition to bank 
characteristics, it was beneficial to consider banks from more than one country. 
Ultimately, MENA countries and their commercial banks were chosen based on data 
availability of the credit ratings in the Reuters databases. The next sub-sections will 
explain the sources of collected data for the above variables and it will further 
elaborate on the variables chosen to be examined in the analysis. 
 
4.5.1 Dependent Variables 
 
The database Thomson Reuters Eikon has been discovered as a source for 
collecting data on historical sovereign and bank ratings. It additionally served as a 
source for financial figures and ratios of banks. However, while ratings of specific 
banks and countries were accessible, related company data could merely be 
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acquired for the respective banking group or holding company. Furthermore, a 
number of countries and banking firms had to be excluded due to insufficient data 
concerning credit ratings. Ultimately, the final sample consisted of 108 commercial 
banks covering 13 MENA countries. The observed time period spanned over the 
years 2000 to 2012. 
 
The credit ratings that are chosen as dependent variables based entirely on long-
term issuer (foreign) ratings from Standard and Poor's (for sovereign ratings) and 
from Fitch (for banks ratings). However, long-term issuer (local) rating is an 
alternative type to be used in case of the unavailability of data for some years. While 
both agencies distinguishes between domestic and foreign issuer ratings, most the 
observed cases domestic and foreign ratings were identical, which made a 
distinction for the analysis redundant. In case a rating change by Standard and 
Poor's and Fitch occurred at a date during the first two months of a year this new 
rating has been attributed to the preceding year for the analysis. 
 
4.5.2 Independent Variables 
 
Meinster and Elyasian (1994) and Sabi (1996) observed that the bank regulators, for 
example, use financial ratios to assess bank's performance. Previous research has 
identified a number and mixture factors that influence bank credit ratings. Figure 
(4.1) illustrates an example of the financial and non-financial variables that are going 







Figure (4.1): Financial and Non-Financial Indicators 
 
 
4.5.2.1 Internal-Financial Factors 
 
Palepu et al. (2000) noticed that the financial statements of any corporation 
summarise the economic consequences of its business actions. Financial statement 
analysis is the most significant part of the fundamental analysis which also known as 
quantitative analysis; it involves looking to historical performance data in order to 
estimate the future performance. Additionally, Fundamental analysis implicates the 
study of an organisation’s processes and assets in an effort to verify its essential 
value. Changes in these fundamental realities are used to give details on the 
forecast of market moves. 
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Financial ratios are considered as one of the investment analytical tools for investors 
in valuing the company’s performance based on traditional fundamental analysis 
because it measures the returns and risks. Also it compares the connected figures 
from financial statements to express past and present performance of the company. 
Ratio analysis (e.g. profitability, liquidity and gearing) has many objectives, it is 
employed in this research to assess and evaluate the bank’s ratings, performance 
and position. The purpose of some of these broad categories of ratios is summarised 
as follows: 
 
• Profitability ratios: It shows if the company is making a satisfactory profit or 
not. 
• Liquidity ratios: It focuses on the bank's short term liability and the ability of 
the bank to pay its short run liabilities. 
• Gearing ratios: It measures the bank’s ability to meet its long term 
liabilities. 
 
Moreover, an essential part of the assessment of creditworthiness by the rating 
agencies concerns the bank characteristics such as financial figures. In particular, 
asset quality proves to be influential. In order to analyse the asset quality of banks, 
consideration is given to their loan portfolio. Loan provision ratios have already been 
discerned as determinants of bank ratings. Furthermore, profitability may be 
measured through various financial ratios. Previously, return on average assets has 
shown to have an impact on ratings. Additionally, bank size has consistently been 
identified as a significant factor for banks’ credit ratings. Despite the importance 
attributed to capital strength for banks, capital structure variables have not been 
identified in previous research as determinants of bank ratings. Similarly, evidence 
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about liquidity is mixed. A further analysis of the above factors may provide further 
insight on estimating bank ratings. 
 
Bank level accounting and financial data (including profitability, capital strength, 
asset quality, liquidity and size) is drawn from Bankscope, as used by Pasiouras et 
al. (2006). Bankscope Database of Bureau van Dijk’s, which is specialised database 
that contains information for approximately 12,000 banks around the world. The 





Table (4.1): Description of the Financial Ratios and Bank-Level Variables 
 
 
Variable  Category  Description 
 
Operations 
    
NTM  Net Interest Margin  Net Interest Income/Interest 
Earning Assets 
ROAA  Return on Average Assets  Net Attributable/Average Total 
Assets 
ROAE  Return on Average Equity  Net Attributable/Shareholders 
Equity 
COST  Cost to Income Ratio  Operating Costs/Total Income 
 
Capital 
    
CAPITAL  Total Capital Ratio  Tier 1 + Tier 2 Capital/Risk-
adjusted Assets  
EQAS  Equity / Total Assets   Tier 1 Capital/Risk-Adjusted 
Assets  
CAPLY  CAP Funds / Liabilities  Total Capital Funds / Total 
Liabilities  
Asset Quality     
LOAN  Loan Loss Res/ Loan  
 













 Loan / Assets  
 
 
Loan / Dep Funding 
 
 
Assets / Dep Funding 
 
 
Net Loans / Total Assets 
 
Net Loans / Deposit (Customer) 
and Short Term Funding 
 
Liquid Assets / Deposit 
(Customer) and Short Term 
Funding 
 
Size      
LGASS  Bank Size  Logarithm of Total Assets 





In details, profitability is recognised to be crucial for a bank’s long-term viability. 
Banks that have a low profitability are more vulnerable to adverse situation than 
healthier banks. High profitability, in particular a high return on assets, has been 
associated with higher bank ratings in previous studies. From Bankscope database 
four profitability ratios could be acquired: Return on Average Assets (ROAA), Return 
on Average Equity (ROAE), Net Interest Margin (NTM) and Cost to Income Ratio 
(COST). 
 
In addition, capital strength is fundamental for banks as a protection against 
insolvency. Considering opposing and mixed results of previous research, an 
investigation into the influence of capital ratios in the analysis might provide further 
insight. The Equity to Total Assets (EQAS) ratio will be included in the analysis as a 
capital structure variable. Additionally, Bankscope provided the ratios Tier 1 capital 
(TIER1) and Total Capital (CAPITAL), which refer to capital adequacy defined by the 
Basel Committee. The total capital ratio is calculated as total capital (Tier 1 and Tier 
2) to risk-adjusted assets. This ratio must not be lower than 8%. Likewise, Tier 1 
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capital ratio is determined as Tier 1 capital to risk-adjusted assets (BIS, 2006). The 
special role of asset quality and its importance along with the liquidity for banks are 
recognised in previous studies. These ratios have also been utilised in order to 
determine a potential influence on bank credit ratings. 
 
However, bank size has been an important determinant of bank credit ratings in 
earlier literature. Even though some researchers argue that larger banks are not 
necessarily safer and may engage in riskier behaviour, a positive relationship 
between bank size and credit ratings was discerned in previous research. In the 
analysis bank size has been determined in accordance with earlier studies as the 
Logarithm of Total Assets (LGASS). 
  
4.5.2.2 External-Non Financial Factors 
 
On the other hand, factors of the banking environment were identified in previous 
research to affect the ratings of sovereigns and banks. Among macroeconomic 
variables such as; GDP (per capita), GPD growth and inflation have been shown to 
be important determinants of country ratings and thus will have an influence on bank 
ratings too. Furthermore, the impact of political and legal environment indicators 
may be determined through factors that measure political stability, government 
effectiveness or the rule of law. A variety of aspects in the regulatory and 
supervision variables may influence the credit rating agencies’ assessment of 
banks’ creditworthiness, for instance the existence of deposit insurance schemes, 
restrictions on banks activities and capital adequacy requirements. Figure (4.2) 
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describes an example of external factors that have been chosen to serve the 




Figure (4.2): Description of Non-Financial and Country-Level Variables 
 
  
4.5.2.2.1 Macro-Economic Factors 
 
Both the rating agencies’ bank rating methodologies and previous literature reveal 
specific macroeconomic factors to be determinants of credit ratings. Additionally, a 
number of macroeconomic variables have been found to have an influence on 
banking stability and soundness. Data for the macroeconomic indicators for this 
study has been extracted from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic 
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Outlook Database, October 2013. The following Table (4.2) provides more details on 
the macroeconomic variables that are going to be examined in the analysis. 
 























Variable Category Description 
RGDPG Real GDP Growth 







Gross Domestic Product 
 
 
GDP per Capita 
 
GDP per U.S. Dollars 
Billions, current prices 
(National Currency) 
 
Gross Domestic Product 
per Capita in U.S. Dollars 







Gross Capital Formation 
at Market Prices as 




Gross National Savings 
 
Gross National Savings as 






Annual Percentage of 
Average Consumer Price 
Index 
   
UNEMP Unemployment Rate 
Unemployment as 
Percentage of Total 
Labour Force 
   
GOVNDEBT Government Net Debt 
General Government Net 





Current Account Balance 
 
Current Account Balance 
as Percentage of GDP 
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4.5.2.2.2 Political and Legal Indicators 
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) define governance as “The traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”, specifically they refer to: 
“The process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; 
and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them”. 
 
The political and legal environment of a country has a considerable impact on the 
stability of its banking system. In order to determine the influence of these indicators, 
expressed as estimate of governance performance from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators Database (2013 update) have been included in the analysis. The 
database was developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), and has 
also been utilised by e.g. Alexe et al. (2003). The following Table (4.3) gives more 
demonstration on the dimensions of aggregate governance indicators that will be 












Table (4.3): World Governance Indicators by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) 
 
 
4.5.2.2.3 Regulation and Supervision Variables 
 
Previous research has analysed the influence of the regulatory and supervisory 
environment on bank credit ratings as well as its impact on bank risk-taking and 
banking stability and soundness in general. The database of the World Bank 
Regulation and Supervision is based on the work of Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). 
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The following Table (4.4) illustrates the type of variables as well as questions 
concerning the regulatory indicators. 
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can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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4.6 Statistical Methods 
 
Two statistical approaches can be discerned in research that investigates 
determinants of credit ratings (see e.g. Afonso, Gomes and Rother, 2006). One 
strand of literature utilises a linear regression model, specifically an ordinary least 
square analysis on a numerical, linear representation of the ratings, e.g. Cantor and 
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Packer (1996), Monfort and Mulder (2000), Alexe et al. (2003), Canuto, Santos and 
Porto (2004). The other strand of literature analyses credit rating determinants by 
applying an ordered response framework. While some researchers make use of an 
ordered logit model, e.g. Poon, Firth and Fung (1999), Pasiouras, Gaganis, and 
Zopounidis (2006), others employ an ordered probit model e.g. Badu and Daniels 
(1997), Shin and Moore (2003), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), Grunert, Norden, 
Weber (2005), Bootheway and Peterson (2008).  
 
The methods this study will be applying in analysing credit rating in countries and 
banks are two major frameworks namely; the linear regression framework and the 
ordered response framework inclusive of the logit and probit models. Linear 
regression framework measures ratings in linear relationship on various financial 
metrics while the ordered response framework relaxes the assumption of a linear 
rating scale by adding endogenously determined break points against which a similar 
fixed coefficient linear index is measured (Mertz and Cantor, 2006). These two 
models have advantageous in the computation and implementation during the 
analysis. Although these methods have been successful in analysing different 
samples of previous researches, still some setbacks have been occurred depending 
on the data size and availability. 
 
4.6.1 The Linear Regression Framework 
 
Statistical methods used by quantitative researchers in carrying their study have 
recorded success over the years. Linear regressions that happen to be one of the 
statistical methods have dominated the quantitative research market. Monfront and 
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Mulder (2000) and Mora (2006) generalised linear regression framework as the 
following: 
 
itiiitit ZXR µλβ +∂++=  
 
Where; 
R represents the quantitative variable that is attained by a non-linear or a linear 
alteration. itX stands for the vector contains factors that include variables which 
vary during a period of time. iZ refers to the vector of time invariant that includes 
regional models. In addition, the index i  ),...,1( Ni =  is a symbol of the country 
while the index t  ),...,1( Tt = symbolizes the time period and i∂ represents the 
distinct effects of countries i  (it can be seen as a model to be assessed). Also itµ
characterises independent variables for countries. 
 
Moreover, by means of a regression analysis a predictive model is fit to collect the 
required data. With this model values of the dependent variable (the outcome 
variable) can be predicted from one or more independent variables (explanatory 
variables). Field (2005) defined linear regression as a linear model to fit and 
generalise the trend of collected data, i.e. a line is determined that summarises the 
general trend of the data. Asteriou (2006) presented the simple multiple regressions 
in an equation which is given as follows: 
 
itkkit ititit




The given equation contains a number of cross-sectional units ),...,2,1( ni = that 
are observed at different time periods ),...,2,1( TT = , and thus represents a panel 
dataset. For example, to the benefit of this research, itY , is the dependent variable 
as a vector of banks and countries credit ratings and itKX ),...,2,1( Kj = is the 
set of explanatory variables, i.e. bank characteristics, macroeconomic, governance 
as well as regulation and supervision indicators. There are different models of 
estimation for the given dataset, which will be elaborated on in the subsequent 
sections. 
 
However, Afonso et al. (2007) evaluated the equation for Linear Regression in three 
methods namely:  
 
• Pooled Ordinary Least Square method 
• Fixed Effect method 
• Random Effect method 
 
The following sub-sections discuss the theoretical methodologies for the above three 
models. The underlying statistical underpinning is provided for each of these 
methods. Furthermore, the existing body of academic literature is reviewed in order 








4.6.1.1 Ordinary Least Square Method 
 
To begin with, ordinary least squares estimation method focuses on the estimation of 
unknown parameters in a linear regression model. Its origins can be traced back to 
the end of the 18th century when it was developed as a statistical method by Carl 
Friedrich Gauss (Allen, 1997). The sum of squared vertical distances between the 
dataset values and predictions based on the linear approximation is minimised via 
this method. The estimation method represents one of the most commonly 
estimation techniques as it allows for the measurement of accuracy of the regression 
model. The key problems that can be associated with this estimation method as 
summarised by Allen (1997) relate primarily around outliers, non-linearities, too 
many variables and dependence among variables. 
 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method is a particular linear regression technique 
to find the line that best describes the analysed data (line of best fit)14, (Field, 2005). 
The pooled OLS can be applied for datasets that contain both different cross-
sections and time periods. This method assumes that there are no differences 
between the examined cross-sections and hence estimates a common constant (β0) 
for all cross-sections. Underlying the application of this model is the a priori 
assumption that the dataset is homogenous (Asteriou, 2006). 
 
14 In order to find the line of best fit the least square method squares the residuals, i.e. the differences 
between the model fitted to the data and the actual data collected, and selects the line with the lowest 




                                                 
Least square as the name implies means minimizing the sum of squared error terms. 
OLS method is known as one of the oldest and simplest of all methods of linear 















Where; we have a sample size of n. 







= which is the squared error 
between the actual and fitted values. Where; 
22 )ˆ( iii YYe −= . 
 
Abdi (2003) also listed some features known as the Gauss-Markov conditions and 
theorem that are linked with OLS method and they are: 
• The data in question must contain a random sample from a definite 
population. 
• The population model must be linear. 
• The independent variables must be linearly independent. 
• The error must have a zero expected value. 
• The error must be distributed and uncorrelated with independent variables. 
 
However, Butler and Fauver (2006) used OLS estimates in which they used the 
same sample of countries and the same regressors, although they used the actual 
values of legal environment rather than the projected values in the OLS. The effect is 
smaller than OLS estimates indicate, although it is still quite large. The magnitude of 
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the coefficient on the legal environment variable drops and despite the drop, the 
coefficient is still statistically significant and the economic relevance is still quite 
large. Moreover, the standardized coefficient drops but it is still larger than the 
standardized coefficient on each of other variables in the regression. This 
standardized coefficient is based on the standard deviation of the instrumented legal 
environment composite. From the analysis of sovereign credit rating by Butler and 
Fauver (2006), it is evident that endogeneity matters enough to materially inflate the 
apparent impact of legal environment on sovereign credit ratings. However, even 
adjusting for endogeneity, legal environment is still an economically major 
determinant of sovereign credit ratings. It is still the largest single factor that we have 
identified as a determinant of sovereign credit ratings. 
 
Moreover, the early study by Cantor and Packer (1996), applies OLS regressions to 
a linear representation of the ratings, on a cross section of 45 countries. This 
methodology was also pursued by Afonso (2003) and Butler and Fauver (2006). 
Using OLS regression analysis on a numerical representation of the ratings is quite 
simple, and this estimation sometimes is inappropriate, since OLS would consider 
the difference in the dependent variable between a 1 and a 2 as equivalent to the 
difference between a 2 and a 3. In addition, OLS technique allows for a straight 
forward generalization to the panel data by doing fixed or random effects estimation 
(Mora, 2006; Monfort and Mulder, 2000). Recently, Hampel et al. (2011) recognised 
that least square has a growing prevalence amongst researchers; however, they 
argued that it suffers from a dramatic lack of robustness. Any single outlier can have 
an excessive effect on the estimate (Galvao, 2011). In the previous literature OLS 
method was applied by e.g. Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2007), Canuto, Santos and 
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Porto (2004) and Monfort and Mulder (2000). However, these papers also employ 
additional specifications such as fixed effects and random effects. 
 
4.6.1.2 Fixed and Random Effects Models 
 
In contrast to pooled OLS, the fixed effects regression model assumes that the 
observed quantities of predicting variables are non-random; it is used in evaluating 
longitudinal data with recurring procedures on both independent and dependent 
variables. This method has a major attracting characteristic of controlling for all 
steady features of individuals (Allison, 2006). Fixed effect method offers unobserved 
differences between individuals as a set of fixed factors that can be either assessed 
directly or partially. According to Allison (2006), there are two requirements for using 
the fixed effect method. These include: 
 
• Measurement of the dependent variable must be done at least twice for each 
individual. They must have the same result. 
• Predictor variable must change in the measurement of each individual. 
 
Fixed effects regression models are important because data often falls into different 
categories. The fixed effects method allows for differences among the data matrices 
of the cross-sectional dimension. This means, different constants for each section 
are estimated by including a dummy variable for each group. This method, however, 
suffers from some drawbacks. First, the degree of freedom is considerably reduced 
through the large number of dummy variables and thus inefficiency is increased. 
Secondly, time-invariant variables are not accounted for. Consequently, other 
136 
 
dummy variables cannot be utilised. Finally, independent variables that are slowly 
changing will be collinear with the effects to a high degree (Asteriou, 2006; Kennedy, 
2003). Due to these problems associated with the fixed effects method, a 
contradictory approach often the random effects method is alternatively applied. 
 
While the fixed effects model treats the constant for each section as fixed, in the 
random effects model the constant for each section is random parameters (Asteriou, 
2006). Once a quantity is categorised as random, it means that it fluctuates and 
appears that a particular observed period based on chance. The same applies to 
statistical models when quantity is at random, it is known as drawing conclusions 
from observed units (Snijders, 2005). Under the random effect method, unobserved 
differences between individuals are offered as random variables with a stated 
possibility distribution (Allison, 2006). The analogue under the random effect method 
is that an interaction variable is obtained by multiplying the explanatory variable by 
the dummy variable for the units to be obtained (Snijders, 2005). 
 
Moreover, random effect method permits a larger degree of freedom and 
consequently leads to more efficient estimators of the coefficients. Additionally, it 
allows for time-invariant independent variables (Kennedy, 2003). However, by this 
technique the estimates will be biased and inconsistent if the errors and independent 
variables are correlated. Furthermore, explicit assumptions have to be made about 
the distribution of the random effect. Ultimately, this method may be more 
appropriate for unbalanced panels, whereas the fixed method is more suitable for 




The existing body of statistical literature highlights numerous shortcomings of the 
ordinal linear regression model. Laird and Ware (1982) pointed out the difficulties in 
applying general covariance structure to highly unbalanced data and recommended 
the use of a two-stage random effects model. Furthermore, the presence of a 
substantial downward bias in ordinal linear regression has been emphasised in the 
academic debate (Moulton, 1986; Moulton, 1990). Despite the theoretical 
foundations provided in the existing body of literature on random effect models (Box 
and Tiao, 1968; Hedeker and Gibbons, 1994), the study conducted Berkey et al. 
(1995) questioned the validity of random-effects regression models. 
 
Nevertheless, Hedges and Vevea (1998) discussed two major categories of 
statistical procedures commonly used in meta-analysis - fixed and random effects 
models. Although these models are commonly considered as viable alternative, the 
authors highlighted the differences in their respective inference goals. While fixed 
effects models aim to make inferences regarding the effect parameters observed in 
the studies, the random effects models is based on making inferences regarding the 
distribution of effect parameters in a population from a random sample of studies 
(Hedges and Vevea, 1998). The authors conducted an in-depth analysis of the two 
families of statistical models and highlighted the need to understand their intended 
goals in order to apply them correctly in the analysis process. Furthermore, Hedges 
and Vevea (1998) reported that conditionally random-effect models, or a hybrid type, 
have properties of both fixed and random effects models. Similar conclusions can be 
found in the work of Greene (2005) who proposed extensions to circumvent the 
respective shortcomings of both fixed and random effects models. In essence, the 
inefficiency measures in the models might be increasing the heterogeneity and 
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decreasing the efficiency of the models. The outcome of the discussion 
encompassed in the work of Greene (2005) thereby extends the fixed effect model to 
a stochastic frontier model which adopts a non-linear specification. Furthermore, 
Greene (2005) considers the random effects model as a special case of random 
parameters model which enhances its efficiency. 
 
Additionally, Afonso et al. (2007) analysed three evaluators and concluded that they 
are known to be stable and their ranking is efficiently clear. They analysed these 
methods under normal circumstances, where the country specific error is 
uncorrelated with the regressors, the random effects method should be applied while 
if circumstances are different from the normal, the fixed effects method should be 
used. They concluded that random effects method is preferred to the fixed effects 
method and that the fixed effects method is preferred to the pooled OLS method. 
 
4.6.2 The Logistic Regression Framework 
 
The other way to counter for linear regression framework is an ordered response 
models that used by the logistic regression framework. The foundation behind the 
application of these ordered response techniques lies in the ordinal, qualitative 
nature of credit ratings. As mentioned previously in the literature for the analysis of 
credit ratings, this method has been used e.g. by Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), 
Bootheway and Peterson (2008) and Shin and Moore (2003). 
 
An early study by Wiginton (1980) compared logistic regression with discriminant 
analysis and concluded that logistic regression completely dominates discriminant 
analysis. In statistics, Greene (2002) described the logistic ordered framework has 
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the dormant variable model. Based on this model, it is impossible to detect the 
correct value of the interest dependant variable Y and possible to detect the 
dependent variable Z which already contains information about variable Y. This 
ordered framework can be divided into two models namely: 
 
• Ordered Logit Model 
• Ordered Probit Model 
 
The ordered logit model and the ordered probit model ensure and provide almost the 
same thing but the major difference is in their distribution. In case of the ordered logit 
model, there is an observed ordinal variable which is a function of another variable 
that is not measured. In this model, there is a continuous unmeasured dormant 
variable whose values define the ordinal variable value. The model is used to 
evaluate categorical outcome in order where some outcomes are greater than 
others. A significant limitation to this model is that the maximum probability requires 
the computation of normal integrals which is mostly carried out by simulation 
(Greene, 2004; Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003; Dardanoni, 2005).  
 
4.6.2.1 Ordered Logit Model 
 
The logit method that originates from the field of econometrics has been applied to 
ratings estimations by various researchers (e.g. Poon et al., 1999; Pasiouras et al., 
2006). Considering the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, an ordered logit 
model has been argued to be appropriate to the modeling of ratings. We discuss 
very briefly the ordered logit model below while more detailed discussions can be 
found in Powers and Xie (2000) and Borooah (2001). 
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In general, logistic regression (sometimes called the logistic model or logit model) is 
used for prediction of the probability of occurrence of an event by fitting data to a 
logistic function. It is a generalised linear model used for binomial regression. Like 
other forms of regression analysis, it makes use of one or more predictor variables 
that may be either numerical or categorical. For example, the probability that a 
person has a stroke within a specified time period might be predicted from the 
person's information such as; age, sex and body mass index. 
 
The logistic regression begins with an explanation of the logistic function which is 
used like the probabilities, that when dependent variables are dummy variables and 
always takes on values between zero and one. It estimates the possibility of 
dependent variables to be 1. Logit models have cumulative standard logistic 
distribution (Torres-Reyna, 2002). In the ordered logit analysis the probability of a 

























The input is z and the output is ƒ (z). The logistic function is useful because it can 
take as an input any value from negative infinity to positive infinity, whereas the 
output is confined to values between 0 and 1. The variable z represents the 
exposure to some set of independent variables, while ƒ (z) represents the probability 
of a particular outcome, given that a set of explanatory variables. The variable (z) is 
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a measure of the total contribution of all the independent variables used in the model 
and is known as the logit. The variable (z) is usually defined as follows: 
 
ikki xxxxz εεβββββ ++++++= ...3322110  
Where; 
iZ is the probability that firm i will be estimated, 0β is the intercept term and
),...,1( mkk =β represents the regression coefficients associated with the 
corresponding independent variables ),...,1( mkX k = for each firm, while iε
represents the error term. 
 
For example, Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) used ordered logit models to estimate credit 
ratings. The dependent variable is treated as a latent variable, because we observe 
the rating, but we do not observe the credit quality or default probability. The authors 
analysed the following variables: (i) Interest coverage ratios: cash flow before 
interest expenses and taxes divided by interest expenses; cash flow before interest 
expenses and taxes divided by total debt; (ii) Capitalization indices: total debt divided 
by total assets; long term debt divided by book equity; (iii) Size variables: total 
assets; issue size; (iv) Stability variables: coefficient of total asset variability; 
coefficient of profit variability; (v) Subordination: dummy variable indicating the 
subordination status; (vi) Market variables: beta coefficient and residual of the 
market model regression. According to Kaplan and Urwitz (1979), the specific risk or 




Some studies have found Logit model superior to other methods (Gu, 2002). This 
method potentially could give a better decision if compared to the distribution of 
financial risk using a model based on discriminant analysis (Boritz and Kennedy, 
1995). However, recent studies (e.g. Shin and Lee, 2002; Abid and Zouari, 2002; 
Rahman et al., 2004; and Pendharkar, 2005) predicted a bankruptcy using the logit 
model. In Malaysia, the applications of a logit model are done only in predicting 
corporate failures rather than for banking institutions. Most of the studies used 
working capital variables as discussed in the study by Mohamed et al. (2001). 
 
4.6.2.2 Ordered Probit Model 
 
Some researchers make use of an ordered probit model to estimate the 
determinants of credit rating models (e.g. Badu and Daniels, 1997; Shin and Moore, 
2003; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005; Grunert et al., 2005; Bootheway and Peterson, 
2008). 
 
The asymptotic properties of the ordered probit model hamper generalisations from a 
small sample, and a number of difficult adjustments are required for this approach 
(Afonso, Gomes and Rother, 2007). An ordered response models make the 
determination of the size of the differences between the single rating categories 
possible, they require careful consideration and various adjustments for a proper 
analysis (Afonso, Gomes and Rother, 2007). They stated that the ordered probit is a 
natural approach of the limited dependent variable framework. The rating is a 
discrete variable and reflects an order in terms of probability of default. Each rating 
agency makes a continuous evaluation of a country’s credit-worthiness, embodied in 
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an unobserved latent variable R*. This latent variable has a linear form and depends 
on the same set of variables as before, the setting is the following: 
 
itiiiiitit ZXXXR µελδβ ++++−= )(*  
 
Wooldridge (2002) described two approaches to estimate ordered probit model. The 
first one is “quick and dirty” possibility, it is assumed with only one error term that is 
serially correlated within banks. Under that assumption one can do the normal 
ordered probit estimation but a robust variance-covariance matrix estimator is 
needed to account for the serial correlation. The second possibility is the random 
effects ordered probit model, which considers both errors iε  and itµ  to be normally 
distributed, and the maximization of the log-likelihood is done accordingly. This 
second approach should be considered the best one, but it has a drawback of the 
quite cumbersome calculations involved. 
 
Moreover, the Ordered Multinomial Probit (OMP) is used for estimation in the context 
of an ordinal polychotomous dependent variable. While taking into account the 
existence of a ranking, the OMP also assumes that the size of the difference 
between any two adjacent ratings is not known but does not matter to the carrying 
out of the analysis, unlike, for example, the usual regression techniques, where the 
size of the difference between adjacent elements is known and matters to the 
carrying out of the analysis (Cheung, 1996). 
 
In general, credit ratings can be viewed as resulting from a continuous, unobserved 
creditworthiness index. Each credit rating corresponds to a specific range of the 
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creditworthiness index, with higher ratings corresponding to a higher range of 
creditworthiness values. Since the credit rating representation of creditworthiness is 
a qualitative ordinal variable, the estimation of a model for such a dependent variable 
necessitates the use of a special technique (Greene, 2002). 
 
Consider the simple case of a qualitative unordered dichotomous dependent 
variable, i.e., a variable that can take only two values (such as yes or no, on or off). 
Assume that this variable, represented as a 0-1 binary variable, is modelled as a 
linear function of a set of explanatory variables and of an error term. The predicted 
values from the estimation of this model should fall mainly within the 0-1 interval, 
suggesting that they could be interpreted as probabilities that the dependent variable 
takes the value (0 or 1), given the values of the explanatory variables. However, 
such estimated probabilities can fall outside the 0-1 range. Various distribution 
functions are available to constrain the estimated probabilities to lie in the range (0, 
1); the most frequently used being the cumulative standard normal probability 
function and the logistic function. The probit model makes use of the former, while 
the logit model makes use of the latter. If the qualitative dependent variable can be 
classified into more than two categories (i.e. if it is a polychotomous variable), 
estimation can be undertaken by means of the multinomial probit or the multinomial 
logit models, which are generalizations of the binary probit and logit models (Greene, 
2002). 
 
However, the credit rating representation of creditworthiness is not only a 
polychotomous qualitative variable; it is also an ordinal variable, i.e., a variable with 
an inherent order (unlike a polychotomous variable representing, say, choices of 
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colours or travel destinations). An ordinal polychotomous dependent variable would 
usually be coded as 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on. This representation reflects only a ranking; 
it is not known to what extent going from 0 to 1 is different from (or equivalent to) 
going from 2 to 3. For ordinal dependent variable, using multinomial probit would not 
be efficient because these models would miss-specify the data gathering process in 
assuming that there is no order in the different categories that the dependent 
variable can take (Greene, 2002). 
 
In statistics, a probit model is a type of regression where the dependent variable can 
only take two values, for example married or not married. A probit model is a popular 
specification for an ordinal or a binary response model that employs a probit link 
function. This model is most often estimated using standard maximum likelihood 
procedure; such estimation is being called a probit regression. 
 
Suppose response variable Y is binary, that can have only two possible outcomes 
which we will denote as 1 and 0. For example, Y may represent presence/absence 
of a certain condition, success/failure of some device, answer yes/no on a survey, 
etc. We also have a vector of regressors X, which are assumed to influence the 




Where; Pr denotes probability, and Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) 




It is also possible to motivate the probit model as a latent variable model. Suppose 
there is existence of an auxiliary random variable: 
 
 
Where; ε ~ N(0, 1). Then Y can be viewed as an indicator for whether this latent 
variable is positive: 
 
 
This technique occurs primarily for reasons inherent in the rating setting process 
within the credit ratings industry (Odders-White and Ready, 2006). Several studies 
note that rating changes tend to exhibit serial correlation (Carty and Fons, 1994; 
Gonzalez et al., 2004). In fact, rating agencies claim that they rate through the cycle 
implying that credit ratings should be stable over time. Altman and Kao (1992) 
documented serial autocorrelation in ratings below investment grade suggesting that 
a downgrade is more likely to be followed by a subsequent downgrade than by an 
upgrade. Finally, Pagratis and Stringa (2007) showed that bank ratings tend to be 
sticky and therefore persistence appears to be very important in predicting bank 
ratings. 
 
One basic premise of this is that modelling credit ratings should take into account the 
persistent nature of ratings. Persistence in rating outcomes is observable and shows 
zero changes dominate in the sample and usually Fitch alters its ratings by one 
category (either upwards or downwards). Based on the above argument, we are 
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prompted to recognise the dynamic nature of ratings and therefore we opt for 
modeling credit ratings in a dynamic ordered probit setting. As such, the dynamic 
ordered probit appears as the most suitable technique to empirically evaluate the 
relationship between measures of business and financial risk and a probability based 
assessment of the rating. This model is one of the widely used approaches under the 
ordered response framework and it has been adopted by several social sciences. It 
originated from bio-statistics (Aitchison and Silvey, 1957). 
 
The idea behind the model is a dormant continuous metric that is fundamental to the 
ordinal responses observed by the forecaster (Jackman, 2000). The dormant 
variable is a linear grouping of predictors that have normal distribution (Jackman, 
2000). Besides, probit models have cumulative standard normal distribution (Torres-
Reyna, 2002). 
 
To compare, Ohlson (1980) used the new technique logistic regression that is more 
flexible and robust avoiding the problems of discriminant analysis. By using logistic 
and probit regression, a significant and robust estimation can be obtained and used 
by many researchers such as; Wiginton (1980), Roszbach (1998), Feelders et al. 
(1998), Hayden (2003) and Huyen and Thanh (2006). 
 
However, according to Feng et al. (2008), the individual processes are independent, 
identically distributed across the population of the firms. The conditional distribution 
of the score of firm given the lagged score values depends on the past through the 
most recent qualitative rating. In the ordered qualitative model, the current rating 
depends on the last observed rating and the last factor value when the factor values 
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are integrated out. The rating histories are no longer processes of order by Markov; 
they now cross sectionally reliant (Frey and McNeil, 2001). Each current rating is 
influenced by all the past ratings. 
 
The introduction of serially correlated random factor is inspired the findings of recent 
times (Feng et al., 2008). Bangia et al. (2002) stated that credit migration matrices 
depend on a macroeconomic variable and this was related to Nickell et al. (2000) 
who proposed a probit model with observed explanatory variables and time 
dependent variables based on the GDP growth of a country. Feng et al. (2008) 
argued and concluded that factors are included in the probit model so that the ratings 
forecast will require the use of an additional dynamic model for predicting the values 
of observable factors at a required number of steps ahead. This implies that no 
matter what types of factors are considered, the factor’s dynamics has to be stated 
and projected. 
 
Furthermore, according to the concluding remarks of Cheung (1996), the ordered 
probit framework makes it possible to capture and summarize the historical 
relationship between discrete-valued credit ratings and continuous-valued 
regressors. This is without the risk of assuming the magnitude of the discreteness 
which is not known and which would have to assume to be known in a linear 
regression. However, Cheung (1996) concluded that the model has some 






4.6.3 Other Statistical Techniques 
 
Horrigan (1966) and Orgler (1970) used multiple linear regressions but this method 
is not appropriate when the dependent variable is categorical. To avoid these 
problems, generalized linear models such as logit and probit regression as explained 
above were developed. For example, Hardle and Muller (2000) used a 
semiparametric regression model which is called generalized partially linear model 
and confirmed that this model is performed better than logistic regression. 
 
However, statistical methods are not limited to the linear and logistic regressions; 
other researchers have also used different methods and techniques for the 
estimation of credit rating models. Early studies by Pinches and Mingo (1973) and 
Harmelink (1974) applied discriminant analysis by using accounting data to predict 
bond ratings. 
 
Corresponding to the other ways for the estimation, we can note that the weights in 
the Weighted Average Rating Model are assumed to be a function of an issuer’s 
leverage ratio. Metrics are charted out to an implied rating and the final rating is 
known as the average of all. The weighting has the following functions; each weight 
requires two free parameters and they are not constant but change with the leverage 
ratio. The weighted average model mostly treats each factor as a substitute for 
others (Mertz and Cantor, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, Hayden (2003) investigated the univariate regression based on rating 
models driven by three different default definitions. Two of these definitions are 
based on the Basel II and the third one is based on traditional definition. The test 
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results show that there is not much prediction power to be lost if the traditional 
definition is used instead of the alternative two ones. 
 
Roszbach (1998) used Tobit model with a variable censoring threshold proposed to 
investigate effects of survival time. Roszbach (1998) concluded that the variables 
with increasing odds were of decreasing expected survival time. This procedure was 
used by Hu et al. (2002), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et 
al. (2005) and Depken et al. (2007). 
 
A recent research by Zhang (2009) also came up with another statistical method 
named; Maturation Exogenous Vintage (MEV) decomposition framework. The MEV 
combination with the zero-trend vintage effect is referred to as the ad hoc approach. 
Other models related to this are as follows; Age Period Cohort (APC) model which is 
used in the social sciences of demography and epidemiology, Generalized Additive 
Model (GAM) which is applied in nonparametric statistics and used as the scatter 
plot smoother. In addition, the Generalized Additive Maturation and Exogenous 
Effects Decomposition (GAMEED) model is also used to reduce to a sequential type 
of the MEV model (Zhang, 2009). 
 
With regard to the sovereign credit ratings, Cruces (2006) analysed the statistical 
properties of institutional investor sovereign ratings, the largest consistent series on 
sovereign ratings available in terms of the number of countries covered, the years for 
which it is available, and the uniformity of the criteria used over time in awarding 
ratings. He modelled a rating as an average of expected collection per period during 
a fixed window of time from the moment that it is issued and solved for expected 
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collection as a function of expected repayment capacity during each period. As 
suggested solution, Cruces (2006) explained how the volatility of ratings should 
change with the rating level and why ratings in some ranges should be expected to 
fall, and those in other ranges to rise, regardless of their previous movements. Two 
credit ratings given one year apart pertain to expected collection during periods that 
only partly overlap. Even if rating teams produce rational expectations forecasts, the 
non-overlapping periods can cause non-zero expected credit revisions. Further, a 
trending repayment capacity is expected to show as serial correlation of credit 
revisions. 
 
Cruces (2006) main findings were that ratings effectively displayed volatility 
clustering and asymmetric adjustments, their revisions are serially correlated during 
most of the sample, and region and other characteristics capture common 
persistence in the ratings. He also concluded that sovereign ratings have three 
implications of interest to investors; a country’s current credit rating is not necessarily 
the best forecast of its long term sovereign risk, the forecast function is different 
across countries at a given point in time, and this function should be reassessed 




This study will concentrate on estimating bank level and country level credit rating 
models for a set of MENA countries, using all three estimation methods mentioned 
above (linear regression, logit and probit). Specifically, this study will employ multiple 
linear regression technique such as OLS, besides random effects ordered probit and 
logit models for panel data regression to estimate country and bank credit ratings. 
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These models are the most likely fit for the research data because the datasets are 
in a ranked, ordinal and panel format. 
 
The object will be to consistently estimate and identify robust determinants of credit 
ratings incorporating, where appropriate, a set of bank level accounting/financial 
ratios and country-level indicators for regulatory, legal and economic environment. 
Although the estimation procedure is implemented in different econometric packages 
such as; LIMDEP by other researchers, STATA is an alternative package that will be 
utilised for the estimation in this study. Figure (4.3) demonstrates the implementation 
process to construct an empirical analysis in estimating the credit rating models for 
MENA countries and their commercial banks. 
 




The above studies and data sources therein, provide the basis for constructing an 
appropriate panel dataset, for MENA countries and their commercial banks over the 
period 2000-2012 to estimate bank and country credit ratings. Banks operating under 
“Sharia law” in MENA region will be distinguished from others using the dummy 
variable approach. These panel datasets and the empirical analysis will be 
presented in the following chapters (5) and (6). 
 
The PhD phase will essentially target to achieve two major objectives in this 
research: these are; further empirical analysis of a detailed examination of country-
level data on country ratings, and investigating the impact of bank-level and country-
level data on bank ratings.  
 
To conclude, this chapter discussed the theoretical part of the econometric 
techniques such as; multiple linear regressions, ordered logit and probit models 
incorporating cointegration and causality testing procedures. In terms of statistical 
analysis, under positivism we can utilise any of the suggested techniques grouped 
by Hussy and Hooley (1995), such as the following: 
 
• Statistical significance tests.  
• Two variable linear regression, multiple regression, exponential smoothing. 
 
The reason for selecting any of the previous techniques would be to reduce the 
possibility of subjectively-driven measurement criteria and to assist in the literature 
development, after testing research construct against validity and reliability (Remenyi 








5.1 Value of Estimating Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
Estimation of sovereign credit ratings has attracted the interests of academics 
especially in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis which resulted in the re-
evaluation of the methods used to determine sovereign credit ratings. Country’s 
sovereign credit ratings have come under a wave of criticism in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis due to their reactive as opposed to a proactive nature (Kolb, 
2011). In line with this wave of criticism, the aim of this section is to highlight the 
value of sovereign credit ratings and point out the key reasons for their continuous 
use. 
 
Credit ratings represent opinions of a rating agency regarding the ability and 
willingness of an issuer to fulfill its financial obligations (Standardandpoor.com). In 
the context of country credit ratings, the issuer stands for the government and 
country credit rating reflects its creditworthiness. Apart from providing valuable 
information regarding the risk estimation, credit ratings guide investors and 
stakeholder's actions and as demonstrated by recent events in the European Union, 
country credit ratings play a crucial role in the development of economic conditions 
(De Santis, 2012). 
Moreover, sovereign credit ratings provide the lenders with valuable information 
regarding the level of risk in foreign countries (Iyengaar, 2012). Furthermore, the 
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relationship between credit ratings and real private investment is well-documented in 
the study conducted by Chen et al. (2013) which suggests that the investors rely 
heavily on the sovereign credit ratings published. Overall, investors tend to 
underestimate the level of risk in foreign countries and therefore, the independent 
assessment of the credit risk encompassed in sovereign credit ratings allows them to 
obtain a more realistic picture. The studies conducted by Kolb (2011), Iyengaar 
(2012) and Cavallo, Powell and Rigobon (2013) all supported the reliability of the 
sovereign credit ratings and uncovered that they in fact reduce information 
asymmetries in the market. As a result, the sovereign credit ratings are of a 
substantial value for the investors. 
 
While the estimation of credit ratings in the US and Europe has attracted a significant 
amount of attention (e.g. White, 2010; Shen, Huang and Hasan, 2012; Alp, 2013), 
the examination of credit ratings for MENA region remains largely under-researched. 
Recent studies focusing on the estimation of credit rating models in MENA region 
uncovered the substantial variability between individual countries and highlighted the 
influence of political (Khawaja, 2012). A recent report published by Moodys 
(Moodys.com, 2014) went even further and uncovered a sharp division between the 
oil-exporting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the remaining countries within the 
MENA region. 
 
The present chapter focuses strictly on the MENA region and aims to critically 
examine the credit rating estimation models for these countries. The study builds on 
the conducted review of the existing body of research on credit ratings and thereby 
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combines the use of financial and non-financial variables in order to estimate a credit 
rating model (Afonso, Gomes and Rother, 2011; Gonis, Paul and Wilson, 2012). 
 
The chapter itself is organised into the following four main sections, each dealing 
with a particular stream of research. To begin with, data description under 
investigation includes types and sources of the data involved, and the country's 
sample. The following section revolves around the estimation methods used to 
estimate sovereign credit ratings, presenting the empirical results and its meanings 
relying on numerous methodological approaches. In the next section, a discussion 
on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings is highlighted with reference to 
empirical studies and emphasis on the arguments depicted in the academic debate. 
The final section of this chapter is used to give a summary on the key arguments 
presented and re-emphasise the current understanding of the studied phenomenon 
by estimating country credit rating models for MENA region. 
 
5.2 Description of the Country Estimation Sample 
5.2.1 Data Sources 
 
 
The data stems from five sources, including Standard and Poor's for country credit 
ratings, World Bank Regulation and Supervision for regulatory and supervisory 
variables, the International Monetary Fund for various macroeconomic variables, and 
the World Bank for opinions on world governance indicators. The sources are 









Country Credit Ratings Standard and Poor's 
Regulatory and Supervisory Variables World Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Macroeconomic Variables IMF World Economic Outlook 
World Governance Indicators World Bank 
 
 
5.2.1.1 Country Credit Ratings 
 
The study encompasses an evaluation of one dependent variable – Standard and 
Poor’s government credit ratings. Gathering the data encompassed using Thomson 
Reuters’ Eikon software, with each entity being assigned one of 21 possible ratings.  
Furthermore, in order for the letter-based ratings to be analysed, they needed to be 
quantified. Single letter values were assigned numerical values from AAA=21 to 
DDD, DD, D=1 (See Appendix 5 - A for MENA countries ratings and its 
transformation scales). 
 
A summary transformation of the alphanumeric ratings to ordinal numeric rankings is 
given in Table (5.2). The methodology is consistent with that employed by Afonso, 
Gomes and Rother (2007), Boothway and Peterson (2008) and Alexe et al. (2003). 
Overall, the data set comprises of 164 data observations, with the most common 
ratings being A at 20, followed by BB at 19, and BBB at 17. The least common 
ratings are CCC+ at 1, BBB+ at 3, and AA at 5.  A summary plot of how the 
countries’ ratings have changed through time is given in Figure (5.1). Interestingly, 
the average country rating generally increased until 2007, and has since been on a 
downward trend from 2010 to 2012. Following Figure (5.2) is a geographic plot of 
countries’ ratings. The highest rated countries in the sample are Kuwait (19), Qatar 








Rating Linear Transformation Count 
 
AA 19 5 
 
AA- 18 13 
 
A+ 17 12 
 
A 16 20 
 
A- 15 13 
 
BBB+ 14 3 
 
BBB 13 17 
 
BBB- 12 7 
 
BB+ 11 14 
 
BB 10 19 
 
BB- 9 9 
 
B+ 8 8 
 
B 7 7 
 
B- 6 16 
 
CCC+ 5 1 
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can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
5.2.1.2. Regulatory and Supervisory Variables 
 
The dataset includes nine regulatory and supervisory variables from the World Bank’s 
Regulation and Supervision database. The variables are based upon the work by Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2001), first developed in 2000, and subsequently updated in 2003, 
2007 (revised in 2008), and the last version database was updated in 2011. Because of 
the infrequent updates, the 2001 and 2002 data points were approximated from the 
2000 database, while the 2004, 2005 and 2006 were assigned the values from the 2003 
database and the 2007 values from the 2007 database. Also the 2009 and 2010 values 
are based on the 2008 database. Lastly, the 2012 numbers were assigned based on the 
2011 database. The World Bank’s methodology is based upon sometimes subjective 
questions regarding regulation and supervision in a given country.  The non-numerical 
figures were converted to numerical values, following the work of Pasiouras, Gaganis 
and Zopounidis (2006). See Appendices 5 - B to 5 – J for the numerical transformation 
of these variables in relation to MENA countries. 
 
A summary of the variable symbols used in the empirical section and the definitions are 
given in Table (5.3). On summary statistics, Capital Requirements have a mean of 5.33, 
a median of 5, and a range from 2 to 8. Deposit Insurance Scheme has a mean of 1.1, a 
median of 1, and a range from 0 to 6.  Restrictions of Bank Activities have a mean of 
2.9, a median of 3, and a range from 1 to 6. Accounting and Disclosure Requirements 
has a mean of 4.5, a median of 5, and a range from 2 to 7. Auditing Requirements has a 
mean of 6.7, a median of 7, and a range from 4 to 8. Entry into Banking Requirements 
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has a mean of 7.2, and median of 8, and a range from 3 to 8. Official Disciplinary Power 
of the Supervisory Agency has a mean of 10, a median of 10, and a range from 5 to 13. 
Liquidation and Diversification Requirements has a mean of 2.7, a median of 2, and a 
range from 0 to 6. Lastly, Internal Management and Organisation Requirements have a 








Variable Variable Symbol Mean St.Dev. Median Max Min Skewness Kurtosis 
Capital Requirements R&S 1 5.33 1.58 5.00 8.00 2.00 0.15 -0.55 
Deposit Insurance Scheme R&S 2 1.07 1.48 1.00 6.00 0.00 2.50 5.47 
Restrictions on Banks Activities R&S 3 2.91 1.00 3.00 6.00 1.00 1.48 3.36 
Accounting and Disclosure Requirements R&S 4 5.30 0.90 5.00 7.00 2.00 -1.41 2.79 
Auditing Requirements R&S 5 6.74 0.91 7.00 8.00 4.00 -0.51 0.04 
Entry into Banking Requirements R&S 6 7.18 1.18 8.00 8.00 3.00 -1.69 2.59 
Official Disciplinary Power of the Supervisory Agency R&S 7 10.00 2.56 10.00 13.00 5.00 -0.30 -1.17 
Liquidity and Diversification Requirements R&S 8 2.67 1.07 2.00 6.00 0.00 1.67 3.25 





5.2.1.3 Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Stemming from the International Monetary Fund’s October 2013 World Economic 
Outlook database, the dataset includes nine macroeconomic variables.  A summary of 
the variables with the associated symbol used in the throughout the remainder of the 
study is given in Table (5.4). Further descriptions of these variables follow Table (5.4). 
 
Real GDP Growth (Macro1) ranges from -7 percent to 26 percent, with a mean Real 
GDP Growth of 5.3 and a standard deviation of 4.4. GDP in US Dollars (Macro2) ranges 
from $5 to $788, with a mean of $257 and a standard deviation of $259. GDP per 
Capita (Macro3) ranges from $5 to $104756, with a mean of $13855 and a standard 
deviation of $15675. Investment as a Percentage of GDP (Macro4) ranges from 5 
percent to 48 percent, with a mean of 21 percent and a standard deviation of 7 percent.  
Savings as a Percentage of GDP (Macro5) ranges from 2 percent to 65 percent, with a 
mean of 37 percent and a standard deviation of 16 percent.  Inflation (Macro6) ranges 
from -5 percent to 55 percent, with a mean of 9 percent and a standard deviation of 14 
percent. Unemployment Rate (Macro7) ranges from 0.8 percent to 18.3 percent, with a 
mean of 8.4 percent and a standard deviation of 3.8 percent. Government Debt as a 
Percentage of GDP (Macro8) ranges from -54 percent to 177 percent, with a mean of 
40 percent and a standard deviation of 36 percent. Lastly, Current Account Balance as 
a Percent of GDP (Macro9) ranges from -19 percent to 45 percent, with a mean of 5 








Symbol Macroeconomic Indicator Mean St.Dev. Median Max Min 
Macro1 Real GDP Growth 5.30 4.42 5.59 26.17 -7.08 
Macro2 GDP in US $ 256.65 259.23 184.54 788.30 5.00 
Macro3 GDP per Capita 13854.57 15675.08 9515.06 104755.81 5.00 
Macro4 Investment as % of GDP 21.46 7.43 20.77 47.63 5.00 
Macro5 Savings as % of GDP 26.56 15.74 19.99 64.75 2.03 
Macro6 Inflation 9.26 13.58 5.04 55.04 -4.87 
Macro7 Unemployment Rate 8.43 3.74 9.50 18.30 0.78 
Macro8 Government Debt as % of GDP 40.02 35.67 36.48 177.01 -53.93 
Macro9 Current Account Balance as % of GDP 5.43 12.94 2.07 44.62 -19.15 
 
 
Macro1: Real GDP Growth: Gross domestic product, constant prices (National 
currency). Annual percentages of constant price GDP are year-on-year changes; the 
base year is country-specific. 
 
Macro2: GDP per U.S. dollars, Billions: Gross domestic product, current prices 
(National currency). Values are based upon GDP in national currency converted to U.S. 
dollars using market exchange rates (yearly average). 
 
Macro3: GDP per Capita (U.S. dollars, Units): Gross domestic product, current prices 
(National currency) Population (Persons). GDP is expressed in current U.S. dollars per 
person. Data are derived by first converting GDP in national currency to U.S. dollars 
and then dividing it by total population. 
 
Macro4: Total Investment as Percent of GDP: Expressed as a ratio of total investment 
in current local currency and GDP in current local currency. 
 
Macro5: Gross National Savings as Percent of GDP: Expressed as a ratio of gross 
national savings in current local currency and GDP in current local currency. 
 
Macro6: Inflation as Percent Change: Inflation, average consumer prices (Index). 
Annual percentages of average consumer prices are year-on-year changes. 
 
Macro7: Unemployment Rate: Percent of total labour force. 
 
Macro8: Government Net Debt as Percent of GDP: Net debt is calculated as gross debt 
minus financial assets corresponding to debt instruments. 
 
Macro9: Current Account Balance as Percent of GDP: Current account is all 
transactions other than those in financial and capital items. The major classifications are 
goods and services, income and current transfers. 
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5.2.1.4 World Bank Governance Indicators 
 
The World Governance Indicators figures are from the 2013 update, Aggregate 
Indicators of Governance from 1996 to 2012. The dataset is based upon the work of 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), includes six broad measures of governance, 
including Voice and Accountability (G1), Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism (G2), Government Effectiveness (G3), Regulatory Quality (G4), Rule 
of Law (G5), and Control of Corruption (G6).  A summary of these six indicators is given 
in Table (5.5). 
 
The concept behind the Worldwide Governance Indicators is to provide researchers 
with a database containing a large number of enterprise, citizen, and expert opinions on 
industrial and developing economies’ governance. The dataset is based on subjective 
opinions. The influence of environment aggregate governance indicators, expressed in 
this research as ''Estimate'' values, range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance. Regarding the data sample in this category, the values for 
year 2001 have been approximated by the year of 2000, due to the unavailability of 
data. 
 
On summary statistics, the Voice and Accountability (G1) measure ranges from -1.9 to 
6.0, with a mean of -0.2 and a standard deviation of 1.7. The Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism (G2) ranges from -2.1 to 6.0, with a mean of 0.1 and a 
standard deviation of 1.7. The Government Effectiveness (G3) ranges from -0.8 to 6.0, 
with a mean of 0.6 and a standard deviation of 1.4. The Regulatory Quality (G4) 
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measure ranges from -1.7 to 6.0, with a mean of 0.6 and a standard deviation of 1.4.  
The Rule of Law (G5) ranges from -1.0 to 6.0, with a mean of 0.6 and a standard 
deviation of 0.6. Lastly, the Control of Corruption (G6) measure ranges from -1.0 to 6.0, 


















Symbol Variable Description Mean St.Dev. Median Max Min Skewness Kurtosis 
G1 Voice and Accountability -0.16 1.68 -0.43 6.00 -1.86 2.83 7.48 
G2 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 0.07 1.68 -0.50 6.00 -2.13 2.54 6.09 
G3 Government Effectiveness 0.57 1.44 0.24 6.00 -0.77 3.13 8.64 
G4 Regulatory Quality 0.62 1.43 0.30 6.00 -1.73 2.99 8.31 
G5 Rule of Law 0.61 1.42 0.16 6.00 -0.98 3.12 8.63 
G6 Control of Corruption 0.50 1.49 0.07 6.00 -0.99 2.92 7.71 
169 
 
5.3 Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results section represents the regression results, correlation 
between all variables, robustness tests; other empirical evidence such as 
ANOVA, while the other parts include the estimation models (random effects 
ordered probit, random effects ordered logit) and a comparison between both 
models. In all statistical presentations, STATA version 13 was used as the 
software tool.   
 
5.3.1 County Ratings Results 
 
This sub-section presents the empirical results on the country's ratings data.  
As an initial inspection, Table (5.6) contains the correlation of all the variables 
included in the country ratings dataset. Based solely on inspecting the country 
ratings variables, none of the variables merit exclusion except perhaps certain 
governance variables, with the correlation of these variables ranging from a 
low of 0.87 and most in the mid to high 90s. 
 
    Table (5.6): Correlation for MENA Country's Ratings Data 
 
 Ratings rs1 rs2 rs3 rs4 rs5 rs6 rs7 
         
Ratings 1.00        
rs1 -0.23 1.00       
rs2 -0.23 0.18 1.00      
rs3 0.16 0.31 -0.23 1.00     
rs4 -0.38 0.19 -0.15 -0.19 1.00    
rs5 -0.51 0.16 0.01 -0.23 0.38 1.00   
rs6 -0.28 0.05 0.32 -0.19 -0.09 0.28 1.00  
rs7 -0.24 -0.04 0.11 -0.43 0.13 0.41 0.42 1.00 
rs8 0.28 -0.39 -0.56 -0.06 -0.14 0.10 -0.22 -0.03 
rs9 -0.31 0.06 -0.24 -0.37 0.57 0.65 -0.06 0.10 
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macro1 0.06 -0.18 0.05 -0.25 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.15 
macro2 0.16 -0.08 -0.15 0.10 0.08 0.25 -0.01 0.09 
macro3 0.81 0.07 -0.24 0.26 -0.10 -0.41 -0.50 -0.39 
macro4 0.29 0.09 0.60 -0.03 -0.45 -0.25 0.33 0.07 
macro5 0.64 -0.20 0.04 0.02 -0.53 -0.25 0.20 0.13 
macro6 -0.45 -0.19 0.13 -0.01 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.00 
macro7 -0.28 -0.15 0.20 -0.20 -0.23 -0.26 -0.13 -0.29 
macro8 -0.40 0.07 0.00 -0.14 0.17 -0.12 -0.32 -0.27 
macro9 0.54 -0.30 -0.36 0.04 -0.30 -0.13 0.01 0.09 
g1voacc 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.07 -0.45 -0.70 -0.57 
g2pol 0.33 -0.41 0.47 -0.23 -0.67 -0.24 0.35 -0.04 
g3goveff 0.61 0.02 0.01 0.16 -0.12 -0.58 -0.66 -0.63 
g4regq 0.64 0.02 0.06 0.19 -0.19 -0.52 -0.53 -0.61 
g5law 0.70 -0.20 0.04 0.03 -0.35 -0.61 -0.45 -0.56 
g6corr 0.64 -0.03 0.07 0.12 -0.27 -0.64 -0.54 -0.60 
         
 rs8 rs9 macro1 Macro2 macro3 Macro4 macro5 macro6 
         
rs8 1.00        
rs9 0.19 1.00       
macro1 0.10 0.13 1.00      
macro2 0.18 0.06 0.14 1.00     
macro3 0.14 -0.13 -0.05 0.24 1.00    
macro4 -0.31 -0.37 0.17 -0.20 0.01 1.00   
macro5 0.22 -0.32 0.16 0.06 0.33 0.49 1.00  
macro6 -0.08 0.05 -0.17 0.20 -0.24 -0.32 -0.33 1.00 
macro7 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.32 -0.35 0.00 -0.38 -0.12 
macro8 -0.11 0.13 -0.16 -0.56 -0.24 -0.34 -0.59 0.04 
macro9 0.46 -0.13 0.06 0.20 0.37 -0.12 0.81 -0.16 
g1voacc -0.19 -0.06 -0.12 -0.01 0.45 -0.19 -0.40 -0.02 
g2pol 0.08 -0.38 0.22 -0.15 -0.05 0.59 0.49 -0.19 
g3goveff -0.05 -0.16 -0.07 0.01 0.81 0.04 0.03 -0.21 
g4regq -0.04 -0.18 -0.07 0.07 0.84 0.11 0.11 -0.13 
g5law 0.10 -0.24 -0.02 -0.05 0.73 0.14 0.19 -0.26 
g6corr -0.04 -0.22 -0.05 -0.04 0.73 0.17 0.12 -0.32 
         
 macro7 macro8 macro9 g1voacc g2pol g3goveff g4regq g5law 
         
macro7 1.00        
macro8 0.64 1.00       
macro9 -0.43 -0.44 1.00      
g1voacc 0.37 0.54 -0.33 1.00     
g2pol 0.32 -0.11 0.16 -0.19 1.00    
g3goveff 0.14 0.18 0.01 0.78 0.07 1.00   
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g4regq 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.68 0.16 0.94 1.00  
g5law 0.27 0.14 0.13 0.60 0.40 0.88 0.90 1.00 
g6corr 0.27 0.15 0.03 0.68 0.25 0.93 0.92 0.94 
         
 g6corr        
         




5.3.2 Ordinary Least Square Results 
 
As an initial inspection of the data, the following Table (5.7)  contains results 
of an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model. The OLS results have an R-
squared of 0.97 and a Root Mean Squared Error of 0.7215. In terms of 
variables with statistical significance, of the 25 predictor variables, 11 are 
statistically significant at the 90 percent level or higher. The statistically 
significant variables in the OLS framework are (symbol and coefficient in 
parentheses). 
 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (rs2, -2.47), Accounting and Disclosure 
Requirements (rs4, 0.39), Entry into Banking Requirements (rs6, -0.24), 
Official Disciplinary Power of the Supervisory Agency (rs7, 0.16), GDP 
(macro2, 0.0001), Inflation (macro6, -0.04), Unemployment Rate (macro7, -
0.23), Voice and Accountability (g1, -1.34), Government Effectiveness (g3, 
2.73), Rule of Law (g5, 4.67), and the constant (6.60). 
 
15 As a note, the regression reported in Table (5.6) has robust standard errors. The results 
with robust standard errors are reported because of prior knowledge that the data suffered 
from heteroskedasticity, as is shown in the following Figure (5.3). 
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Interestingly, of the statistically significant regulatory variables, a Deposit 
Insurance Scheme and Entry into Banking Requirements are negatively 
related, indicating perhaps countries with a higher barrier to entry into the 
banking system or require deposit insurance generally have lower bond 
ratings. In contrast, the results on Accounting and Disclosure Requirements 
and Official Disciplinary Power are positively related, indicating that some 
transparency and enforcement mechanism may lead to better run banks. The 
OLS results on the macroeconomic variables are unsurprising, with both 
Inflation and the Unemployment Rate negatively related, indicating that 
countries with poor economic performance are more likely to receive poor 
bond ratings.  Additionally, the results produce a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between GDP size and bond rating. 
 
On the governance results, two of the three variables are positively related 
with ratings – Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law. These results 
indicate that a government with some respect (or more likely, perception 
thereof) for rule of law and desire to be effective may receive a higher bond 









Table (5.7): Ordinary Least Square Regression Results for Country Ratings 
 
   F( 24, 57) = 128.51 
   Prob > 
F 
 = 0.00 
   R-
squared 
 = 0.97 
   Root MSE = 0.72 
   N 16  = 82 
  Robust     




t P>t [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
       
rs1 -0.10 0.11 -0.92 0.36 -0.31 0.11 
rs2 -2.47*** 0.48 -5.17 0.00 -3.42 -1.51 
rs3 0.49 0.44 1.11 0.27 -0.40 1.38 
rs4 0.39* 0.20 1.93 0.06 -0.01 0.80 
rs5 -0.07 0.16 -0.44 0.66 -0.39 0.25 
rs6 -0.24* 0.13 -1.91 0.06 -0.49 0.01 
rs7 0.16** 0.08 2.01 0.05 0.00 0.32 
rs8 -0.21 0.25 -0.81 0.42 -0.71 0.30 
rs9 -0.44 0.32 -1.35 0.18 -1.09 0.21 
macro1 -0.06 0.04 -1.62 0.11 -0.13 0.01 
macro2 0.0001**
* 
0.00 4.15 0.00 0.00 0.01 
macro3 0.001 0.00 0.43 0.67 0.00 0.00 
macro4 0.31 0.37 0.83 0.41 -0.43 1.04 
macro5 -0.08 0.36 -0.21 0.83 -0.80 0.65 
macro6 -0.04** 0.02 -2.12 0.04 -0.08 0.00 
macro7 -0.23*** 0.09 -2.56 0.01 -0.41 -0.05 
macro8 0.01 0.01 0.75 0.46 -0.01 0.02 
macro9 0.14 0.36 0.39 0.70 -0.58 0.86 
g1voacc -1.34*** 0.43 -3.13 0.00 -2.20 -0.48 
g2pol 0.62 0.49 1.25 0.22 -0.37 1.60 
g3goveff 2.73*** 0.75 3.66 0.00 1.24 4.23 
g4regq -1.06 0.94 -1.13 0.26 -2.94 0.81 
g5law 4.67*** 1.13 4.13 0.00 2.41 6.93 
g6corr -1.29 1.00 -1.29 0.20 -3.31 0.72 
_cons 6.60* 3.73 1.77 0.08 -0.86 14.07 






16 N=82 is less than the total sample size of 169 because variables with missing predictors are 
excluded from the calculation in STATA.   
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5.3.2.1 OLS Robustness Checks 
 
This sub-section presents checks for robustness, including inspections on 




Reported in the following Figure (5.3) is a heteroskedasticity check on the 
OLS residuals. The results indicate some interesting patterns, with the 
residuals exhibiting diagonal patterns. The diagonal patterns are the result of 
trying to fit an inefficient OLS model on panel data in ordered format. The 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity fails to confirm 
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Linear prediction
OLS Heteroskedasticity Check for Country Ratings Model
 
 
Figure (5.3): Heteroskedasticity Check on OLS Residuals for Country Ratings  
 
 175 
5.3.2.1.2 OLS Autocorrelation 
 
The data includes a time series component.  Because of this, an IM-Pesaran-
Shin unit-root test was performed on the ratings. The IM-Pesaran-Shin test 
produces a Z-t-tilde-bar of 2.95 and a p-value of greater than 0.99, indicating 
that one fails to reject the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root.  
The autocorrelation problem is addressed later in the paper through the use of 
random effects ordered probit model and a random effects ordered logit 
model. 
 
5.3.2.1.3 OLS Collinearity 
 
The variance inflation factor tests are reported in the following Table (5.8). 
Unsurprisingly given the nature of the dataset, suffer from colliniearity (VIF > 
4). Although coefficients in the model are not affected by collinearity, the 
standard errors are. This issue is addressed in the logit and probit models. 
 
Table (5.8): OLS Collinearity Diagnostics for Country Rtaings 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 




Ranking 33.93 5.82 0.03 0.97 
rs1 4.97 2.23 0.20 0.80 
rs2 12.77 3.57 0.08 0.92 
rs3 3.45 1.86 0.29 0.71 
rs4 6.11 2.47 0.16 0.84 
rs5 8.44 2.90 0.12 0.88 
rs6 8.50 2.92 0.12 0.88 
rs7 5.64 2.37 0.18 0.82 
rs8 4.29 2.07 0.23 0.77 
rs9 5.72 2.39 0.17 0.83 
macro1 1.56 1.25 0.64 0.36 
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macro2 5.46 2.34 0.18 0.82 
macro3 38.02 6.17 0.03 0.97 
macro4 793.68 28.17 0.00 1.00 
macro5 2,124.65 46.09 0.00 1.00 
macro6 5.04 2.25 0.20 0.80 
macro7 11.47 3.39 0.09 0.91 
macro8 10.43 3.23 0.10 0.90 
macro9 1,640.72 40.51 0.00 1.00 
g1voacc 14.80 3.85 0.07 0.93 
g2pol 19.15 4.38 0.05 0.95 
g3goveff 52.74 7.26 0.02 0.98 
g4regq 42.53 6.52 0.02 0.98 
g5law 57.41 7.58 0.02 0.98 
g6corr 37.69 6.14 0.03 0.97 




5.3.2.1.4 OLS Omitted Variables Bias 
 
The OLS results comprise 25 independent regression variables. Still, the data 
may suffer from omitted variable bias. To check for this, a Ramsey RESET 
test using powers of the fitted values was performed. The result gave an F (3, 
54) value of 1.81 and a p-value of 0.16, meaning one fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of no omitted variable bias. The result, though, may change with 
the use of a more efficient model used later in this paper.       
 
 
5.3.2.1.5 OLS Non-Normality 
 
The last robustness test reported here is consideration of non-normality. The 
following Table (5.9) reports the Skewness/Kurtosis/Shapiro-Wilk W tests for 
normality. The results indicate that the Ranking variable is not normally 




Table (5.9): OLS Normality Test for Country Ratings 
 
Skewness/Kurtosis 





Ranking 164.00 0.59 0.00 46.25 0.000 
Shapiro-Wilk W test 






This section presents results of an analysis of variance model (ANOVA).  As a 
note, ANOVA models do not allow non-integer or negative values as factors in 
an ANOVA model. Because of this, the reported macroeconomic and 
governance variables are in rounded thousands, with the variables 
transformed into all positive integers by adding to each column cell the 
minimum of the given variable. The results are reported in Table (5.10). 
Overall, the ANOVA model produces an R-squared of 0.99, with a Root Mean 
Squared Error (MSE) of 0.47. 
 
Of the variables with a strong relationship, all seven of the non-excluded 
regulatory variables are strongly related, with F values ranging from 2.97 to 
13.80 and all significant at the 95% level or above. 
 
 178 
In contrast to the regulatory results, the sole macroeconomic variable with 
close to statistical significance is the Unemployment Rate (macro7) at 93%.  
Similar to the macroeconomic variables’ results, the sole governance variable 
with any significance of 90% is Government Effectiveness (G3) at 92%. The 
ANOVA results turn out to be inferior to the random effects logit/probit results, 
so no further discussion is needed here. 
 
Table (5.10): ANOVA Regression Results for Country Ratings 
  
ANOVA Results 
N=82    R-Sq=0.99 
Root MSE = 0.47   Adj- R-Sq=0.98 
Source Partial 
SS 
df MS F Prob > F 
Model 983.17 40.00 24.58 111.72 0.00 
      
RS1 3.26** 5.00 0.65 2.97 0.02 
RS2 3.04* 1.00 3.04 13.80 0.00 
RS3 3.03* 1.00 3.03 13.78 0.00 
RS4 3.50* 3.00 1.17 5.31 0.00 
RS5 2.76** 4.00 0.69 3.13 0.02 
RS6 4.24* 3.00 1.41 6.43 0.00 
RS7 10.72* 8.00 1.34 6.09 0.00 
RS8 0.00 0.00    
RS9 0.00 0.00    
Macro1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.93 
Macro2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.92 
Macro3 0.19 1.00 0.19 0.88 0.35 
Macro4 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.91 
Macro5 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 
Macro6 0.21 1.00 0.21 0.94 0.34 
Macro7 0.74*** 1.00 0.74 3.36 0.07 
Macro8 0.35 1.00 0.35 1.61 0.21 
Macro9 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
G1VOACC 0.32 1.00 0.32 1.45 0.23 
G2POLths 0.03 1.00 0.03 0.14 0.71 
G3GOVEFFths 0.71 1.00 0.71 3.24 0.08 
G4REGQths 0.03 1.00 0.03 0.14 0.71 
G5LAWths 0.16 1.00 0.16 0.72 0.40 
G6CORRths 0.04 1.00 0.04 0.17 0.69 
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Residual 9.02 41.00 0.22     
Total 992.20 81.00 12.25   
*Significant at the 99% level, ** 95% level, *** 90% level 
 
 
5.3.3.1 ANOVA Robustness Checks 
 
This section presents checks for robustness, including inspections on 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, collinearity, and non-normality of the 
ANOVA results. 
 
5.3.3.1.1 ANOVA Heteroskedasticity 
 
Reported in the following Figure (5.4) is a heteroskedasticity check on the 
ANOVA residuals. The results indicate some interesting patterns, with the 
residuals exhibiting diagonal patterns and getting smaller as the prediction 
number increases. The diagonal patterns are the result of trying to fit an 
inefficient OLS model on panel data in ordered format. The Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity confirm heteroskedasticity, 
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ANOVA Heteroskedasticity Check for Country Ratings Model
 
Figure (5.4): Heteroskedasticity Check on ANOVA Residuals for Country Ratings 
 
5.3.3.1.2 ANOVA Collinearity 
 
The variance inflation factor tests are reported in the following Table (5.11).  
The diagnostics for ANOVA collinearity differ little from the OLS results, 
indicating no further explanation is needed. The results indicate collinearity 
problems. 
 
Table (5.11): ANOVA Collinearity Diagnostics for Country Ratings 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 




Ranking 33.77 5.81 0.03 0.97 
RS1 4.99 2.23 0.20 0.80 
RS2 12.77 3.57 0.08 0.92 
RS3 3.44 1.86 0.29 0.71 
RS4 6.13 2.48 0.16 0.84 
RS5 8.45 2.91 0.12 0.88 
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RS6 8.49 2.91 0.12 0.88 
RS7 5.64 2.37 0.18 0.82 
RS8 4.30 2.07 0.23 0.77 
RS9 5.73 2.39 0.17 0.83 
Macro1 1.56 1.25 0.64 0.36 
Macro2 5.47 2.34 0.18 0.82 
Macro3 37.78 6.15 0.03 0.97 
Macro4 791.87 28.14 0.00 1.00 
Macro5 2,122.61 46.07 0.00 1.00 
Macro6 5.04 2.25 0.20 0.80 
Macro7 11.43 3.38 0.09 0.91 
Macro8 10.44 3.23 0.10 0.90 
Macro9 1,638.57 40.48 0.00 1.00 
G1VOACC 14.83 3.85 0.07 0.93 
G2POL 18.98 4.36 0.05 0.95 
G3GOVEFF 52.59 7.25 0.02 0.98 
G4REGQ 42.33 6.51 0.02 0.98 
G5LAW 56.54 7.52 0.02 0.98 
G6CORR 37.55 6.13 0.03 0.97 




5.3.3.1.3 ANOVA Omitted Variable Bias 
 
The ANOVA results for omitted variable bias indicate a Ramsey RESET F (3, 
38) value of 15.59 and a p-value of less than 0.01, meaning one rejects the 
null hypothesis of no omitted variable bias. 
 
 
5.3.4 Random Effects Ordered Probit 
 
With the results of the OLS and ANOVA models providing some interesting, 
albeit biased results, this section presents the random effects ordered probit 
model results. A random effect ordered probit model is the most likely fit for 
the data because the data are in a ranked, ordinal, and panel format. A 
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Where:  represents the rank-ordered dependent variable (in this case 
country rating),  represents the column vectors of the predictor variables,  
is a vector of estimated coefficients, and  is the error term. A probit 





The following Table (5.12) presents the results of a random effects ordered 
probit model for country ranking. As a note, the results reported below 
exclude macro6 (Inflation) and macro7 (Unemployment Rate) due to the 
amount of observations excluded when including these two variables (N drops 
from 142 to 82 because of missing values). As is shown in Table (5.12), there 
are ten independent variables of statistical significance in the probit model.  
 
The results on the regulatory variables (rs1 and rs9) indicate that too much 
regulation is a bad thing when it comes to bond ratings, with every one unit 
increase in Capital Requirements correlated with a 0.29 drop in expected 
bond rating. The drop is larger for Internal Management and Organisational 
Requirements at a 0.69 drop.   
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The results on the macroeconomic variables are also surprising. A one unit 
increase in real GDP growth is correlated with a 0.08 drop in expected bond 
rating. The other three statistically significant macroeconomic results are more 
in-line with a priori theory. Real GDP has a 1% positive association, GDP per 
capita is slightly positive, and investment is at 0.48, the largest positive effect 
of the macroeconomic variables.   
 
The last group – governance – has three of its four statistically significant 
variables in positive correlation territory, with Political Stability at 1.75, 
Government Effectiveness at 6.52, and Rule of Law at 3.08.  In contrast to the 
previous three, Control of Corruption is negatively correlated at -3.20. 
 
  Table (5.12): Random Effects Ordered Probit Results for Country Ratings 
 
 
N = 142    LR ratio chi2 = 201.35 
N groups = 13    Log likelihood = -138.99 
              
Rankings dy/dx Std. 
Err. 
z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
       
rs1 -0.29** 0.15 -1.96 0.05 -0.58 0.00 
rs2 -1.10 0.96 -1.14 0.25 -2.98 0.79 
rs3 -0.69*** 0.38 -1.80 0.07 -1.44 0.06 
rs4 -0.08 0.23 -0.34 0.74 -0.53 0.37 
rs5 -0.10 0.28 -0.35 0.73 -0.64 0.45 
rs6 0.01 0.19 0.07 0.94 -0.36 0.38 
rs7 0.05 0.09 0.58 0.57 -0.12 0.22 
rs8 0.40 0.38 1.05 0.30 -0.35 1.15 
rs9 -0.77 0.51 -1.50 0.13 -1.77 0.23 
macro1 -0.08** 0.05 -1.82 0.07 -0.17 0.01 
macro2 0.01* 0.00 2.45 0.01 0.00 0.01 
macro3 0.0002* 0.00 4.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
macro4 0.48** 0.21 2.26 0.02 0.06 0.90 
macro5 -0.23 0.21 -1.08 0.28 -0.64 0.19 
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macro6 -0.03 0.03 -1.02 0.31 -0.09 0.03 
macro9 0.21 0.22 0.98 0.33 -0.21 0.63 
g1voacc -1.32 0.89 -1.49 0.14 -3.07 0.42 
g2pol 1.75* 0.55 3.16 0.00 0.66 2.84 
g3goveff 6.52* 1.64 3.97 0.00 3.30 9.73 
g4regq -0.75 1.17 -0.65 0.52 -3.04 1.53 
g5law 3.08*** 1.70 1.81 0.07 -0.25 6.40 
g6corr -3.20* 1.07 -2.98 0.00 -5.30 -1.10 
       
/cut1 -9.43 3.73 -2.53 0.01 -16.74 -2.13 
/cut2 -6.10 3.66 -1.67 0.10 -13.27 1.08 
/cut3 -5.16 3.67 -1.41 0.16 -12.35 2.02 
/cut4 -3.34 3.61 -0.92 0.36 -10.42 3.74 
/cut5 -1.71 3.60 -0.48 0.63 -8.77 5.34 
/cut6 0.95 3.62 0.26 0.79 -6.14 8.03 
/cut7 2.79 3.62 0.77 0.44 -4.30 9.88 
/cut8 4.63 3.61 1.28 0.20 -2.44 11.70 
/cut9 8.38** 3.76 2.23 0.03 1.01 15.74 
/cut10 8.86** 3.76 2.36 0.02 1.50 16.22 
/cut11 10.77* 3.74 2.88 0.00 3.44 18.10 
/cut12 14.63* 3.94 3.71 0.00 6.91 22.35 
/cut13 19.86* 4.28 4.64 0.00 11.47 28.26 
/cut14 25.09* 5.11 4.91 0.00 15.09 35.10 
       
/sigma2_u 26.00 12.92   9.82 68.84 
LR test vs. oprobit regression:  chibar2(01) =   100.52 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000  
*99% level, **95% level, ***90% level 
 
 
5.3.5 Random Effects Ordered Logit 
 
Comparable to the presentation in Equation (1), an ordered logit fits the data 





The following Table (5.13) presents the results of random effects ordered logit 
model for country ranking. As mentioned in the probit section, the results 
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reported below exclude macro6 (Inflation) and macro7 (Unemployment Rate) 
due to the amount of observations excluded when including these two 
variables (N drops from 142 to 82 because of missing values). Similar to the 
probit results, ten of the independent predictors are statistically significant in 
the logit framework. The statistically significant variables include: 
 
• Capital Requirements (rs1) with an odds-ratio at 0.66 (90% level);  
• Internal Management and Organisational Requirements (rs9) with an 
odds-ratio of 0.19 (90% level); 
• Real GDP Growth (macro1) with an odds-ratio of 0.86 (90% level); 
• GDP (macro2) with an odds ratio of 1.01 (95% level); 
• GDP per capita (macro3) with an odds-ratio of 1.00 (99% level); 
• Investment as a percentage of GDP (macro4) with an odds-ratio of 
2.41 (95% level); 
• Voice and Accountability (g1) with an odds-ratio of 0.07 (90% level); 
• Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (g2) with an 
odds-ratio of 18.71 (99% level); 
• Government Effectiveness (g3) with an odds-ratio of 89,442 (99% 
confidence level); 
• Rule of Law (g5) with an odds-ratio of 203.52 (99% confidence level); 
and, 




The results are somewhat surprising in relation to theory. First, only two of the 
nine regulatory variables are statistically significant, and the two that exhibit 
significance have odds-ratios less than one. The result on Capital 
Requirements at 0.66 indicate that countries with less stringent capital 
requirements are by a 1.5 to 1 margin more likely to get a better credit rating.  
Also surprising, the result on Internal Management and Organisational 
Requirements at 0.19 indicates that countries with less burdensome 
organisational requirements are by 5 to 1 odds more likely to receive a better 
bond rating. 
 
The second area is the macroeconomic variables, with four of the variables 
statistically significant and three of the four greater than one. The sole 
variable with an odds-ratio less than one is Real GDP Growth (macro1) at 
0.86, indicating that countries with slower GDP growth have 1.16 to 1 higher 
odds to receive a better bond rating. In contrast, higher absolute GDP 
countries are 1% more likely to be assigned a higher rating, countries with 
higher GDP per capita are only slightly more likely to be given a higher bond 
rating, while countries with large investment activity as a percentage of GDP 
are by a greater than 2 to 1 margin to be given a higher bond rating. 
 
The last grouping is the governance variables. The two governance variables 
with an odd-ratio less than one are Voice and Accountability at 0.07 and 
Control of Corruption at 0.005, indicating that countries with less burdensome 
corruption activities are more likely to be assigned a higher rating. On the 
other end, Political Stability and Government Effectiveness each have very 
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large probabilities associated with their effect on bond ratings. Given the size 
of these two results, the reader is cautioned into reading too much into the 
magnitude of the effect, but rather focuses on the direction. 
 
Table (5.13): Random Effects Ordered Logit Results for Country Ratings 
 
 
N = 142    LR ratio chi2 = 194.1 
N groups = 13    Log likelihood = -139.2 
              
Rakings Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
rs1 0.66 0.18 -1.55 0.12 0.38 1.12 
rs2 0.09 0.16 -1.36 0.18 0.00 2.87 
rs3 0.25*** 0.18 -1.92 0.06 0.06 1.03 
rs4 1.00 0.41 -0.01 0.99 0.44 2.25 
rs5 0.95 0.47 -0.11 0.91 0.36 2.50 
rs6 0.96 0.31 -0.13 0.89 0.50 1.82 
rs7 1.09 0.17 0.55 0.59 0.80 1.47 
rs8 1.68 1.16 0.75 0.46 0.43 6.52 
rs9 0.19*** 0.18 -1.79 0.07 0.03 1.17 
macro1 0.86*** 0.07 -1.89 0.06 0.74 1.01 
macro2 1.01** 0.01 2.23 0.03 1.00 1.02 
macro3 1.00* 0.00 3.83 0.00 1.00 1.00 
macro4 2.41** 0.90 2.36 0.02 1.16 4.99 
macro5 0.66 0.24 -1.14 0.25 0.32 1.34 
macro6 0.94 0.05 -1.14 0.25 0.84 1.05 
macro9 1.49 0.55 1.08 0.28 0.72 3.08 
g1voacc 0.07*** 0.11 -1.68 0.09 0.00 1.57 
g2pol 18.71* 18.81 2.91 0.00 2.61 134.20 
g3goveff 89,441.75* 257,785 3.96 0.00 314.95 25,400,000 
g4regq 0.27 0.55 -0.64 0.52 0.01 14.35 
g5law 203.52*** 637.09 1.70 0.09 0.44 94,000.89 
g6corr 0.005* 0.01 -2.67 0.01 0.00 0.24 
       
/cut1 -16.81 6.61 -2.54 0.01 -29.77 -3.85 
/cut2 -10.77 6.51 -1.65 0.10 -23.54 2.00 
/cut3 -9.11 6.51 -1.40 0.16 -21.87 3.65 
/cut4 -5.84 6.42 -0.91 0.36 -18.42 6.74 
/cut5 -2.94 6.40 -0.46 0.65 -15.48 9.59 
/cut6 1.75 6.44 0.27 0.79 -10.87 14.37 
/cut7 4.95 6.46 0.77 0.44 -7.72 17.62 
/cut8 8.25 6.45 1.28 0.20 -4.40 20.90 
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/cut9 14.98 6.78 2.21 0.03 1.69 28.28 
/cut10 15.92 6.78 2.35 0.02 2.63 29.20 
/cut11 19.55 6.75 2.90 0.00 6.32 32.78 
/cut12 26.27 7.11 3.69 0.00 12.33 40.22 
/cut13 35.41 7.79 4.54 0.00 20.14 50.67 
/cut14 44.54 9.34 4.77 0.00 26.24 62.85 
       
/sigma2_u 79.95 40.13   29.89 213.85 
LR test vs. ologit regression:   chibar2(01) =   102.69 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000  
*99% confidence level, **95% confidence level, ***90% confidence level 
 
 
5.3.6 Hausman Model Discussion 
 
In panel modelling, the most often used statistic in evaluating whether a 
random effects or fixed effects model fits the data best is the Hausman 
statistic (Hausman, 1978). In evaluating consistency of estimators that are 
generally efficient, the Hausman statistic has as the null hypothesis that 
random effects is preferred due to higher efficiency. 
In the current study, the results of the Hausman statistic is not reported 
because of the probit and logit order model structures. The dependent 
variable is a binary outcome variable with independent fixed effects, which 
eliminates a fixed effects model from consideration in most binary panel 
model regressions.  Additionally, STATA, the software employed in this study, 
specifically recommends avoiding attempts at a fixed effects panel regression 
unless there are a large number of observations within each group (STATA 
Corporation, 2003). In the current study, the number of observations within 
each group is at most 13, which means that the number of estimated 
parameters increases to infinity (theoretically), which makes the estimates 
inconsistent (Greene, 2003). 
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In addition to the issues with attempting a fixed effects model on ordered logit 
and probit regression models, the results of the random effects model 
appears to fit the data well, as shown in the post-estimation results on the 
Likelihood Ratio tests for the ordered probit and logit regressions presented 
previously in this chapter. 
 
As shown in Table (5.14), both country's models indicate a Prob > chi2 (or 
Prob > chibar2 for probit models) of less than 0.01, indicating, at the very 
least, that the ordered probit and logit models reported provide more 




Table (5.14): Fit Results for the Country's Ordered Logit/Probit Models 
 
Country Ratings Model (probit) 
 
LR test vs. ordered probit regression: 
chi2(0) = 8.5e-14, Prob> chi2 < 0.01. 
  
Country Ratings Model (logit) LR test vs. ordered logit regression: 
chi2(0) = 8.5e-14, Prob> chi2 < 0.01. 
 
 
5.3.7 Comparison between Ordered Probit and Logit 
 
Among the methods available to compare probit model results to logit model 
results are the AIC and BIC figures. The following Table (5.15) provides such 
a comparison. As is shown, the two models produce virtually identical results.  
Because of this, both models’ results are discussed in the next section 
regarding connecting the results with the theory. 
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Table (5.15): AIC and BIC of Probit vs. Logit Models for Country Ratings 
 
 
Probit Model AIC and BIC 
Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC 
142 -239.67 -138.99 37.00 351.98 461.35 
Logit Model AIC and BIC 
Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC 
142 -236.31 -139.25 37.00 352.49 461.86 
 
 
5.4 Critical Discussions of the Empirical Results 
 
 
With the empirics now established, this section discusses the results in 
relationship to a priori theory. The following Table (5.16) contains the results 
from the probit and logit models. 
 
Table (5.16): Random Effects Ordered Probit vs. Logit Results for Country Ratings 
 
 
N = 142    
N groups = 13   
  Probit Logit 
Ranking dy/dx P>z Odds-Ratio P>z 
         
rs1 -0.29** 0.05 0.66 0.12 
rs2 -1.10 0.25 0.09 0.18 
rs3 -0.69* 0.07 0.25* 0.06 
rs4 -0.08 0.74 1.00 0.99 
rs5 -0.10 0.73 0.95 0.91 
rs6 0.01 0.94 0.96 0.89 
rs7 0.05 0.57 1.09 0.59 
rs8 0.40 0.30 1.68 0.46 
rs9 -0.77 0.13 0.19* 0.07 
macro1 -0.08* 0.07 0.86* 0.06 
macro2 0.01*** 0.01 1.01** 0.03 
macro3 0.0002*** 0.00 1.00*** 0.00 
macro4 0.48** 0.02 2.41** 0.02 
macro5 -0.23 0.28 0.66 0.25 
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macro6 -0.03 0.31 0.94 0.25 
macro9 0.21 0.33 1.49 0.28 
g1voacc -1.32 0.14 0.07* 0.09 
g2pol 1.75*** 0.00 18.71*** 0.00 
g3goveff 6.52*** 0.00 89,441.75*** 0.00 
g4regq -0.75 0.52 0.27 0.52 
g5law 3.08** 0.07 203.52* 0.09 
g6corr -3.20*** 0.00 0.005*** 0.01 




The first variable is Capital Requirements (rs1). This variable has a marginal 
effect on the logit model; Capital Requirements has an odds-ratio of 0.66 and 
a statistical significance at the 88% level. The 0.66 implies about a 1.5 to 1 
higher likelihood for countries with less of a capital requirement burden to 
have a higher bond rating, compared to 0.29 for the probit result. Although the 
two differ by a reasonable amount, the two are consistent in direction. This 
result is given the popular view that capital requirements act as a backstop 
when the financial system is under stress. The finding, though, may be the 
result of the effect higher capital requirements have on overall economic 
growth. Essentially, if countries impose higher capital requirements, this may 
result in lower overall GDP and similar measures, which might put downward 
pressure on bond ratings. These findings are consistent with the results of 
previous studies such as; Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2010) and Pasiouras et 
al. (2006). 
 
The next statistically significant regulatory variable is Restrictions on Bank 
Activities. The variable has a marginal effect coefficient of -0.69 and an odds-
ratio of 0.25 (4 to 1). Both are statistically significant at the 90% level. The 
results show that restrictions on banking activity may lead to lower bond 
 192 
ratings. Similar to the capital requirements finding, this may be the result of 
the effect these restrictions have on economic risk taking and its effect on 
broader economic growth.            
 
The last of the regulatory variables to exhibit any measure of statistical 
significance is Internal Management and Organisational Requirements (rs9).  
The probit marginal effect for this measure is -0.77, while the logit odds-ratio 
is 0.19 (5 to 1 odds). Overall, the results imply that country level regulation on 
Internal Management and Organisational Requirements is not beneficial for 
bond ratings. 
 
The remainder of the regulatory variables is statistically insignificant in both 
the probit and logit regressions. Interestingly, none of the regulatory variables 
have any statistical significance at improving a country’s bond rating, while 
three show the negative effects of regulation on bond ratings. 
 
The next grouping is the macroeconomic variables. The first statistically 
significant variable is Real GDP growth (macro1). This variable does not show 
a positive relationship, with the marginal effect from the probit regression at -
0.08 and the odds-ratio at 0.86 (1.16 to 1 odds). Both probit and logit results 
are statistically significant. The statistical significance indicates that as Real 
GDP growth increases relative to other countries, bond ratings generally 
decrease. The counterintuitive findings might be the result of small country 
sample size or, a more likely explanation lies in the nature of how growth 
happens. Here is what the previous statement means. Countries that grow 
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faster generally are emerging economies with smaller banking sectors. The 
lack of a strong financial system may lead bond rating agencies to lower a 
given countries’ bond rating even though these countries may be growing 
much quicker than countries with larger financial systems. 
 
The remaining three statistically significant macroeconomic variables are in 
the expected shape. The next variable is GDP (macro2). Overall, the probit 
model gives a coefficient of 0.01, while the logit model gives an odds-ratio of 
1.01. Both models confirm the idea that nations with higher total GDP 
generally get higher bond ratings. The effect, though, is not that large 
compared to the previous variables’ results. This finding likely corresponds to 
the explanation given in for the Real GDP growth finding. 
 
Following GDP is GDP per capita (macro3), with a probit marginal effect of 
0.0002 a logit coefficient of slightly greater than one. This variable also 
exhibits a small positive effect, although, the small positive effect is very 
small. 
 
The final macroeconomic variable with a measure of statistical significance is 
Investment as a percentage of GDP (macro4), with a probit model marginal 
effect of 0.48 and a logit odds ratio of 2.41. Both results are statistically 
significant at the 98% level. The strong relationship between Investment and 
the bond rating a country receives may indicate that bond rating agencies look 
at the long-term outlook of the economy in a given country. One of the most 
accurate predictors of future economic prosperity is how much a given 
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individual, business, or country spends on investment. This finding is given 
the amount of evidence produced in the economic growth literature on the 
importance of investment. The findings of this research in relation to the real 
GDP growth, total GDP, GDP per capita and investment as a percentage of 
GDP are consistent with the conclusion of many researchers who have 
focused on studying the determinants of sovereign credit ratings (see for 
example, Cantor and Parker, 1996; Afonso, 2003; Canuto, Santos and Porto, 
2004; Rowland, 2004; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005; Mellios and Paget-Blanc 
2006). 
 
As mentioned, the remaining macroeconomic variables – Savings as a 
percentage of GDP (macro5), Government Debt as a percentage of GDP 
(macro6), and Current Account Balance (macro9) as a percentage of GDP 
are statistically insignificant. Two of the measures – Inflation (macro7) and the 
Unemployment Rate (macro8) – were dropped due to collinearity problems.  
The finding on Savings and Current Account Balance is unsurprising given the 
nature of how the financial world actually operates and how international 
transactions happen. By contrast, the finding that Government Debt as a 
percentage of GDP does not lead to lower bond ratings may give researchers 
some pause to think. One often hears bond rating agencies mentioned the 
improvement or deterioration of balance sheets as a measure in arriving at a 
given company’s or country’s bond rating.  Perhaps this finding indicates that 
bond rating agencies do not necessarily frown upon government debt, but 
rather what governments are doing with their debt. 
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Moving on to the last group of predictor variables – governance, overall, four 
of the six governance variables are statistically significant. The first significant 
variable is Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (g2). The 
probit marginal effect coefficient is 1.75 and the logit odds-ratio is 18.71. Both 
models produce a statistical significance of greater than 99%. This finding is 
unsurprising.  Countries with concerns for stability or terrorism usually need to 
pay a risk premium to investors in order to sell their debt. Although the 
direction of the effect is completely unsurprising, the magnitude of the effect is 
perhaps somewhat surprising. The 1.75 for the probit model indicates that 
rating agencies, ceterus paribus, give countries a full two notch increase in 
their rating when political instability/terrorism is absent. The logit model 
convert to an almost 1,800% higher likelihood of a better bond rating when 
political instability/terrorism is absent. 
 
The second significant variable is Government Effectiveness (g3), with a 
marginal effects coefficient from the probit model at 6.52 and a logit model 
estimated odds ratio of 89,422. Although the logit model coefficient should be 
taken with large caution, both models produce very large estimates of the 
positive effect Government Effectiveness has on a given country’s rating.  
This finding is completely unsurprising given that investors purchasing a given 
government’s debt want to know what they’ll be paid back, and bond rating 
agencies’ understanding of investors’ concerns shows up in the numbers. 
 
The third significant governance variable is Rule of Law (g5), with a marginal 
effects coefficient form the probit model of 3.08 and an odds ratio coefficient 
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from the logit model of 204. The probit model result is significant at the 93% 
level, while the logit model produces a 91% significance level. Akin to the 
discussion on the previous two findings, this variable is consistent with the 
concern of investors purchasing the debt and rating agencies rating the debt 
that governments will make good on their commitments. One sign of a given 
government’s commitment to paying off its debt is by creating (or actually 
abiding by) the perception of a respect for the rule of law. Governments that 
do this well are rewarded; governments that do not, are punished. 
 
The fourth and last governance variable with statistical significance is Control 
of Corruption (g6). Produced from the probit model, the variable has a 
marginal effect of -3.20, while the logit model produces an odds ratio of about 
0.005. Both models produce a statistical significance level of greater than 
99%. 
 
The outcomes with regard to the political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of 
corruption are sensible, consistent and in line with the previous studies 
conducted by Cantor and Packer (1996), Butler and Fauver (2006), Afonso et 
al. (2007) and Bootheway and Peterson (2008). 
 
To conclude, why would Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, and Rule of Law produce very strong effects on higher bond 
ratings and Control of Corruption produce such a strong negative effect on 
bond ratings? One possible explanation is that countries with an absence of 
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political stability/terrorism and respect for the rule of law may achieve such a 
result by using under-the-table corruption. Essentially, employing a quid-pro-
quo strategy is to keep conditions manageable. Another possible explanation 
is that corruption is an efficient way to get things accomplished, and when 
governments attempt to control corruption, it leads to political instability. This 




An extensive body of empirical studies has been dedicated to the examination 
of the determinants of sovereign credit ratings in order to enhance the 
understanding of the studied phenomenon. A systematic study conducted by 
Chen, Cheng and Yang (2011) which evaluated sovereign credit ratings for 
120 countries in a longitudinal period (1986-2009) revealed that particular 
determinants can have both positive and negative effects on the sovereign 
credit ratings. 
 
The existing body of research on the estimation of credit ratings for countries 
highlighted numerous short- and long-term determinants of ratings. Cantor 
and Packer (1996) conducted the first systematic study examining the 
determinants of sovereign credit ratings. Cantor and Packer (1996) concluded 
that these economic factors explain 90 per cent of the cross-sectional 
variation in ratings. A more recent study conducted by Canuto, Santos and 
Porto (2004) extended this list and suggested that per capita income, 
economic growth, inflation, external debt / current account receipts ratio and 
government gross debt / total fiscal receipts ration are the main determinants. 
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The study conducted by Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2011) emphasised 
changes in GDP per capita, GDP growth, government debt, government 
balance, government effectiveness, external debt and foreign reserves as the 
key determinants of credit ratings. 
 
However, the integrity of sovereign credit ratings has been questioned in the 
aftermath of the recent global financial crisis. The key problem arises from the 
argument that rating agencies are too slow in their reaction to the market 
trends which exacerbates the financial crises (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and 
Treepongkaruna, 2011). Eijffinger (2012) went even further and argued that 
the business model pursued by credit rating agencies is flawed. In addition, 
Eijffinger (2012) pointed out the lack of competition which results in the strong 
market position of the top three credit rating agencies. The recommendations 
proposed by the author revolve around increasing the level of competition and 
transparency in order to enhance the quality of ratings provided. Moreover, 
Eijffinger (2012) suggested that investors and policy makers should not overly 
rely on the credit rating agencies. The practical solutions proposed by the 
author revolve around three potential courses of action - creation of a network 
of small credit rating agencies, delegation of sovereign debt ratings to the 
European Central Bank or the creation of a European rating agency. 
 
The review conducted of the existing body of research on the topic of 
sovereign credit ratings has uncovered the crucial importance of country’s 
credit ratings as well as the practical difficulties in their effective estimation. 
While the empirical body of research has focused on the examination of the 
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particular determinants of the credit ratings, the underlying problems 
stemming from the reactive nature of the credit ratings have provided the 
basis for the critique of the current business model. 
 
This chapter has covered regulatory policy, macroeconomic variables, and 
governance factors in explaining bond rating agencies’ decision to rate a 
given country. Some omitted variables that may also provide further insight 
include the power of the given country’s military and influence on international 
events. Essentially, although the use of military power to extract payback for 
unpaid debt has gone out of style, strength still matters, and it likely matters 




















 6.1 Rationale to Estimate Banks Ratings 
 
Bank ratings reflect the bank's viability, performance and risk exposure and 
thereby provide valuable information for investors (Doumpos and Zopounidis, 
2010). The most common estimation models rely on a combination of both 
financial and qualitative data in order to produce an overall performance 
index. Doumpos and Zopounidis (2010) highlighted the crucial role of banks 
ratings, especially in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, arguing that it 
provides a necessary assessment of the bank’s overall viability. 
 
Despite the widely acknowledged significance of estimating bank ratings, 
Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez (2012) uncovered a substantial level of 
confusion in terms of the meaning of a credit rating. As stated in the Moody’s 
rating methodology, “one of Moody’s goals is to achieve stable expected 
default rates across rating categories” (Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 
2012). Similar suggestions can be found in the methodologies of other major 
credit agencies, all of which point out towards the aim of developing cardinal 
measures of future defaults. In essence, this approach would require the 
agencies to accurately predict bank distress and thereby proactively shape 
the nature of the banking industry (Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 
2012). On the contrary to the cardinal rating for banks, ordinal ratings which 
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are in fact issued by the rating agencies focus solely on the assessment of the 
banks’ relative creditworthiness. 
 
Although the banks ratings provide valuable information regarding the relative 
creditworthiness of the institutions, the study conducted by Harvey and 
Merkowsky (2008) suggested that investors tend to rely too heavily on these 
ratings. As a result, the rationale to estimate bank rating models needs to be 
put into the wider context. On one hand, the credit ratings allow investors to 
gain information about the relative creditworthiness of the banking institutions 
and thereby contribute to the objective assessment of the bank’s overall 
viability. On the other hand however, the limitations of the credit rating models 
and their ordinal nature need to be acknowledged in order to prevent over-
reliance on the information encompassed in bank ratings. Furthermore, the 
question of bank rating quality plays a crucial role in affecting the importance 
of the bank’s rating.  
 
Table (6.1) below summarises the rating methodologies for banks pursued by 














Treacy and Carey (2000) argued that internal credit rating systems provide 
the necessary information for the assessment of banks’ viability, however, 
more recent studies have emphasised the need for independent banks’ credit 
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This item has been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
rating models (e.g. Peresetsky and Kaminsky, 2011; Shen, Huang and 
Hasan, 2012; Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 2013). In their study of 
rating errors, Kashyap and Kovrijnykh (2013) focused on the validity of banks’ 
credit ratings and concluded that it largely depends on the party that requests 
a credit rating. While credit ratings requested by the investors provide more 
accurate information, these requests come often efficiently according to 
Kashyap and Kovrijnukh (2013). 
 
The study conducted by Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez (2013) examined 
the banks’ credit ratings issued by the three largest rating agencies. Although 
these ratings are generally interpreted as the assessments of creditworthiness 
of an institution, significant competitive distortions affect the reliability of the 
ratings. The authors revealed that large banks tend to receive more positive 
ratings and this effect is even magnified in the case when the agency is 
provided with securitization business at the bank. As a result, these 
competitive distortions fuel the too-big-to-fail notion in the banking industry. 
 
In addition to the existing body of research on banks’ credit ratings, Shen, 
Huang and Hasan (2012) proposed an information asymmetry hypothesis 
suggesting that it can provide an explanation why banks’ credit ratings vary 
among different countries despite those constant bank financial ratios. In their 
study of 86 countries covering the period from 2002 to 2008, the authors 
concluded that a reduction of information asymmetry represents a viable 
strategy of improving banks’ credit ratings. 
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Against this background, this chapter conducts an empirical investigation of 
credit rating models for the MENA countries commercial banks, providing an 
analysis of the bank level credit rating model estimated using OLS, probit and 
logit methods, assessing the relative importance of the explanatory factors, 
and providing a critical discussion of their importance in the light of the 
literature. 
 
6.2 Banks Data Sample and Sources 
 
This section describes the data sources and presents descriptive statistics of 
the different variables to estimate MENA bank's ratings. The data involved in 
this chapter is classified according to the attributes that are measured in the 
dataset. It includes the dependent variable as Fitch for banks’ credit ratings; 
and also four main independent variables: bank characteristics and various 
financial ratios that are collected from Bankscope database, and three main 
country specific indicators which are discussed in the previous chapter 
(regulatory and supervisory, macroeconomic and the world aggregate 
governance variables) that are obtained from different sources. These 
sources are listed in Table (6.2) as follows: 
 
Table (6.2): Data Sources for Bank's Analysis 
 
Data Source 
Bank credit ratings Fitch 
Various financial ratios Bankscope 
Regulatory and Supervisory variables World Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Macroeconomic variables IMF World Economic Outlook 




6.2.1 Banks Credit Ratings 
 
In contrast to the country ratings dataset, the estimation of banks ratings 
maintains one dependent variable of interest, but from different rating agency 
that is Fitch’s Long Term Issuer Ratings, this has been selected due to the 
availability of data for MENA banks. The credit rating agency distinguishes 
between domestic and international long-term issuer ratings, although, upon 
inspection, the two were identical in all cases for the banks included in the 
study. By using Thomson Reuters Eikon software, the ratings for MENA 
banks have been gathered and are being assigned one of 21 possible ratings. 
The transformation of the alphanumeric ratings to ordinal numeric rankings is 
given in Table (6.3). Similar to the country ratings transformation, this has 
been converted based on how it was employed by (e.g. Pasiouras et al., 
2006; Afonso, Gomes, and Rother, 2007). Single letter values were assigned 
numerical values from AAA=21 to DDD, DD, D=1 (See Appendix 6 - A for 
MENA banks ratings and its transformation scales). 
 
In terms of total data points, the Fitch’s bank ratings dataset comprises 965 
observations, with the most common ratings being A- at 152, BBB+ at 118, 
and A at 98.  On the other end, the least common ratings are CCC at 1, C at 
1, and DDD at 3. A summary plot of how the average rating for banks has 
changed through time is in Figure (6.1). Interestingly, the average rating for 
banks declined from 2001 to 2002, and has since been consistently 






   
 
Table (6.3): Fitch Long Term Issuer for MENA Bank Ratings 
 
 
Fitch's Bank Ratings  
Rating Linear Transformation Count  
AA- 18 10  
A+ 17 76  
A 16 98  
A- 15 152  
BBB+ 14 118  
BBB+  14 6  
BBB 13 59  
BBB- 12 90  
BB+ 11 57  
BB 10 59  
BB- 9 81  
B+ 8 41  
B 7 73  
B- 6 40  
CCC 4 1  
C 2 1  
DDD 1 3  









10.51 0234Avg. Line      
Average Banks' Ratings by Year
 
 




6.2.2 Independent Variable (Financial Ratios) 
 
The entire database comprises 12 bank characteristics and financial ratios. 
These financial ratios are described in Table (6.4). Overall, the financial ratios 
encompass four broad categories, including operations, capital, asset quality, 





Table (6.4): Bank Characteristics and Financial Ratios  
 
Symbol Variable 
FR1 Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
FR2 Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 
FR3 Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 
FR4 Cost to Income Ratio 
FR5 Total Capital Ratio 
FR6 Equity to Total Asset Ratio 
FR7 Capital Funds to Liabilities Ratio 
FR8 Loan Loss Reserves to Gross Loans 
FR9 Net Loans to Total Assets 
FR10 Net Loans to ∑(Customer Deposits and Short-term Funding) 
FR11 Liquid Assets to ∑(Customer Deposits and Short-term Funding) 




A descriptive summary of each of the 12 financial ratio variables is presented 
in Table (6.5). In details, the Net Interest Margin (FR1) ranges from -1.48 to 
40.82, with a mean of 3.94 and a standard deviation of 2.85. Return on 
Average Assets (FR2) ranges from -26.55 to 13.20, with a mean of 1.89 and a 
standard deviation of 1.98. Return on Average Equity (FR 3) ranges from -
443.31 to 245.26, with a mean of 14.12 and a standard deviation of 22.40. 
Cost to Income Ratio (FR 4) has a mean of 44.95, a median of 42.57, and a 
minimum/maximum range from 9.04 to 509.74. The Total Capital Ratio (FR 5) 
has a mean of 18.47, a median of 16.81, and a minimum/maximum range of 0 
to 183. Equity to Total Asset Ratio (FR 6) has a minimum of -0.97, a 
maximum of 98.93, a mean of 13.76, and a standard deviation of 8.07. The 
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Capital Fund to Liability Ratio (FR 7) ranges from -0.96 to 111.63, with a 
mean of 15.97 and a standard deviation of 9.19. The Loan Loss Reserves to 
Gross Loans (FR 8) ranges from 0 to 38.59, with a mean of 4.88 and a 
standard deviation of 4.25. Net Loans to Total Assets (FR 9) has a mean of 
56.19, a standard deviation of 14.01, and a range (minimum/maximum) from 
6.42 to 89.59. Net Loans to the sum of Consumer Deposits and Short-term 
Funding (FR10) ranges from 13.79 to 541.91, with a mean of 76.68 and a 
standard deviation of 35.49.  Liquid Assets to the sum of Consumer Deposits 
to Short-term Funding (FR 11) ranges from 2.46 to 943.96, with a mean of 
33.81, a median of 28.92, and a standard deviation of 35.66. The log of Total 
Assets ranges from 17.07 to 25.45, with a mean of 22.80, a median of 22.84, 
and a standard deviation of 35.66. 
 
Table (6.5): Financial Ratios Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean St.Dev. Median Max Min Skewness Kurtosis 
FR 1 3.94 2.85 3.35 40.82 -1.48 6.07 55.88 
FR 2 1.89 1.98 1.85 13.20 -26.55 -3.45 61.50 
FR 3 14.12 22.40 14.83 245.26 -443.31 -9.12 206.36 
FR 4 44.95 22.63 42.57 509.74 9.04 9.96 190.64 
FR 5 18.47 8.70 16.81 183.00 0.00 9.14 155.02 
FR 6 13.76 8.07 11.99 98.93 -0.97 3.82 25.88 
FR 7 15.97 9.19 14.27 111.63 -0.96 5.35 45.52 
FR 8 4.88 4.25 3.86 38.59 0.00 2.95 12.51 
FR 9 56.19 14.01 57.77 89.59 6.42 -0.50 0.10 
FR 10 76.68 35.49 74.48 541.91 13.79 5.13 49.28 
FR 11 33.81 35.66 28.92 943.96 2.46 17.83 443.90 









6.2.3. Other Independent Variables  
 
This sub-section describes almost the same independent variables that have 
been employed to estimate country's rating models in the previous chapter. 
To clarify, brief explanation of these main variables is discussed here for the 
purpose of estimating bank's rating models.  
 
The dataset includes nine regulatory variables; these have been extracted 
from the World Bank survey regarding the regulation and supervision 
database. The survey is based on a multitude of Yes/No questions in a 
country. Consequently, a conversion into numerical values was required for 
the analysis and followed by the work of Pasiouras, Gaganis and Zopounidis 
(2006). Further details and summary of the variable symbols, statistics and 
the definitions are given in the previous chapters (see sub-section 5.2.1.2 and 
Table 5.3). 
  
The bank's dataset also includes nine categories of macroeconomic variables; 
these are stemmed from the International Monetary Fund’s October 2013 
World Economic Outlook database. These categories with the associated 
symbol used and definitions with the statistics summary are given in the 
previous chapters (see sub-section 5.2.1.3 and table 5.4). 
 
The World Aggregate Governance Indicators is another main independent 
variable is used for the bank's rating dataset; the database was developed 
and based upon the work of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). The 
dataset includes six broad dimensions of governance, namely; Voice and 
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Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
Corruption.  A summary of these six indicators, symbols and statistics are 
given in the previous chapter (see sub-section 5.2.1.4 and Table 5.5).  
 
Lastly, to distinguish between the conventional and Islamic banks, the dataset 
includes a dummy variable prescribed as (0) for non-Islamic banks, and (1) 
classified as a flag for Islamic banks in MENA countries. Of the 108 total 
banks, 16 are Islamic and 92 are non-Islamic banks. 
 
6.3 Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results section is divided into two sections. The first addresses 
the statistical results and the second summarises the results in relation to a 
priori theory. Similar to the country's estimations, STATA version 13 software 
was used for the banks data and the statistical presentations.       
 
6.3.1 Banks Ratings Results 
 
As an initial look at the bank ratings data, Table (6.6) contains the correlation 
of all variables in the dataset. As is evidenced, the financial ratio variables, 
macroeconomic variables, regulatory variables, and governance variables 
show no evidence of high correlation among the variables, with the exception   
of the six governance variables with appear to be highly correlated with each 
other and certain other regulatory and governance variables. The lowest 
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correlation coefficient between the governance indicators is 0.87 (G1 with 
G2), while most are correlated in the mid-to high 90s. 
 
Table (6.6): Correlation for MENA Bank's Ratings Data 
 
   
 Rankings Islamic fr1 fr2 fr3 fr4 fr5 fr6 
         
Rankings 1.00        
Islamic -0.07 1.00       
fr1 -0.50 0.12 1.00      
fr2 0.10 -0.04 0.29 1.00     
fr3 -0.08 -0.04 0.32 0.76 1.00    
fr4 -0.42 -0.04 0.06 -0.60 -0.42 1.00   
fr5 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.39 0.05 -0.37 1.00  
fr6 0.23 0.07 0.18 0.56 0.06 -0.48 0.75 1.00 
fr7 0.30 0.07 0.08 0.45 -0.07 -0.32 0.68 0.91 
fr8 -0.22 -0.02 -0.12 -0.16 0.00 0.13 0.06 -0.16 
fr9 0.33 0.06 0.04 -0.13 -0.17 0.11 -0.37 -0.10 
fr10 0.25 0.05 0.16 -0.07 -0.22 0.12 -0.09 0.16 
fr11 -0.22 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.10 -0.01 0.38 0.23 
fr12 0.39 -0.22 -0.29 -0.19 -0.07 0.05 -0.29 -0.27 
rs1 -0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.10 -0.18 0.13 0.01 0.06 
rs2 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.30 0.00 -0.38 0.47 0.56 
rs3 0.53 0.19 -0.11 0.34 0.05 -0.44 0.30 0.49 
rs4 -0.45 0.00 0.32 0.07 0.09 0.25 0.11 -0.05 
rs5 -0.56 -0.12 0.47 0.16 0.25 0.04 0.12 0.00 
rs6 -0.20 -0.05 0.17 0.16 0.19 -0.30 0.10 0.10 
rs7 -0.38 -0.24 0.15 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 -0.13 
rs8 0.49 0.12 -0.14 0.39 0.15 -0.48 0.36 0.49 
rs9 0.25 0.17 0.02 0.27 -0.02 -0.34 0.44 0.50 
macro1 -0.16 -0.02 0.22 0.22 0.19 -0.07 0.10 0.13 
macro2 -0.33 -0.13 0.58 0.10 0.19 0.17 -0.17 -0.04 
macro3 0.26 -0.24 -0.35 -0.32 -0.25 0.32 -0.29 -0.35 
macro4 -0.19 -0.18 -0.11 -0.25 -0.11 0.13 -0.31 -0.30 
macro5 0.24 -0.26 -0.30 0.03 0.12 -0.20 -0.16 -0.14 
macro6 -0.48 0.04 0.35 0.03 0.13 0.15 0.01 -0.01 
macro7 -0.57 0.08 0.24 -0.23 -0.06 0.51 -0.40 -0.41 
macro8 -0.39 -0.04 -0.02 -0.29 -0.06 0.55 -0.24 -0.49 
macro9 0.55 -0.17 -0.33 0.29 0.25 -0.46 0.11 0.14 
g1voacc 0.27 0.20 0.01 0.19 -0.07 -0.16 0.32 0.40 
g2pol 0.40 0.21 -0.04 0.36 0.06 -0.50 0.48 0.58 
g3goveff 0.41 0.19 -0.09 0.22 -0.08 -0.26 0.35 0.46 
g4regq 0.43 0.20 -0.09 0.25 -0.06 -0.31 0.39 0.49 
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g5law 0.44 0.20 -0.11 0.26 -0.04 -0.35 0.39 0.49 
g6corr 0.43 0.20 -0.09 0.24 -0.06 -0.32 0.37 0.48 
 fr7 fr8 fr9 fr10 fr11 fr12 rs1 rs2 
         
fr7 1.00        
fr8 -0.17 1.00       
fr9 0.09 -0.46 1.00      
fr10 0.37 -0.42 0.88 1.00     
fr11 0.16 0.36 -0.62 -0.42 1.00    
fr12 -0.14 -0.02 0.27 0.20 -0.46 1.00   
rs1 0.14 -0.17 0.16 0.25 -0.07 0.14 1.00  
rs2 0.60 -0.09 0.11 0.27 0.15 -0.13 0.12 1.00 
rs3 0.55 -0.14 0.26 0.31 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.84 
rs4 -0.04 0.23 -0.20 -0.08 0.36 -0.14 0.31 0.10 
rs5 -0.17 0.11 -0.41 -0.27 0.16 -0.23 0.22 -0.27 
rs6 -0.13 -0.01 -0.40 -0.35 0.13 -0.24 0.12 -0.29 
rs7 -0.34 0.17 -0.55 -0.56 0.25 -0.26 -0.27 -0.59 
rs8 0.51 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.11 -0.02 -0.17 0.76 
rs9 0.56 -0.03 0.12 0.28 0.11 -0.07 0.09 0.96 
macro1 0.09 -0.23 0.01 0.08 -0.22 -0.09 -0.19 0.12 
macro2 -0.12 -0.17 0.18 0.23 -0.32 0.08 0.13 -0.36 
macro3 -0.19 -0.20 0.28 0.15 -0.32 0.29 0.18 -0.59 
macro4 -0.37 -0.10 -0.09 -0.17 -0.13 0.00 0.09 -0.74 
macro5 -0.23 -0.14 -0.10 -0.24 -0.18 0.01 -0.23 -0.62 
macro6 -0.03 0.05 -0.13 -0.02 0.13 -0.14 -0.06 0.15 
macro7 -0.37 0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.13 0.07 -0.01 -0.25 
macro8 -0.42 0.35 -0.26 -0.33 0.33 0.01 0.07 -0.35 
macro9 0.07 -0.13 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 0.01 -0.39 -0.10 
g1voacc 0.53 -0.09 0.28 0.39 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.92 
g2pol 0.59 -0.03 0.06 0.18 0.19 -0.13 -0.08 0.94 
g3goveff 0.58 -0.10 0.28 0.38 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.93 
g4regq 0.60 -0.11 0.25 0.35 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.94 
g5law 0.58 -0.09 0.22 0.31 0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.94 
g6corr 0.58 -0.10 0.26 0.35 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.94 
 rs3 rs4 rs5 rs6 rs7 rs8 rs9 macro1 
         
rs3 1.00        
rs4 -0.12 1.00       
rs5 -0.50 0.40 1.00      
rs6 -0.36 -0.05 0.55 1.00     
rs7 -0.69 -0.04 0.59 0.62 1.00    
rs8 0.87 -0.09 -0.40 -0.41 -0.47 1.00   
rs9 0.80 0.21 -0.23 -0.37 -0.62 0.78 1.00  
macro1 -0.03 -0.10 0.20 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.14 1.00 
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macro2 -0.38 0.10 0.57 0.33 0.23 -0.38 -0.32 0.27 
macro3 -0.41 -0.17 -0.12 -0.10 0.06 -0.43 -0.52 -0.09 
macro4 -0.71 -0.26 0.32 0.54 0.57 -0.76 -0.78 0.02 
macro5 -0.44 -0.51 0.06 0.43 0.53 -0.32 -0.63 0.08 
macro6 -0.04 0.09 0.27 0.04 -0.06 -0.08 0.13 0.24 
macro7 -0.33 0.28 0.06 -0.25 -0.06 -0.40 -0.23 0.04 
macro8 -0.35 0.53 0.06 -0.22 0.13 -0.36 -0.31 -0.34 
macro9 0.12 -0.51 -0.24 0.11 0.17 0.31 -0.09 0.12 
g1voacc 0.85 0.14 -0.45 -0.58 -0.75 0.76 0.92 0.08 
g2pol 0.90 -0.05 -0.38 -0.27 -0.51 0.89 0.90 0.10 
g3goveff 0.89 0.06 -0.51 -0.54 -0.75 0.82 0.93 0.04 
g4regq 0.91 0.04 -0.49 -0.49 -0.72 0.83 0.93 0.05 
g5law 0.92 0.00 -0.51 -0.48 -0.69 0.86 0.93 0.05 
g6corr 0.91 0.03 -0.52 -0.51 -0.72 0.84 0.93 0.03 
 macro2 macro3 macro4 macro5 macro6 macro7 macro8 macro9 
         
macro2 1.00        
macro3 0.09 1.00       
macro4 0.26 0.51 1.00      
macro5 0.08 0.56 0.70 1.00     
macro6 0.29 -0.29 -0.14 -0.31 1.00    
macro7 0.24 -0.14 0.02 -0.38 0.29 1.00   
macro8 -0.24 0.04 -0.02 -0.26 -0.10 0.50 1.00  
macro9 -0.17 0.27 0.04 0.74 -0.31 -0.59 -0.42 1.00 
g1voacc -0.37 -0.45 -0.85 -0.72 0.12 -0.07 -0.18 -0.16 
g2pol -0.44 -0.59 -0.75 -0.47 0.01 -0.39 -0.38 0.11 
g3goveff -0.43 -0.37 -0.81 -0.61 0.03 -0.22 -0.27 -0.03 
g4regq -0.44 -0.38 -0.80 -0.58 0.03 -0.28 -0.31 0.01 
g5law -0.47 -0.42 -0.81 -0.55 0.01 -0.28 -0.31 0.05 
g6corr -0.44 -0.41 -0.81 -0.58 0.00 -0.24 -0.29 0.01 
 g1voacc g2pol g3goveff g4regq g5law g6corr   
         
g1voacc 1.00        
g2pol 0.87 1.00       
g3goveff 0.98 0.91 1.00      
g4regq 0.97 0.93 1.00 1.00     
g5law 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.99 1.00    









6.3.2 OLS Regression of Bank Ratings 
 
To begin with the regression analysis, Table (6.7) contains the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression results. Overall, the OLS results give an R-squared 
of 0.88 with a Root Mean Squared Error (MSE) of 1.01. Interestingly, only ten 
of the 37 independent variables are statistically significant above the 90% 
level (t stat in parentheses). 
 
The financial ratio variables significant in the OLS model include Net Interest 
Margin (fr1) at -0.22 (-1.88), Loan Loss Reserves to Gross Loans (fr8) at -0.06 
(-1.88), Liquid Assets to the sum of Customer Deposits and Short-term 
Lending (fr11) at 0.02 (2.20), and Total Assets (log form) (fr12) at 0.87 (7.57). 
The sole regulatory variable of significance in the OLS model is Internal 
Management and Organisational Requirements (rs9) at 0.71 (1.87). On the 
macroeconomic variables, GDP per Capita (macro3) at 0.0001 (1.65) and 
Inflation (macro6) at -0.10 (-4.25) are statistically significant above 90%.   
 
Lastly, four of the governance variables are statistically significant, including 
Voice and Accountability (g1) at -2.34 (-3.81), Political Stability (g2) at 0.99 
(1.97), and Regulatory Quality (g4) at 2.75 (2.15). Because the dependent 
variables are in ordinal format and the dataset is in panel format, the OLS 
results are only presented as background. The following random effects 
ordered probit and logit results are most appropriate for the analysis at hand.  




Table (6.7): OLS Regression Results for Banks Ratings 
 
 
    N=228 
    R-squared = 0.88 
    MSE = 1.01 
  Robust     
Rating Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
       
Islamic Bank -0.19 0.51 -0.38 0.70 -1.20 0.81 
fr1 -0.22* 0.12 -1.88 0.06 -0.45 0.01 
fr2 0.21 0.19 1.13 0.26 -0.16 0.59 
fr3 -0.02 0.02 -0.99 0.32 -0.06 0.02 
fr4 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.72 -0.02 0.03 
fr5 -0.01 0.03 -0.37 0.71 -0.08 0.05 
fr6 0.05 0.07 0.72 0.48 -0.09 0.19 
fr7 -0.04 0.05 -0.89 0.38 -0.14 0.05 
fr8 -0.06* 0.03 -1.88 0.06 -0.11 0.00 
fr9 0.03 0.03 1.24 0.22 -0.02 0.09 
fr10 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.71 -0.02 0.03 
fr11 0.02** 0.01 2.20 0.03 0.00 0.04 
fr12 0.87*** 0.11 7.57 0.00 0.64 1.09 
rs1 -0.12 0.17 -0.68 0.49 -0.46 0.22 
rs2 0.37 0.65 0.57 0.57 -0.91 1.66 
rs3 0.76 0.61 1.24 0.22 -0.45 1.97 
rs4 -0.62 0.50 -1.25 0.21 -1.60 0.36 
rs5 -0.25 0.26 -0.99 0.33 -0.76 0.25 
rs6 -0.14 0.26 -0.53 0.60 -0.64 0.37 
rs7 -0.16 0.16 -1.02 0.31 -0.47 0.15 
rs8 -0.35 0.41 -0.84 0.40 -1.16 0.47 
rs9 0.71* 0.38 1.87 0.06 -0.04 1.45 
macro1 -0.07 0.06 -1.20 0.23 -0.18 0.04 
macro2 0.0014 0.00 1.02 0.31 0.00 0.00 
macro3 0.0001* 0.00 1.65 0.10 0.00 0.00 
macro4 -0.99 0.69 -1.44 0.15 -2.34 0.36 
macro5 0.88 0.69 1.28 0.20 -0.48 2.24 
macro6 -0.10*** 0.02 -4.25 0.00 -0.15 -0.06 
macro7 0.09 0.10 0.94 0.35 -0.10 0.28 
macro8 0.004 0.01 0.41 0.68 -0.02 0.03 
macro9 -0.87 0.68 -1.28 0.20 -2.22 0.47 
g1voacc -2.34*** 0.61 -3.81 0.00 -3.55 -1.13 
g2pol 0.99** 0.50 1.97 0.05 0.00 1.98 
g3goveff -1.10 1.46 -0.75 0.45 -3.98 1.78 
g4regq 2.75** 1.28 2.15 0.03 0.22 5.27 
g5law 1.45 1.96 0.74 0.46 -2.42 5.32 
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g6corr -1.26 1.17 -1.08 0.28 -3.57 1.05 
_cons -4.64 4.82 -0.96 0.34 -14.14 4.86 
*90% significance, **95% significance, ***99% significance 
 
 
6.3.2.1 OLS Robustness Checks 
 
This sub-section presents checks for robustness, including inspections on 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, collinearity, and non-normality.   
 
6.3.2.2 OLS Heteroskedasticity 
 
As reported in Figure (6.2), a heteroskedasticity check on the OLS residuals is 
likely with no surprise, the results indicate some interesting patterns, with the 
residuals exhibiting diagonal patterns. The diagonal patterns are the result of 
trying to fit an inefficient OLS model on panel data in ordered format. The 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity fails to confirm 
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Figure (6.2): Heteroskedasticity Check on OLS Residuals for Banks Ratings 
 
 
6.3.2.3 OLS Autocorrelation 
 
The data include a time series component. Because of this, an Im-Pesaran-
Shin unit-root test was performed first attempted on the ratings. The Im-
Pesaran-Shin test failed because of insufficient observations. The lack of a 
result for the Im-Pesaran-Shin required the use of the Fisher-type unit root 
test. Table (6.8) presents the results. Overall, the result fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root. The autocorrelation problem is 
addressed later in the chapter through the use of random effects ordered 




Table (6.8): Fisher-Type Unit Root Test for Banks Ratings 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for Ranking 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests   
  Statistic p-value 
    
Inverse chi-squared(202) P 193.072 0.6619 
Inverse normal Z 3.8572 0.9999 
Inverse logit t(424) L* 2.1142 0.9825 




6.3.2.4 OLS Collinearity 
 
The variance inflation factor tests are reported in Table (6.9). Unsurprisingly 
given the nature of the dataset, some of the variables suffer from collinearity 
(VIF > 4). Although the coefficient estimates in the model are not affected by 
collinearity, the standard errors are which affect the statistical significance of 
the estimates. This issue is addressed in the logit and probit models. 
 




  SQRT  R- 
Variable VIF VIF Tolerance Squared 
Ranking 8.51 2.92 0.12 0.88 
Islamic 1.78 1.34 0.56 0.44 
fr1 4.27 2.07 0.23 0.77 
fr2 10.52 3.24 0.10 0.91 
fr3 6.78 2.60 0.15 0.85 
fr4 5.85 2.42 0.17 0.83 
fr5 5.07 2.25 0.20 0.80 
fr6 21.08 4.59 0.05 0.95 
fr7 18.33 4.28 0.05 0.95 
fr8 2.14 1.46 0.47 0.53 
fr9 23.23 4.82 0.04 0.96 
fr10 16.15 4.02 0.06 0.94 
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fr11 6.60 2.57 0.15 0.85 
fr12 3.42 1.85 0.29 0.71 
rs1 10.21 3.19 0.10 0.90 
rs2 356.06 18.87 0.00 1.00 
rs3 56.30 7.50 0.02 0.98 
rs4 13.40 3.66 0.07 0.93 
rs5 21.34 4.62 0.05 0.95 
rs6 30.15 5.49 0.03 0.97 
rs7 27.41 5.24 0.04 0.96 
rs8 57.90 7.61 0.02 0.98 
rs9 77.49 8.80 0.01 0.99 
macro1 3.66 1.91 0.27 0.73 
macro2 21.41 4.63 0.05 0.95 
macro3 45.43 6.74 0.02 0.98 
macro4 3,904.09 62.48 0.00 1.00 
macro5 12,004.00 109.56 0.00 1.00 
macro6 4.85 2.20 0.21 0.79 
macro7 11.86 3.44 0.08 0.92 
macro8 27.96 5.29 0.04 0.96 
macro9 6,255.21 79.09 0.00 1.00 
g1voacc 353.37 18.80 0.00 1.00 
g2pol 212.37 14.57 0.00 1.00 
g3goveff 1,239.40 35.21 0.00 1.00 
g4regq 957.18 30.94 0.00 1.00 
g5law 1,544.35 39.30 0.00 1.00 
g6corr 589.48 24.28 0.00 1.00 
Mean VIF 735.75    
 
 
6.3.2.5 OLS Omitted Variable Bias 
 
The OLS results comprise 25 independent regression variables.  Still, the data 
may suffer from omitted variable bias. To check for this, a Ramsey RESET 
test using powers of the fitted values was performed. The result gave an F (3, 
187) value of 3.94 and a p-value of 0.01, meaning one rejects the null 




6.3.2.6 OLS Non-Normality 
 
The last robustness test reported here is consideration of non-normality. 
Table (6.10) reports the Skewness/Kurtosis/Shapiro-Wilk W tests for 
normality. The results indicate that the Ranking variable is not normally 
distributed in looking at the z value of 25.41 from the Shapiro-Wilk W test. 
 
Table (6.10): OLS Normality Tests for Banks Ratings 
 
Skewness/Kurtosis 
Variable N Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) adj chi2 (2) Prob>chi2 
Ranking 965 0.00 0.00 69.31 0.00 
Shapiro-Wilk W test 






This section presents results of an analysis of variance model (ANOVA). As a 
note, ANOVA models do not allow non-integer or negative values as factors in 
an ANOVA model. Because of this, the reported macroeconomic and 
governance variables are in rounded thousands, with the variables 
transformed into all positive integers by adding to each column cell the 
minimum of the given variable. The results are reported in Table (6.11).   
 
On the whole, the ANOVA model produces an R-squared of 0.91, with a Root 
Mean Squared Error (MSE) of 0.93. Of the variables with a strong 
relationship, all four are financial measures, with F values ranging from 2.98 
to 46.14 and all significant at the 95% level or above. In contrast to the 
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financial variable results, none of the macroeconomic variables presented any 
significance level above 90%. Of the same kind to the macroeconomic 
variables’ results, none of the governance variables exhibited any level of 
significance above 90%. 
 
    Table (6.11): ANOVA Regression Results for Banks Data 
  
 
N=226    R-Sq=0.91 
Root MSE = 0.93   Adj- R-Sq=0.88 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob > F 
Model 1,463.20 50.00 29.26 34.12 0.00 
      
Islamic bank 1.57 1.00 1.57 1.83 0.18 
fr1ths** 3.44 1.00 3.44 4.01 0.05 
fr2ths 1.76 1.00 1.76 2.05 0.15 
fr3ths 0.30 1.00 0.30 0.35 0.56 
fr4ths 0.09 1.00 0.09 0.11 0.74 
fr5ths 1.37 1.00 1.37 1.60 0.21 
fr6ths 0.31 1.00 0.31 0.36 0.55 
fr7ths 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.94 0.33 
fr8ths*** 7.22 1.00 7.22 8.42 0.00 
fr9ths 0.26 1.00 0.26 0.30 0.58 
fr10ths 1.91 1.00 1.91 2.23 0.14 
fr11ths 0.11 1.00 0.11 0.13 0.72 
fr12ths*** 39.57 1.00 39.57 46.14 0.00 
rs1*** 12.79 5.00 2.56 2.98 0.01 
rs2 0.76 3.00 0.25 0.30 0.83 
rs3 0.08 1.00 0.08 0.09 0.76 
rs4 1.31 2.00 0.65 0.76 0.47 
rs5 2.20 4.00 0.55 0.64 0.63 
rs6 0.71 3.00 0.24 0.28 0.84 
rs7 2.60 4.00 0.65 0.76 0.55 
rs8 0.00 0.00    
rs9 0.00 0.00    
macro1ths 0.08 1.00 0.08 0.10 0.76 
macro2ths 0.05 1.00 0.05 0.06 0.80 
macro3ths 1.37 1.00 1.37 1.60 0.21 
macro4ths 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 
macro5ths 0.05 1.00 0.05 0.06 0.80 
macro6ths 0.65 1.00 0.65 0.76 0.38 
macro7ths 0.04 1.00 0.04 0.05 0.82 
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macro8ths 0.25 1.00 0.25 0.29 0.59 
macro9ths 0.03 1.00 0.03 0.03 0.85 
g1voaccths 1.44 1.00 1.44 1.68 0.20 
g2polths 0.06 1.00 0.06 0.07 0.79 
g3goveffths 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 
g4regqths 0.28 1.00 0.28 0.32 0.57 
g5lawths 0.44 1.00 0.44 0.51 0.48 
g6corrths 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 
      
Residual 150.08 175.00 0.86     
Total 1,613.27 225.00 7.17     
*90% level, **95% level, ***95% level 
 
 
6.3.3.1 ANOVA Robustness Checks 
 
This sub-section presents checks for robustness, including inspections on 
heteroskedasticity, collinearity, and omitted variable bias of the ANOVA 
results.   
 
6.3.3.1.1 ANOVA Heteroskedasticity 
 
The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity confirms that 
heteroskedasticity is likely present, rejecting the null hypothesis of constant 
variance, with a chi2 (1) of 5.31 and a p value of 0.02. 
 
6.3.3.1.2 ANOVA Collinearity 
 
The variance inflation factor tests are reported in the following Table (6.12) 
and the results differ little from the OLS results, indicating collinearity 
problems. 
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  SQRT  R- 
Variable VIF VIF Tolerance Squared 
Ranking 8.39 2.90 0.12 0.88 
Islamic 1.85 1.36 0.54 0.46 
fr1ths 4.35 2.08 0.23 0.77 
fr2ths 10.60 3.26 0.09 0.91 
fr3ths 6.78 2.60 0.15 0.85 
fr4ths 5.81 2.41 0.17 0.83 
fr5ths 5.05 2.25 0.20 0.80 
fr6ths 21.09 4.59 0.05 0.95 
fr7ths 18.51 4.30 0.05 0.95 
fr8ths 2.13 1.46 0.47 0.53 
fr9ths 23.78 4.88 0.04 0.96 
fr10ths 16.08 4.01 0.06 0.94 
fr11ths 6.71 2.59 0.15 0.85 
fr12ths 3.52 1.88 0.28 0.72 
rs1 10.24 3.20 0.10 0.90 
rs2 528.79 23.00 0.00 1.00 
rs3 56.18 7.50 0.02 0.98 
rs4 13.00 3.60 0.08 0.92 
rs5 28.19 5.31 0.04 0.96 
rs6 30.16 5.49 0.03 0.97 
rs7 27.24 5.22 0.04 0.96 
rs8 65.31 8.08 0.02 0.98 
rs9 79.20 8.90 0.01 0.99 
macro1ths 3.67 1.91 0.27 0.73 
macro2ths 22.01 4.69 0.05 0.95 
macro3ths 48.94 7.00 0.02 0.98 
macro4ths 4,291.50 65.51 0.00 1.00 
macro5ths 13,058.93 114.28 0.00 1.00 
macro6ths 5.26 2.29 0.19 0.81 
macro7ths 11.70 3.42 0.09 0.91 
macro8ths 28.36 5.33 0.04 0.96 
macro9ths 6,835.92 82.68 0.00 1.00 
g1voaccths 356.45 18.88 0.00 1.00 
g2polths 211.67 14.55 0.00 1.00 
g3goveffths 1,208.93 34.77 0.00 1.00 
g4regqths 961.17 31.00 0.00 1.00 
g5lawths 1,507.82 38.83 0.00 1.00 
g6corrths 575.66 23.99 0.00 1.00 
Mean VIF 792.13    
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6.3.3.1.3 ANOVA Omitted Variable Bias 
 
The ANOVA results for omitted variable bias indicate a Ramsey RESET F (3, 
172) value of 0.21 and a p-value of less than 0.89, meaning one fails to reject 
the null hypothesis of no omitted variable bias. 
 
6.3.4 Random Effects Ordered Probit 
 
With the results of the OLS and ANOVA models providing some interesting, 
albeit biased results, this section presents the random effects ordered probit 
model results. A random effect ordered probit model is the most likely fit for 
the data because the data are in a ranked, ordinal, and panel format. Details 
of theory and equations to fit a random effect ordered probit and logit models 
can be found on previous chapters (research methodology chapter 4 and the 
country rating models chapter 5). 
 
An initial attempt at running the random effects ordered probit model in 
STATA produced the “adaptive quadrature failed to converge”, indicating a 
need to check if the model was over-identified. Upon running various versions 
of a random effects ordered probit model, the exclusion of macro5 (Gross 
National Savings), macro6 (Inflation), g1 (Voice and Accountability), g2 
(Political Stability), g4 (Regulatory Quality), g5 (Rule of Law), and g6 (Control 
of Corruption) enabled running of a full random effects model. The 
requirement to eliminate five of the six governance variables is not surprising 
given the high correlation between all six as indicated in the correlation table 
(Table 6.6). Table (6.13) contains the results. The Log likelihood is -237.4 and 
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the LR test vs. a simple ordered probit is 171.7, indicating the random effects 
ordered probit model is the correct model for the data set.   
 
The statistically significant financial ratio variables are Net Interest Margin 
(fr1), Return on Average Assets (fr2), Return on Average Equity (fr3), Net 
Loans to the sum of Customer Deposits and Short-term Lending (fr10), Liquid 
Assets to the sum of Customer Deposits and Short-term Lending (fr11), and 
Logarithm of Total Assets (fr12). 
 
The statistically significant regulatory variables include Capital Requirements 
(rs1), Deposit Insurance Scheme (rs2), Restrictions on Bank Activities (rs3), 
Official Disciplinary Power of Supervisory Agency (rs7), Liquidity and 
Diversification Requirements (rs8), and Internal Management and 
Organisational Requirements (rs9). 
 
The sole statistically significant macroeconomic variable is the Unemployment 
Rate (macro7). The only governance variable included in the model – 
Governance Effectiveness (G3) is statistically insignificant. Lastly, the fixed 
effects flag for whether a bank is an Islamic bank is statistically insignificant 
using the 90% threshold, although, at the 83% level, being an Islamic bank 
increases the chances of a higher bank rating by a full two notches 





Table (6.13): Random Effects Ordered Probit Results for Banks Ratings 
 
N = 228    Log likelihood = -237.4   
N groups = 48    LR chi2 (29) = 334.9   
    Prob > chi2 = 0.00   
Rating Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Islamic bank 2.15 1.55 1.39 0.17 -0.89 5.19 
fr1 -0.84*** 0.22 -3.81 0.00 -1.27 -0.41 
fr2 0.69*** 0.25 2.77 0.01 0.20 1.19 
fr3 -0.08*** 0.03 -3.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.03 
fr4 0.001 0.02 -0.23 0.82 -0.04 0.04 
fr5 0.02 0.06 0.43 0.67 -0.09 0.13 
fr6 -0.05 0.14 -0.39 0.70 -0.32 0.21 
fr7 -0.02 0.09 -0.27 0.79 -0.21 0.16 
fr8 -0.06 0.05 -1.19 0.23 -0.16 0.04 
fr9 0.001 0.05 0.01 0.99 -0.10 0.10 
fr10 0.08*** 0.03 2.41 0.02 0.01 0.14 
fr11 -0.02* 0.01 -1.75 0.08 -0.05 0.00 
fr12 2.24*** 0.44 5.10 0.00 1.38 3.10 
rs1 -0.50*** 0.17 -3.02 0.00 -0.82 -0.18 
rs2 -4.22*** 1.30 -3.23 0.00 -6.77 -1.66 
rs3 3.75*** 0.74 5.08 0.00 2.30 5.19 
rs4 0.21 0.48 0.45 0.66 -0.72 1.15 
rs5 -0.48 0.43 -1.12 0.26 -1.31 0.36 
rs6 -0.23 0.28 -0.84 0.40 -0.79 0.32 
rs7 0.35*** 0.14 2.45 0.01 0.07 0.63 
rs8 -1.71*** 0.61 -2.79 0.01 -2.92 -0.51 
rs9 1.80*** 0.63 2.88 0.00 0.58 3.03 
macro1 -0.03 0.06 -0.46 0.64 -0.13 0.08 
macro2 0.00 0.00 -0.52 0.60 -0.01 0.00 
macro3 0.00 0.00 -1.56 0.12 0.00 0.00 
macro4 -0.05 0.08 -0.57 0.57 -0.21 0.11 
macro7 -0.94*** 0.16 -6.03 0.00 -1.25 -0.64 
macro8 -0.01 0.01 -1.00 0.32 -0.04 0.01 
macro9 0.04 0.04 1.14 0.25 -0.03 0.12 
g3goveff 1.84 1.24 1.49 0.14 -0.59 4.26 
       
/cut1 33.49 12.64 2.65 0.01 8.72 58.26 
/cut2 35.74 12.71 2.81 0.01 10.83 60.66 
/cut3 37.42 12.79 2.92 0.00 12.35 62.50 
/cut4 39.54 12.88 3.07 0.00 14.30 64.78 
/cut5 40.98 12.91 3.17 0.00 15.68 66.28 
/cut6 43.10 12.97 3.32 0.00 17.68 68.52 
/cut7 45.06 13.02 3.46 0.00 19.54 70.58 
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/cut8 47.01 13.06 3.60 0.00 21.41 72.61 
/cut9 49.95 13.17 3.79 0.00 24.14 75.75 
/cut10 52.32 13.22 3.96 0.00 26.41 78.23 
/cut11 56.68 13.42 4.22 0.00 30.38 82.98 
/cut12 60.08 13.55 4.43 0.00 33.52 86.64 
       
/sigma2_u 7.96 2.49   4.31 14.69 
LR test vs. oprobit regression:  chibar2(01) =   171.73 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000 
*90% level, **95% level, ***99% level 
 
 
6.3.5 Random Effects Ordered Logit 
 
The previous section presented the results of the random effects ordered 
probit model. This section presents the results of the random effects ordered 
logit (see Table 6.14). As mentioned previously, the results reported below 
exclude macro5 (Gross National Savings), macro6 (Inflation), g1 (Voice and 
Accountability), g2 (Political Stability), g4 (Regulatory Quality), g5 (Rule of 
Law), and g6 (Control of Corruption) due to collinearity problems. 
 
Similar to the probit results, 13 of the independent predictors are statistically 
significant in the logit framework. The statistically significant variables include: 
 
• Net Interest Margin (fr1) with an odds-ratio of 0.22 (p value less than 
0.01); 
• Return on Average Assets (fr2) with an odds-ratio of 3.53 (p value = 
0.01); 
• Return on Average Equity (fr3) with an odds-ratio of 0.86 (p-value less 
than 0.01); 
• Net Loan to the sum of Customer Deposits and Short-term Funding 
(fr10) with an odds-ratio of 1.14 (p value = 0.02); 
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• Liquid Assets to the sum of Customer Deposits and Short-term 
Funding (fr11) with an odds-ratio of 0.96 (p value = 0.09); 
• Logarithm of Total Assets with an odds ratio of 67.04 (p value less 
than 0.01); 
• Capital Requirements (rs1) with an odds-ratio at 0.37 (p value less 
than 0.01); 
• Deposit Insurance Scheme (rs2) with an odds-ratio of 0.001 (p value 
less than 0.01); 
• Restrictions on Bank Activities (rs3) with an odds-ratio of 942.69 (p 
value less than 0.01);  
• Official Disciplinary Power of the Supervisory Agency (rs7) with an 
odds-ratio of 1.83 (p value = 0.02); 
• Liquidity and Diversification Requirements (rs8) with an odds-ratio of 
0.05 (p value = 0.01); 
• Internal Management and Organisational Requirements (rs9) with an 
odds-ratio of 26.49 (p value less than 0.01); 
• Unemployment Rate (macro7) with an odds-ratio of 0.19 (p value less 
than 0.01). 
 
The results are somewhat surprising in relation to theory. First, only six of the 
financial variables are statistically significant. The results on Net Interest 
Margin, Return on Average Assets, Return on Average Equity, Net Loans to 
Deposits, Liquid Assets to Deposits, and Logarithm of Total Assets do not 
possess, at least on the surface, strong reasons for having stronger 
correlations than the insignificant variables. The insignificant variables are 
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Cost to Income Ratio, Total Capital Ratio, Equity to Total Asset Ratio, Capital 
Funds to Liabilities Ratio, Loan Loss Reserves to Gross Loans, and Net 
Loans to Total Assets. This is discussed in the later section 6.4.      
 
Second, a surprisingly six of the nine regulatory variables are statistically 
significant and three of the statistically significant variables have an odds-ratio 
less than one. It is not readily apparent, although discussed later, why, for 
example, Capital Requirements or Liquidity and Diversification Requirements 
would have statistically significant odds-ratios less than one and Restrictions 
on Bank Activities or Internal Management and Organisational Requirements 
have odds-ratios much greater than one. 
 
Third, only one of the seven included macroeconomic variables, Inflation, is 
statistically significant. These results might stem from the countries included 
in the study. The finding that the other six are statistically insignificant is 
interesting in that ratings agencies will often say they consider government 
debt or macroeconomic conditions in their evaluations. The evaluation may be 
more of a holistic approach in the context of ratings agencies evaluating the 
more important financial ratios – at least when it comes to rating banks. 
Fourth, the sole governance variable – Political Stability and Absence of 
Terrorism/Violence – also says something about how banks are rated. 
 
Lastly, the logit model did not produce a strongly significant result for the 
Islamic bank fixed effect, although, the odds-ratio is quite high at 54.93 and 
significant at the 84% level. 
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Table (6.14): Random Effects Ordered Logit Results for Banks Ratings 
 
 
N = 228    Log likelihood = -237.5   
N groups = 48    LR chi2 (29) = 333.4   
    Prob > chi2 = 0.00   
Rating Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
Islamic bank 54.93 154.98 1.42 0.16 0.22 13,851.66 
fr1 0.22*** 0.09 -3.68 0.00 0.10 0.49 
fr2 3.53*** 1.65 2.69 0.01 1.41 8.83 
fr3 0.86*** 0.04 -3.01 0.00 0.78 0.95 
fr4 0.99 0.04 -0.14 0.89 0.93 1.07 
fr5 1.04 0.10 0.41 0.69 0.86 1.27 
fr6 0.91 0.22 -0.41 0.69 0.56 1.46 
fr7 0.98 0.16 -0.13 0.90 0.71 1.35 
fr8 0.92 0.09 -0.90 0.37 0.76 1.11 
fr9 1.02 0.09 0.18 0.86 0.85 1.21 
fr10 1.14** 0.07 2.34 0.02 1.02 1.28 
fr11 0.96* 0.02 -1.69 0.09 0.91 1.01 
fr12 67.04*** 56.49 4.99 0.00 12.85 349.66 
rs1 0.37*** 0.12 -3.19 0.00 0.20 0.68 
rs2 0.001*** 0.00 -3.16 0.00 0.00 0.06 
rs3 942.69*** 1,299.23 4.97 0.00 63.28 14,044.49 
rs4 1.21 1.06 0.22 0.83 0.22 6.71 
rs5 0.46 0.35 -1.01 0.31 0.10 2.07 
rs6 0.74 0.38 -0.59 0.56 0.27 2.03 
rs7 1.83** 0.47 2.36 0.02 1.11 3.03 
rs8 0.05*** 0.05 -2.70 0.01 0.01 0.44 
rs9 26.49*** 30.18 2.88 0.00 2.84 247.02 
macro1 0.94 0.09 -0.64 0.52 0.77 1.14 
macro2 1.00 0.00 -0.40 0.69 0.99 1.01 
macro3 1.00 0.00 -1.48 0.14 1.00 1.00 
macro4 0.93 0.14 -0.47 0.64 0.69 1.25 
macro7 0.19*** 0.06 -5.67 0.00 0.11 0.34 
macro8 0.98 0.03 -0.73 0.46 0.93 1.03 
macro9 1.09 0.08 1.28 0.20 0.95 1.25 
g3goveff 27.81 62.09 1.49 0.14 0.35 2,212.86 
       
/cut1 66.63 23.96 2.78 0.01 19.67 113.59 
/cut2 70.69 24.11 2.93 0.00 23.42 117.95 
/cut3 73.77 24.31 3.03 0.00 26.12 121.43 
/cut4 77.74 24.53 3.17 0.00 29.67 125.81 
/cut5 80.47 24.63 3.27 0.00 32.20 128.75 
/cut6 84.39 24.78 3.41 0.00 35.82 132.96 
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/cut7 87.88 24.90 3.53 0.00 39.08 136.67 
/cut8 91.36 24.99 3.66 0.00 42.39 140.33 
/cut9 96.78 25.21 3.84 0.00 47.36 146.19 
/cut10 101.13 25.35 3.99 0.00 51.45 150.82 
/cut11 108.86 25.75 4.23 0.00 58.38 159.33 
/cut12 115.01 26.03 4.42 0.00 63.98 166.03 
       
/sigma2_u 26.55 8.60   14.07 50.11 
LR test vs. ologit regression:   chibar2(01) =   150.18 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000 




6.3.6 Comparison between Random Effects Ordered Probit and Logit 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the AIC and BIC criteria are used to 
compare the probit model results to the logit one results. Table (6.15) 
presents the results of such a comparison.  The results are broadly similar. 
 
Table (6.15): AIC and BIC of Probit vs. Logit Models for Banks Ratings 
 
 
Probit Model AIC and BIC 
Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC 
228.00 -404.89 -237.42 43.00 560.85 708.31 
Logit Model AIC and BIC 
Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC 




6.4 Critical Discussion of the Empirical Results 
 
With the empirics now established, this section discusses both models' results 
in relationship to a priori theory. Also, as mentioned, the probit and logit 
models fit the data about the same. A comparison of both results is given in 
Table (6.16) below. 
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N = 228   
N groups = 48   
 Probit Logit 
Ranking dy/dx P>z Odds-Ratio P>z 
     
Islamic bank 2.15 0.17 54.93 0.16 
fr1 -0.84*** 0.00 0.22*** 0.00 
fr2 0.69*** 0.01 3.53*** 0.01 
fr3 -0.08*** 0.00 0.86*** 0.00 
fr4 0.001 0.82 0.99 0.89 
fr5 0.02 0.67 1.04 0.69 
fr6 -0.05 0.70 0.91 0.69 
fr7 -0.02 0.79 0.98 0.90 
fr8 -0.06 0.23 0.92 0.37 
fr9 0.001 0.99 1.02 0.86 
fr10 0.08** 0.02 1.14** 0.02 
fr11 -0.02* 0.08 0.96* 0.09 
fr12 2.24*** 0.00 67.04*** 0.00 
rs1 -0.50*** 0.00 0.37*** 0.00 
rs2 -4.22*** 0.00 0.001*** 0.00 
rs3 3.75*** 0.00 942.69*** 0.00 
rs4 0.21 0.66 1.21 0.83 
rs5 -0.48 0.26 0.46 0.31 
rs6 -0.23 0.40 0.74 0.56 
rs7 0.35*** 0.01 1.83** 0.02 
rs8 -1.71*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
rs9 1.80*** 0.00 26.49*** 0.00 
macro1 -0.03 0.64 0.94 0.52 
macro2 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.69 
macro3 0.00 0.12 1.00 0.14 
macro4 -0.05 0.57 0.93 0.64 
macro7 -0.94*** 0.00 0.19*** 0.00 
macro8 -0.01 0.32 0.98 0.46 
macro9 0.04 0.25 1.09 0.20 
g3goveff 1.84 0.14 27.81 0.14 






The first variable is the dummy variable for whether a bank is an Islamic one 
or not. The significance level for the probit model is 83% and 84% for the logit 
model. The marginal effect from the probit model is 2.15, while the odds-ratio 
for the logit model is 54.93. Although statistically insignificant, the result is 
consistent with the theory that Islamic banks may budget and do business in a 
more conservative manner, and thus receive higher ratings on the order of 
two ranks if one uses the marginal effects from the probit model.   
 
The next variable is Net Interest Margin (fr1). The result is statistically 
significant and consistent in direction from both models, with the probit model 
marginal effect at -0.84 and the logit model odds-ratio at 0.22. The result 
indicates that banks with higher net interest margins generally receive lower 
ratings. This might be the result of the nature of the banking business. Banks 
with a higher net interest margin may be dealing with more risky customers, 
and thereby receive a lower rating. Another explanation is the wealth effect.  
Essentially, wealthy customers’ money usually migrates to the highest yielding 
bank and banks that pay a higher yield generally have a lower Net Interest 
Margin. By the same token, wealthy customers are generally customers are 
safer banks, which explains the higher ratings for banks with lower Net 
Interest Margin. 
 
The third variable is Return on Average Assets (fr2). The statistically 
significant result from the probit model is a marginal effect of 0.69 and from 
the logit model an odds-ratio of 3.53. This result simply implies that banks that 
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earn the most on their assets generally possess less risk because better 
managers run the banks. 
 
The fourth variable is Return on Average Equity (fr3). In theory, the 
explanation behind this finding is consistent with the previous finding on the 
Return on Average Assets. Better managers generally run banks with the 
exhibited ability to maximize the return on their equity. Apparently, rating 
agencies generally reward banks with better managers with higher ratings.   
 
The fifth statistically significant variable is Net Loans to the sum of Customer 
Deposits and Short-term Funding (fr10), with a marginal effect of 0.08 (probit) 
and an odds-ratio of 1.14 (logit). This finding of a positive relationship is 
somewhat surprising given the common sense view that the higher the loan 
balance sheet is relative to customer deposits and short-term funding, the 
greater the risk. The finding might stem from assumption that better managers 
run banks that make more money, and banks that make the most money 
generally have high loan balances.       
 
The sixth statistically significant variable is Liquid Assets to the sum of 
Customer Deposits and Short-term Funding (fr11), with a marginal effect of -
0.02 and an odds-ratio of 0.96.  Akin to the finding on Net Loans to the sum of 
Customer Deposits and Short-term Funding (fr10), this result is somewhat 
surprising. One would think that banks with higher liquid assets would receive 
a higher rating because of the ability to cover any losses from bad loans or 
other unprofitable banking activities. Perhaps, consistent with the finding just 
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mentioned on net loans, rating agencies view banks with a high balance in 
liquid assets as an indication of poor management. Banks with perceived poor 
management would generally receive lower ratings on their debt. The result 
could also be the result of the reason behind certain banks having high liquid 
assets. Essentially, banks may be holding high liquid balances because of 
higher volume in risky loans, and banks with more risky loans need a higher 
liquid asset balance to cover any potential losses. Apparently, ratings 
agencies view it this way. 
 
The seventh and last financial ratio with statistical significance is the 
Logarithm of Total Assets (fr12), with a marginal effect of 2.24 and an odds-
ratio of 67.04. The very large and strong statistical relationship indicates that 
ratings agencies consider assets as an indication of safety. This finding is in 
line with a study was conducted by Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) who confirmed 
that credit ratings will be improved with the increase of any firm size, value 
added per employee and the firm age. 
 
The other six financial variables are statistically insignificant. The variables 
are Cost to Income Ratio (fr4), Total Capital Ratio (fr5), Equity to Total Asset 
Ratio (fr6), Capital Funds to Liabilities Ratio (fr7), Loan Loss Reserves to 
Gross Loans (fr8), and Net Loans to Total Assets (fr9). The finding of 
statistical insignificance on these six financial variables compared with the 
results from the previous seven is not completely explainable with theory. 
Why would Net Loans to the sum of Customer Deposits and Short-term 
Funding (fr10) provide an indication of a banks rating while the Total Capital 
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Ratio does not?  With this as an overarching question mark, some of the 
statistical insignificance is explainable. 
 
The first statistically insignificant financial variable is the Cost to Income Ratio 
(fr4). This result likely indicates that ratings agencies care little about what 
banks are spending to run their business or the amount of money they are 
making. As mentioned previously, ratings agencies care about a bank’s ability 
to repay debt, and apparently the cost to run a bank is not related to the risk 
of paying back bank debt. 
 
The second statistically insignificant financial variable is Total Capital Ratio.  
This result might be an issue with the definition of the numerator of the Total 
Capital Ratio. The numerator is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital. Tier 2 
Capital includes risky assets as well as safe assets, so the ratio apparently 
isn’t different enough for the highly rated banks compared to the lowly rated 
banks to tell a difference on rating agencies’ thinking. 
 
The third statistically insignificant variable is Equity to Total Asset Ratio (fr6).  
This might stem from rating agencies’ lack of concern equity as an indication 
of the riskiness of a banks’ debt. As mentioned, ratings agencies concern 
themselves more with the ability of the given bank to pay back issued debt.  
 
The fourth statistically insignificant variable is the Capital Fund to Liabilities 
Ratio (fr7). This finding lacks no readily apparent explanation. Rating 
agencies certainly look at the liability of banks when arriving at a rating, as 
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well as the ability to cover that liability with available funds. This result might 
have something to do with the definition of Capital Funds. 
 
The fifth statistically insignificant financial variable is Loan Loss Reserves to 
Gross Loans (fr8). This finding might stem from two competing factors.  
Rating agencies certainly care about banks’ ability to cover their gross loan 
exposure, which would indicate a positive relationship between loan loss 
reserves and gross loans. On the other end, banks with higher loan loss 
reserves to gross loans have a higher balance for a reason, meaning that 
riskier banks keep more in reserve to cover riskier loans. These two 
competing factors may explain the observed statistical insignificance.     
 
The sixth and last statistically insignificant financial variable is Net Loans to 
Total Assets (fr9). When comparing this result to the results on Net Loans to 
the sum of Customer Deposits and Short-term Funding (fr11) and Liquid 
Assets to the sum of Customer Deposits and Short-term Funding (fr12), it 
might indicate that rating agencies probably give more attention to funds 
available to pay for debt. Essentially, available funds is more important than 
assets available to a bank, perhaps because it takes time and legal issues to 
free up some assets if there is insufficient cash to cover interest payments on 
loans. 
 
In general, the above findings in relation to the profitability, capital, asset 
quality, liquidity and bank size are consistent with the existing literature and 
empirical studies such as; Poon, Firth and Fung (1999), Doumpos and 
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Pasiouras (2005), Grunert, Norden and Weber (2005), Poon and Firth (2005) 
and Pasiouras et al. (2006). 
 
Moving on to the regulatory variables, the probit and logit models each show 
six of the nine indicators as statistically significant. The first variable strongly 
correlated regulatory variable is Capital Requirements (rs1). This variable has 
a marginal effect of -0.50 from the probit model and significant at greater than 
the 99% level. For the logit model, Capital Requirements has an odds-ratio of 
0.37 and a statistical significance at greater than the 99% level. The 0.37 
implies about a 2.7 to 1 higher likelihood for countries with less of a capital 
requirement burden to have a higher bond rating, compared to 0.50 for the 
probit result. Although the two differ by a reasonable amount, the two are 
consistent in direction. This result is given the popular view that capital 
requirements act as a backstop when the financial system is under stress. 
The finding, though, may be the result of the effect higher capital 
requirements have on overall economic growth and thus, a given bank’s 
balance sheet. Essentially, if countries impose higher capital requirements, 
this may result in lower overall GDP and similar macroeconomic measures, 
which might put downward pressure on bond ratings. Another potential 
channel in which this shows up is in banking practice. Banks that keep more 
money in inactive liquid assets are likely riskier and riskier banks generally 
receive a lower bond rating. 
 
The second statistically related regulatory variable is Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (rs2), with a probit model estimated marginal effect of -0.50 and a 
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logit odds-ratio of 0.0001. Both models are statistically significant above the 
99% level. Interestingly, both models produce strongly adverse effects a 
Deposit Insurance Scheme has on a given bank’s rating. This might indicate 
that banks operating or headquartered in countries with deposit insurance 
schemes may be riskier banks and thus receive lower ratings. Another 
possible explanation is that the deposit insurance scheme itself has an 
adverse effect on economic growth, with banks operating in countries with 
poor economies receiving lower ratings. 
 
The third statistically significant regulatory variable is Restrictions on Bank 
Activities (rs3). The variable has a marginal effect coefficient of 3.75 and an 
odds-ratio of 942.69. Both are statistically significant above the 99% level.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the result show that restrictions on banking activity may 
lead to higher bond ratings. This finding might stem from the mindset of a 
rating agency. A rating agency is, again, concerned about banks’ ability to 
repay their liabilities. By countries imposing restrictions on banking activities, it 
may make banking safer, which would explain rating agencies giving higher 
ratings to banks operating in countries with restrictions on banks’ activities. 
 
The fourth statistically significant regulatory variable is Official Disciplinary 
Power of the Supervisory Agency (rs7). The variable has a marginal effect 
from the probit model of 0.35 and an odds-ratio of 1.83 from the logit model. 
The result indicates that rating agencies not only care about the law, but on 
the enforcement of the law, as measured by the ability to discipline 
 241 
nonconforming banks. The result is completely unsurprising given the 
apparently reduced risk bondholders have when banks can be disciplined. 
 
In contrast to the findings of Pasiouras et al. (2006), the results show that 
banks in countries with higher restrictions on bank activities and official 
disciplinary power may lead to obtain higher credit ratings. 
 
The fifth statistically significant regulatory variable is Liquidity and 
Diversification Requirements (rs8). This finding on liquidity and diversification 
requirements is completely unsurprising because it reduces risk.  
Interestingly, the finding is in the opposite direction one might have expected.  
Instead of liquidity and diversification requirements having a positive effect on 
a given bank’s rating, the probit and logit models produce a negative effect.  
The marginal effect from the probit model is -1.71 and the odds-ratio from the 
logit model is 0.05. Apparently, rating agencies might be concerned about 
what banks are required to be involved in from the liquidity and diversification 
requirements, and that concern shows up in ratings. The result might simply 
be indicating that liquidity and diversification requirements are stemming from 
pre-assigned risk rather than post-assigned risk. Riskier banks may have 
higher liquidity and diversification requirements because they are riskier. 
 
The sixth and last of the regulatory variables to exhibit any measure of 
statistical significance is Internal Management and Organisational 
Requirements (rs9). The probit marginal effect for this measure is 1.80, while 
the logit odds-ratio is 26.49. Overall, the results imply that country level 
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regulation on Internal Management and Organisational Requirements is 
viewed kindly by ratings agencies. Interestingly, if one compares this result to 
the opposite finding on government bond ratings, one gets a more complete 
view of rating agencies’ thinking. Essentially, Internal Management and 
Organisational Requirements is a positive for banks’ ratings because of the 
apparent decreased risk, while it has a negative effect on countries’ ratings, 
perhaps due to the effect it might have on economic growth. 
 
The remainder of the regulatory variables – Accounting and Disclosure 
Requirements (rs4), Auditing Requirements (rs5), and Entry into Banking 
Requirements (rs5) were statistically insignificant in both the probit and logit 
regressions. The finding on these three is unsurprising given that rating 
agencies get a complete view of a bank’s balance sheet before a rating is 
issued.  Because of this, rating agencies are apparently unconcerned with any 
accounting disclosure or auditing requirements because the rating agencies 
already have access to the information they need. 
 
Additionally, most of the above findings with regards to this group are 
supported by previous empirical research which was conducted by Pasiouras 
et al. (2006). 
 
The next grouping is the macroeconomic variables. The sole macroeconomic 
variable exhibiting statistical significance above 99% is the Unemployment 
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Rate17. Both the probit and logit models produce negative relationship 
between higher unemployment and lower bond ratings, with the marginal 
effect probit coefficient at -0.94 and the logit odds-ratio at 0.19. Both are 
statistically significant at above the 99% level. The result indicates that banks 
not only consider banks’ balance sheets in assigning a rating, but also the 
condition of the economy in which the bank operates. In view of that, same 
conclusion has been reached by Les Bras and Andrews (2004) as well as 
Vuong (2007) to support this finding. 
 
The remaining six macroeconomic variables are statistically insignificant. The 
statistical insignificance of Real GDP growth (macro1), GDP (macro2), GDP 
per Capita (macro3), Investment as a Percentage of GDP (macro4), 
Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP (macro8), and Current Account 
Balance as a Percentage of GDP (macro9) is unsurprising given the nature of 
the issue at hand – banks’ ratings, as opposed to government ratings. The 
results indicate that safe and risky banks are generally equally likely to 
operate in countries with high and low GDP growth, high and low GDP per 
Capita and high and low government debt to GDP. These broader issues 
apparently matter little to the riskiness of a bank’s ability to repay a loan, at 
least according to ratings agencies. 
 
Moving on to the last group of predictor variables, that is World Governance 
Indicators. As mentioned, five of the six governance variables were dropped 
due to collinearity, including Voice and Accountability (g1), Political Stability 
17 As a reminder, Savings as a Percentage of GDP (macro5) and Inflation (macro6) were 
dropped due to collinearity. 
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and Absence of Terrorism (g2), Regulatory Quality (g4), Rule of Law (g5), and 
Control of Corruption (g6). 
 
The sole governance variable included was Government Effectiveness (g3).  
Interestingly, this variable was not significant above 90%, with both the probit 
and logit models produces statistical significance estimates of 86%. The 
direction of the statistically insignificant result is generally consistent with what 
one might think, with the marginal effect from the probit model at 1.84 and the 
odds-ratio at 27.81. The results indicate, akin to the finding on Official 
Disciplinary Power of the Supervisory Agency (rs6), that rating agencies may 
pay some attention to the government’s actions in relation to banks. 
 
To support this argument, Pasiouras, Gaganis and Zopounidis (2006) 
confirmed the importance use of the overall state of the economic 
environment and policies. They found that lower corruption, government 
bureaucracy and better quality of the legal system would make banks to be 
stable and achieve higher credit ratings. 
 
6.5 Interlink between Country and Bank Ratings 
 
It is quite common in economic circles to argue about the presence (or lack 
thereof) of endogeneity bias and the impact of time dependency. For reporting 
purposes, the following two Tables (6.19 and 6.18) report the results of 
Arellano-Bond regression for both banks’ ratings and countries’ ratings. 
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Interestingly, of the four lags reported, only one, Lag 1 of County Ratings, is 
statistically significant at the 95% level. Additional results including lags of the 
independent variables also show varying degrees of significance. As a note 
from the previous section’s discussion, there are three reasons for not 
including time effects in the final regression model. 
 
The reasons are, first, the nature of the dependent variable (ordered nature, 
which favours ordered probit or logit models).  Second, the limited number of 
years in the data set (only 13 years, implying that elimination of a year or two 
for model fitting purposes eliminates some sample fit years).  Third, excluding 
these variables provides limited insight into the final results (results of the 
correlations change by only marginal amounts). 
 
Table (6.17): Arellano-Bond Results for Banks Ratings  
 
Arellano-Bond Results for Banks Ratings 
N instruments = 84   Wald-chi2(31) = 133685.51   
    Prob > chi2 = 0.00   
       
Rating Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
L1. 0.23 0.12 1.82 0.07 -0.02 0.47 
L2. -0.13 0.12 -1.04 0.30 -0.36 0.11 
       
Islamic bank 0.00 (omitted)     
fr1 -0.15 0.14 -1.07 0.29 -0.42 0.12 
fr2 0.19 0.14 1.39 0.16 -0.08 0.47 
fr3 -0.01 0.02 -0.94 0.35 -0.05 0.02 
fr4 0.01 0.01 0.94 0.35 -0.01 0.03 
fr5 0.09 0.05 1.66 0.10 -0.02 0.19 
fr6 -0.10 0.09 -1.10 0.27 -0.28 0.08 
fr7 -0.01 0.07 -0.17 0.86 -0.14 0.12 
fr8 0.09 0.06 1.49 0.14 -0.03 0.20 
fr9 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.94 -0.09 0.08 
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Arellano-Bond Results for Banks Ratings 
N instruments = 84   Wald-chi2(31) = 133685.51   
    Prob > chi2 = 0.00   
       
Rating Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
fr10 0.02 0.03 0.67 0.50 -0.04 0.08 
fr11 -0.03 0.01 -2.50 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 
fr12 1.06 0.65 1.63 0.10 -0.21 2.33 
rs1 -0.29 0.14 -2.14 0.03 -0.56 -0.02 
rs2 -14.55 14.47 -1.01 0.32 -42.91 13.82 
rs3 1.20 0.88 1.36 0.17 -0.53 2.93 
rs4 -0.16 0.60 -0.27 0.79 -1.34 1.01 
rs5 0.17 0.47 0.36 0.72 -0.76 1.10 
rs6 0.05 0.37 0.15 0.88 -0.67 0.78 
rs7 0.10 0.14 0.77 0.44 -0.16 0.37 
rs8 -0.81 0.58 -1.40 0.16 -1.95 0.32 
rs9 0.79 0.61 1.30 0.19 -0.40 1.99 
macro1 -0.02 0.04 -0.57 0.57 -0.10 0.05 
macro2 0.00 0.00 -0.15 0.89 -0.01 0.01 
macro3 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.87 0.00 0.00 
macro4 -0.02 0.06 -0.30 0.76 -0.13 0.10 
macro7 -0.16 0.12 -1.36 0.18 -0.39 0.07 
macro8 -0.01 0.01 -0.98 0.33 -0.02 0.01 
macro9 0.01 0.02 0.52 0.60 -0.04 0.06 
g3goveff 1.67 1.14 1.47 0.14 -0.56 3.90 
_cons 0.00 (omitted)     
 
 
Table (6.18): Arellano-Bond Results for Country’s Ratings 
 
Arellano-Bond Results on Country Ratings 
N = 64    Wald chi2(26) = 157.33 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.00 
              
Rating Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. 0.31 0.16 1.98 0.05 0.00 0.62 
L2. -0.05 0.18 -0.30 0.77 -0.40 0.30 
       
rs1 -0.26 0.15 -1.70 0.09 -0.57 0.04 
rs2 -0.07 1.51 -0.05 0.96 -3.03 2.89 
rs3 0.11 0.41 0.26 0.80 -0.70 0.91 
rs4 -0.19 0.35 -0.55 0.58 -0.88 0.50 
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Arellano-Bond Results on Country Ratings 
N = 64    Wald chi2(26) = 157.33 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.00 
              
Rating Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
rs5 0.10 0.30 0.33 0.74 -0.49 0.69 
rs6 0.09 0.23 0.40 0.69 -0.35 0.54 
rs7 0.08 0.11 0.72 0.47 -0.13 0.29 
rs8 -0.49 0.54 -0.91 0.36 -1.54 0.56 
rs9 0.48 0.66 0.73 0.47 -0.81 1.77 
macro1 -0.03 0.07 -0.39 0.70 -0.16 0.11 
macro2 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.98 -0.01 0.01 
macro3 -0.0001 0.00 -0.63 0.53 0.00 0.00 
macro4 -0.06 0.46 -0.12 0.90 -0.95 0.84 
macro5 0.09 0.46 0.19 0.85 -0.82 0.99 
macro6 -0.04 0.03 -1.34 0.18 -0.11 0.02 
macro7 -0.34 0.16 -2.19 0.03 -0.65 -0.04 
macro8 -0.02 0.02 -0.89 0.37 -0.05 0.02 
macro9 -0.08 0.46 -0.17 0.86 -0.97 0.81 
g1voacc 0.51 1.05 0.48 0.63 -1.56 2.58 
g2pol 0.43 0.60 0.72 0.47 -0.74 1.60 
g3goveff 2.08 1.35 1.54 0.12 -0.57 4.72 
g4regq -1.03 1.36 -0.75 0.45 -3.69 1.64 
g5law 2.52 1.53 1.64 0.10 -0.49 5.53 
g6corr -2.06 0.90 -2.29 0.02 -3.83 -0.30 
_cons 13.50 6.57 2.06 0.04 0.63 26.37 
 
 
With the results of both country credit rating models and bank credit rating 
models now analysed and discussed in chapter 5 and this chapter 
respectively, it remains to assess the importance of the findings in relation to 
the literature. Despite the growing interest of academics into the examination 
of both sovereign and banks credit ratings, interlink between these two types 
of credit rating models remains largely under-researched. Williams, Alsakka 
and Gwilym (2013) attempted to address this gap in the existing body of 
research and conducted a study on the effects of sovereign credit ratings on 
the credit ratings of banks. The authors focused on 54 emerging countries in 
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the period of 1999-2009. The conclusions drawn by the authors suggest a 
presence of a strong effect of the sovereign credit ratings on bank rating 
upgrades. These effects are mediated by countries’ economic and financial 
freedom as well as macroeconomic conditions. 
 
Furthermore, Correa et al. (2014) examined the similar effects in the context 
of 37 countries over the period 1995-2011. Focusing on both emerging and 
developed countries, the authors reported similar findings to the conclusions 
drawn by Williams, Alsakka and Gwilym (2013). As a result, a strong 
relationship between sovereign credit ratings and banks credit ratings has 
been established in the existing body of research on the topic. The underlying 
reason for this correlation can be found in the investors’ perception of 
interconnectedness between sovereign credit ratings and banks credit ratings. 
Correa et al. (2014) attributed these perceptions to government guarantees 
suggesting that investors acknowledge the expected support from the banks’ 
governments. 
 
The relationship between country’s credit ratings and bank credit ratings is 
however a two-way type of a relationship as highlighted by Rogers, Sedghi 
and Burn-Murdoch (2013). A supporting evidence for the effect of the bank 
credit ratings on the sovereign credit rating of a country can be found in the 
recent case of Cyprus. The weakening banks represented the key argument 
for the downgrade of the country’s credit rating since the government was 
expected to provide additional financial support to the country’s bank and 
hence, a threat to the sustainability of the government’s debt burden has been 
predicted (Rogers, Sedghi and Burn-Murdoch, 2013). 
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To conclude, there is a strong interlink between countries and banks credit 
ratings. The ratings have been shown to go hand in hand under the influence 
of a two-way type of a relationship. While the sovereign credit rating affects 
the general perception of the creditworthiness of a bank, the bank’s 
creditworthiness has also been shown to have an impact on the sustainability 




With regards to the discussion emerged on Hausman statistic as reported in 
chapter (5), the results of random effects model appears to fit the data well 
and has been employed because of the probit and logit order model 
structures. In this chapter (bank's estimations), the same procedure is 
followed by the previous chapter (country's estimations), the dependent 
variable is a binary outcome variable with independent fixed effects, which 
eliminates a fixed effects model from consideration in most binary panel 
model regressions. The banks rating (probit and logit) models as shown in 
Table (6.17) below indicate a Prob > chi2 (or Prob > chibar2 for probit models) 
of less than 0.01, indicating that the ordered probit and logit models reported 







Table (6.29): Fit Results for the Bank's Ordered Logit/Probit Models 
 
Banks Ratings Model (probit) LR test vs. ordered probit regression: 
chibar2(01) = 171.73, Prob>chibar2 < 
0.01. 
 
Banks Ratings Model (logit) 
 
LR test vs. ordered probit regression: 
chibar2(01) = 150.18, Prob>chibar2 < 
0.01. 
 
However, international banking has witnessed tremendous growth in the last 
decade which has brought with it increased risk with global consequences on 
financial services and products. International banks, just like a growth 
company, comes across a wide range of risks which include interest rate risk, 
foreign exchange risk in addition to the business risk and compliance risk and 
the counter for risks keep on increasing every day as the business grow, 
which affects a bank’s credit rating. This chapter has provided the empirical 
assessment of a good range of financial and macroeconomic variables 
including; financial ratios, regulatory policy, macroeconomic variables, and 
governance factors in explaining and estimating bank level credit rating 
models to assess bond rating agencies’ decision to rate a given bank. 
 
Moreover, the rationale behind not using other dynamic panel data methods 
on the estimation for this research is because the time series component of 
the study includes 13 years for countries and banks with a complete data set 
history. In doing dynamic panel models, such as Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) or Arellano and Bover/Blundell regressions, one is assuming 
some time dependency in the dependent or independent variables, meaning 
that period t-1 may provide some information about period t. 
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One explanation for the exclusion of time effects is the small time sample 
included in the study. With only 13 years of 13 countries and 108 banks, 
employing one or two years for model fit eliminates 8% of the fitted sample for 
every lagged year included in the models. 
 
As a note of caution, the Fischer-type unit-root test for the linear 
transformation of ratings for both banks and countries knowingly indicate the 
potential presence of unit roots. 
As reported in Table (6.18) for banks and for countries, the Inverse chi-
squared, Inverse normal, Inverse logit, and Modified inv. Chi-squared all fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots. 
 
 
Table (6.20): Fischer-type Unit Root Results 
 
Fischer-type unit-root test for ratings 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
H0: All panels contain unit roots 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary 
 Bank Results Country Results 
 Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Inverse chi-squared (202) 193.07 0.66 18.82 0.84 
Inverse normal 3.86 1.00 1.40 0.92 
Inverse logit t(424) 2.11 0.98 1.52 0.93 




This finding, of course, does not invalidate the results presented throughout 
this study for the reason mentioned above as well as two other reasons. The 
second reason behind not adjusting for unit roots (meaning including lags in 
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the study) is that inclusion of lagged values makes little difference in the 
results. In comparing the linear results with Arellano-Bond results, the general 
findings hold in both direction and general magnitude. The third reason for not 
presenting dynamic, time-dependent results is that the dependent variable – 
banks’ or countries’ ratings – is in ordered probit or logit format. Essentially, 
ratings only take on a limited number of values, and these values are ordered.  
An ordered probit or logit model produces results with residuals of a lower 
magnitude than competing dynamic models, such as the Arellano-Bond 
estimates performed against the dataset.  Additionally, certain fixed effect 
variables, such as whether the bank is an Islamic bank, is omitted in an 
Arellano-Bond regression. 
 
Regarding the finance risk and interest rate risk, this will increase our 
exposure by the derivative instruments, the reason of financial crisis and the 
base for the bankruptcy of major companies across the globe. Specifically a 
derivative instrument in itself is exposed to a bunch of risks which include the 
interest rate risk and adds the risk of the change in the underlying instrument 
which drives the value of the derivative instrument. This makes the nature of 
banks and the instruments designed by them more complex and the 
stakeholders are exposed to a great extent of risk. 
 
The failure of major international banks have triggered the central banks to 
stricken the risk assessment process of the commercial banks/financial 
institutes and specifically the financial derivative markets which are more 
complex in nature than a routine banking arrangement. Swap market is 
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considered to be the fastest growing segment of the derivative market where 
in MENA region it was reported to be 90% of the entire derivative market 
(Hakim and Neaime, 2005). The bank reliance on the derivative instruments 
and the exposure on off balance sheet items have increased the overall risk of 
the banks and makes it difficult to assess the volatility of their underlying cost 
drivers. At the same time, the deregulation and financial innovations including 
securitization and credit derivatives have made banking sector more 
concentrated, complex and more closely connected with capital markets. To 
overcome these issues, the central banks started focusing on risk assessment 
criteria to be unbiased and fair indicator of the bank’s exposure to risk. This 
leads to the usage of rating agencies for an unbiased opinion on the risk an 
















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  




Credit rating is an independent opinion expressed by the professional bodies 
e.g. credit rating agencies that state about capacity of an entity to meet its 
obligations and is based on various quantitative and qualitative factors. These 
ratings therefore, represent the opinions of respective rating agencies and do 
not reflect the views of the Central bank. Besides, these rating agencies also 
do not represent investment advice or should be construed as such. The 
objective is to provide another yardstick to stakeholders for informed decision 
making, promote healthy competition and induce financial institutions to 
improve their state of financial affairs. 
 
In this context, this study has examined the importance of bank level as well 
as country level attributes that affect the credit ratings of MENA countries and 
their commercial banks covering the period 2000 - 2012. Throughout the 
study, the empirical analysis is conducted using panel data and cross-country 
sample covering 13 MENA countries to estimate country's rating models, and 
by using a panel data and cross-country sample of commercial banks 
covering 108 banks to estimate bank's rating models. The empirical research 
has been conducted with regard to examining the following specific 
objectives:   
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• Undertake a critical review of extant methodologies and evidence on 
credit rating models, specifically as they apply to banks and sovereign 
countries. 
• Conduct empirical analysis using panel data methodology for 
estimating bank and country credit rating models for MENA countries.  
• Analyse the policy implications with regard to the risk-sharing 
incentives for MENA countries’ banks through an informed analysis of 
the significant factors affecting their credit ratings. 
 
For the purpose of testing the hypotheses and objectives of this research, it 
may be useful to note that Enrico Fermi, who obtained an Italian Nobel Prize 
for Physicist in 1938, argued that “There are two possible outcomes: if the 
result confirms the hypothesis, then you have made a discovery. If the result 
is contrary to the hypothesis, then you have made a discovery”. 
 
7.2 Main Conclusion of the Research 
 
7.2.1 Summary of Country's Rating Results 
 
Three empirical models (ordinary least square, random effect probit and 
random effect logit) have been employed to predict MENA country's ratings. 
Although the logit and probit models differ by a reasonable amount of odds 
ratio but still they are consistent towards the general outcome. Three different 




According to the first group of regulatory and supervision variables, only three 
independent variables namely; capital requirements, restrictions on banking 
activities and internal management and organisational requirements are 
proved to be statistically significant but with an inverse relationship with the 
ratings. This indicates that too much regulation is a bad thing when it comes 
to estimate bond ratings. 
 
The result of capital requirement is given the popular view it acts as a 
backstop when the financial system is under stress. The research findings 
suggest that higher likelihood for countries with less of a capital requirement 
burden to have higher (better) bond ratings. In terms of the restrictions on 
bank activities, the results show that countries who adopt too many 
restrictions might lead to lower bond ratings. Hence if countries impose higher 
capital requirements with more restrictions on bank activities, this may result 
in lower overall GDP and the possible influence that might occur on economic 
risk taking and its effect on broader economic growth, which might put 
downward pressure on bond ratings. Since the internal management and 
organisational requirements factor has not been investigated by previous 
research, the research result indicates that countries with less burdensome 
organisational requirements are by 5 to 1 odds more likely to receive a better 
rating, although is not beneficial to be considered for bond ratings. 
 
The second group of macroeconomic variables provides interesting results 
with four of the variables statistically significant namely; real GDP growth, 
GDP, GDP per capita and investment as a percentage of GDP; they relatively 
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are in-line with a priori theory. Real GDP growth variable with an odds-ratio 
less than one, indicating that countries with slower GDP growth have 1.16 to 1 
higher odds to receive a better bond rating. Real GDP growth does not show 
a positive relationship to the credit ratings, this could be due to the small 
country sample size. Generally speaking, emerging economies with weaker 
financial system may have issued lower bond ratings even though these 
countries may be growing much quicker than countries with stronger financial 
systems, this statement can be applied to some cases related to MENA 
countries. 
 
Moreover, it has been pointed out through the results that the probit and logit 
models confirm that nations with higher total GDP generally get a hold of 
higher bond ratings. However, GDP per capita exhibits a very small positive 
effect and was also observed to be statistically significant. In addition, it 
should be noted that a country with a relatively high per capita GDP may have 
to be assigned with high sovereign ratings. According to the estimation of both 
models, investment as a percentage of GDP is statistically significant at the 
98% level. This implies that countries with large investment activity are by a 
greater than 2 to 1 margin to be given a higher bond rating. This finding is 
expected based on the existing literature which demonstrates that the healthy 
long term outlook of any economy leads to positive sovereign ratings. 
 
In general, the real GDP growth, total GDP, GDP per capita and investment 
as a percentage of GDP were observed to have a significant impact on 
sovereign ratings.  
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However, this study does not identified investment debt to GDP variable as a 
statistically significant in the determination of sovereign credit ratings at the 
same level of previous research, although this variable observed to have a 
positive correlation with the ratings. It is worth to mention that this finding does 
not lead to lower bond ratings and this may give researchers some pause to 
think. The reason for this may be that bond rating agencies do not necessarily 
frown upon government debt, but rather what governments are doing with 
their debts. 
 
The last group of the world aggregate governance indicators has four 
statistically significant predictor variables to determine sovereign credit 
ratings. Within these variables, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, government effectiveness and rule of law proved to have 
positive correlation territory with the ratings, while control of corruption is the 
only variable gives a negative relationship with the ratings. 
 
With regard to the political stability factor, the probit and logit models produce 
a statistical significance of this variable at greater than 99%. The findings 
suggest that countries which obtain lack of political risk and high percentage 
of absence of the political instability and terrorism would maximize their 
chances to have better and higher bond ratings. For the government 
effectiveness indicator, both models signify very large estimates of the 
positive effect this variable has on a given country’s rating. Again unsurprising 
finding given that strong quality of public services and high credibility of the 
policy government's commitment would lead to high sovereign ratings. The 
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rule of law shows significant level at 93% in the probit model and 91% in the 
logit model. This indicates when a country has confidence in, abides by the 
rules of society and applies high quality of contract enforcement as well as 
property rights; then it will face positive reflections that will lead to obtain 
higher sovereign ratings. 
 
On the other hand, the logit and probit models confirm that control of 
corruption has a statistical significance level of greater than 99%. It also 
shows in contrast by the above three indicators that control of corruption 
generates such a strong negative influence on bond ratings. This points 
toward that a country which is exercising for high private gains and interests 
including grand forms of political corruption will end up to be rewarded lower 
sovereign ratings. 
 
To conclude, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government 
effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption were all observed to have a 
significant impact and considered to be important determinants of estimating 
sovereign ratings. The study also finds that improved macroeconomic 
conditions are correlated with higher ratings, while greater reserve regulations 
are correlated with lower ratings. 
 
7.2.2 Summary of Bank's Rating Results  
 
Similar to the previous section of country's ratings results, three empirical 
models (ordinary least square, random effect probit and random effect logit) 
have been employed to predict MENA bank's ratings. Four different groupings 
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of predictor variables are employed in the process of estimating bank's 
ratings. 
 
The first group provides only six of the bank's characteristics and financial 
variables to be statistically significant. These are as follows; net interest 
margin, return on average assets, return on average equity, net loans to 
deposits, liquid assets to deposits and logarithm of total assets. The 
significant results are consistent by both models. The findings indicate that 
MENA banks which hold higher net interest margin are probably dealing with 
average and risky customers, and thereby are likely to receive lower ratings. 
However, this means banks should focus to make optimal decisions and rely 
more on wealthy customers in order for them to minimize the interest margin 
in a way that can be reflected positively to obtain high credit ratings. 
 
Moreover, consistent results appear in term of the return on average assets 
and return on average equity, this implies that when banks have the efficiency 
to maximize shareholder’s equity and the ability to convert their invested 
assets into generating more profit generally possess less risk and accomplish 
good ratings. In both cases, banks should recruit qualified and professional 
managers who are able to achieve high percentages of return out of their 
assets and equities. By doing this, banks would guarantee the high 




The results of net loans to deposits and liquid assets to deposits provided a 
positive relationship that would be associated with the risk. Specifically, when 
banks have high ratio of net loans to customer deposits, it is likely to receive 
greater risk because banks may not have enough liquidity to cover any 
unforeseen fund requirements. Also, as a result of the high volume in risky 
loans that banks might have, this will lead them to maintain a high balance in 
the liquid assets in order to cover any potential losses from the banking 
activities. Therefore, in both cases for assessing a bank's liquidity, a high 
percentage of net loans and liquid assets to deposits would lead banks to 
receive lower credit ratings on their debts. 
 
In terms of the logarithm of total assets that represents the bank's size, 
unsurprising findings concluded that banks with a hold of large assets and 
strong total market value of the securities indicate to have a good sign of 
credit safety; as a result these banks will be issued higher and better credit 
ratings. 
 
To conclude, bank level accounting and financial characteristics played a key 
role having been observed to be important factors on the impact of estimating 
banks credit ratings.  
 
The second group with regard to regulatory and supervision variables offer 
significant results to influence bank's credit ratings. Relatively, the logit and 
probit models show that six of these variables are statistically significant at 
greater than 99% level to influence credit ratings. According to the capital 
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requirements and deposit insurance scheme, both models produce adverse 
effects on banks ratings. In detail, it suggests that banks operating in 
countries that impose higher capital requirements and with explicit deposit 
insurance scheme are considered being riskier banks and negatively 
influencing the overall GDP and economic growth, which may result in 
receiving lower credit ratings. 
 
The results show that banks in countries with higher restrictions on bank 
activities and official disciplinary power may lead to obtain higher credit 
ratings. This could be due to many reasons, first the fact that credit rating 
agencies are concerned about banks’ ability to repay loans, and pleased to 
issue higher ratings to banks which operate under countries that apply more 
restrictions on banks activities, as this may make the banking industry to be 
safer. Second, rating agencies are also concerned about the application of 
business law and its enforcements. By regulating the nonconforming banks, 
this may reduce the risk involved and amplify the good chances in acquiring 
better credit ratings. 
 
Furthermore, interesting results appear in terms of the liquidity and 
diversification requirements. The probit and logit models generate a negative 
effect on banks credit ratings. This indicates that rating agencies might be 
concerned about what banks are required to be involved in and that concern 
shows up in ratings. However, internal management and organisational 
requirements have a positive effect on banks credit ratings because this 
variable deals with reducing the risk involved. This means that banks in 
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countries which require high standards of internal and organisational 
management, it is more likely to obtain higher ratings. On the other hand, this 
is not the case for the government bond ratings, since this variable is viewed 
kindly by rating agencies, and it can deliver negative effect due to the 
unpleasant consequences it might have on the GDP and other economic 
cycle. 
 
Moreover, in order to explain and estimate banks credit ratings, it is essential 
to incorporate country-level data including regulatory and supervision 
features. This is in line with the point of view for other researchers (e.g. 
Grunert, Norden and Weber, 2005; Ioannidis, Pasiouras and Zopounidis, 
2010) who conducted different studies on the importance of using non-
financial factors to explain credit ratings. 
 
In connection with the third group of macroeconomic variables, only one 
variable (unemployment rate) provides significant impact on banks credit 
ratings. The probit and logit models show evidence of that unemployment rate 
is statistically significant at above 99% level, and it has a negative correlation 
with the credit ratings. The result indicates that when the percentage rate of 
unemployment is high and on the rise, the credit ratings of banks would be 
affected negatively to be low. 
 
Regarding the last group of predictor variables that is world governance 
indicators, government effectiveness was the only variable to be included in 
the estimations, while other variables were excluded due to collinearity 
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problems. Despite the fact that this variable was not significant above 90%, 
the probit and logit models generate statistical significance estimates of 86%. 
Similar to the finding on official disciplinary power of the supervisory agency, 
the result indicates that when assessing bank's ratings, credit rating agencies 
should pay more attention to the government's actions towards banks. 
 
Lastly, in terms of the dummy variable which has been used to whether a 
bank is an Islamic one or not, the result shows to be statistically insignificant 
using the 90% threshold, while the significance level for the probit model is 
83% and 84% for the logit model. The result is consistent with the theory that 
Islamic banks may budget and do business in a more conservative manner 
than the conventional ones, and thus receive higher credit ratings. 
 
7.2.3 Summary of Overall Results  
 
This study empirically evaluates predictors of ratings given to countries and 
banks. The measures capture financial health, regulation environment, 
governance, and macroeconomic conditions. The results provide some 
interesting connections with economic theory. 
 
7.2.3.1 Financial Ratios 
 
The results on the financial health measures, which are included only in the 
bank ratings chapter (net interest margin, return on average assets, total 
assets, and other financial ratios are not relevant to government ratings). 
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The economic theory behind inclusion of these variables is that these financial 
ratios capture risk, financial capability, and other indications of the strength of 
a bank’s balance sheet. 
 
Of the 12 measures included, six were found to be statistically significant 
above the 99% level at predicting the ordered ranking of a given bank.  The 
six measures are Net Interest Margin (fr1), Return on Average Assets (fr2), 
Return on Average Equity (fr3), Net Loans to the sum of Customer Deposits 
and Short-term Funding (fr10), Liquid Assets to the sum of Customer Deposits 
and Short-term Funding (fr11), and the Logarithm of Total Assets (fr12).   
 
The probit result on Net Interest Margin indicates that as the Net Interest 
Margin increases, ratings generally decline. This implies that banks that lend 
at higher rates relative to the cost of acquiring funds have lower ratings. In 
relation to economic theory, this result is completely unsurprising.  Banks that 
lend at higher margins generally are lending to individuals and businesses 
that are riskier to lend to, which is consistent with the theory of moral hazard.  
Essentially, only firms with riskier propositions or ability to repay would take 
out higher interest loans, and banks that lend to such individuals and 
businesses generally have higher risk. 
 
The second statistically significant result is the Return on Average Assets; the 
result indicates that as Return on Average Assets increases, ratings generally 
increase.  This result stems from the risk-average nature of ratings agencies. 
Ratings agencies are looking for evidence of well-run banks.  The ability of a 
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bank to achieve higher returns on their assets indicates a less risky nature of 
the assets held by the bank.     
 
The third statistically significant result is Return on Average Equity (fr3). The 
results indicate that as the Return on Average Equity increases, the rating 
generally declines. This result seems completely consistent two tenants of 
economic theory. The first is the theory of adverse selection. Adverse 
selection simply implies (and as a note, this could also apply to the first result 
on Net Interest Margin) that individuals and banks with higher rates are riskier, 
meaning banks dealing in such loans have an adverse selection problem.  
The second economic theory explaining the statistically significant results 
here is a fundamental theory in finance related to risk and reward.  
Essentially, the higher the risk, the higher the expected return has to be for 
investors (or in this case banks) to take on the risk.  Banks with higher Return 
on Average Equity get lower ratings because they are dealing in riskier loans, 
and, as theorised in the financial literature, with higher risk comes higher 
expected returns (thus, the higher Return on Average Equity with lower 
overall ratings). 
 
The difference between the result on Return on Average Assets (negatively 
related to ratings) and the result on Return on Average Equity (positive result 
related to ratings) probably stems from the core difference between what an 
asset is and what equity is. Equity is a liability in accounting, while an Asset is 
strength. When banks have a higher equity outstanding, this means a greater 
portion of their operations are funded by equity, a riskier form of financing. 
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The fourth statistically significant result is Net Loans to the sum of Customer 
Deposits and Short-term Funding. The results indicate that as Net Loans to 
the sum of Customer Deposits and Short-term Funding increases, so do 
ratings. This result stems from the nature of the banking business. Banks with 
a larger loans portfolio in relation to customer deposits and short-term funding 
likely indicates the ability of banking managers to use their assets to increase 
business. This is consistent with the economic theory of Signalling.  Signalling 
simply implies that banks, just as job seekers do when looking for a job, signal 
their strengths. In this case, ratings agencies incorporate such signals into 
banks’ ratings. 
 
The fifth statistically significant financial ratio result is Liquid Assets to the sum 
of Customer Deposits and Short-term Funding. The results indicate that as 
liquid assets increase relative to customer deposits and short-term funding, 
ratings generally decline. This finding is consistent with signalling as well, 
except that in this case, banks are signalling the wrong information to ratings 
agencies. Essentially, when banks keep a larger portion of their assets in a 
liquid form, which is forgoing higher returns by investing the money 
somewhere else, this signals to ratings agencies that there is some reason 
the given bank has to keep a higher percentage of its deposits in liquid 
assets. Thus, the signal gets incorporated into banks’ ratings. 
 
The sixth significant financial variable is the Logarithm of Total Assets. The 
results indicate that as the total assets increase, so do ratings. Two economic 
theories likely explain this phenomenon. The first is the theory of scale.  
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Essentially, as the amount of assets under management increases, banks are 
likely able to become more efficient and scale their operations. Efficient 
operations are generally thought to be less risky, and thus, ratings agencies 
reward efficient banks with better ratings. In addition to the theory of scale, the 
second theory is that of asymmetric information. Larger banks likely have the 
resources to exploit the asymmetric information between themselves and 
ratings agencies. This asymmetric information is exploited when ratings 
agencies assign ratings to banks.  
 
7.2.3.2 Regulatory Variables 
 
The study includes nine regulatory variables, of which two are statistically 
significant for countries and six are statistically significant for banks. A 
discussion of the two (Capital Requirements, rs1 and Restrictions on Bank 
Activities, rs3) statistically significant results for countries is first, followed by a 
discussion of the six statistically significant predictors of banks’ ratings.   
 
The findings indicate that as Capital Requirements increase, ratings generally 
go down. The economic theory that might explain this result is signalling 
among countries. Essentially, countries that have to impose higher capital 
requirements are signalling to ratings agencies that they are riskier for the 
country as a whole. This signal is incorporated into ratings agencies’ 
decisions. Results of the second regulatory variable for governments indicate 
that as restrictions on banks activities increase, ratings decline. In addition to 
being consistent with the economic literature on signalling, this result is also 
consistent with the moral hazard literature. Moral hazard is present whenever 
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someone or some government takes on more risk whenever someone else 
bears a higher percentage of the burden associated with the risk. In this case, 
countries that place greater restrictions on banks activities are signalling their 
need to deal with moral hazard problems, and unsurprisingly, ratings agencies 
incorporate this behaviour into their ratings. 
 
However, the six significant results for regulatory variables for banks are 
Capital Requirements (rs1), Deposit Insurance Scheme (rs2), Restrictions on 
Banks Activities (rs3), Official Disciplinary Power of the Supervisory Agency 
(rs7), Liquidity and Diversification Requirements (rs8), and Internal 
Management and Organisational Requirements (rs9). 
 
First, the results indicate that Capital Requirements increase, a banks’ rating 
generally declines. This result is consistent with the result on countries.  The 
theory behind this observed result is likely the same as explained for 
governments. Essentially, countries are signalling to ratings agencies that 
their banks are riskier when governments impose greater capital 
requirements, and this signalling is incorporated into ratings agencies’ 
decisions. 
 
Deposit Insurance Schemes (rs2) results indicate that this variable becomes 
more prevalent when ratings decline. Signalling likely explains this result. 
 
In terms of the Restrictions on Banks Activities, the results indicate that as this 
variable increases, so do ratings. This result likely stems from the risk-averse 
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nature of assigning ratings. When governments place regulations on what 
banks can do, ratings agencies apparently view this not as a signal of problem 
banks, but rather as an indication that banks are safer than they otherwise 
would be. This less risky component of bank activities therefore pushes 
ratings up. 
 
For the fourth variable, the result indicates that as Supervisory Agencies of 
governments get more teeth, or in other words the ability to punish, banks 
receive higher ratings. This likely stems from the economic theory of signalling 
as well as the theory behind asymmetric information. The theory of 
asymmetric information simply implies that ratings agencies, which lack 
complete information compared to the individuals responsible for the day-to-
day activities of the banks, view government supervisory agencies as a way to 
lower the risk associated with asymmetric information. 
 
A result of the fifth variable indicates that as Liquidity and Diversification 
Requirements increase, ratings generally decline. This result is also 
consistent with signalling, where governments are signalling to ratings 
agencies that their banks are riskier than banks in other places of the globe.   
 
The sixth statistically significant variable is Internal Management and 
Organisational Requirements (rs9). Finding of the sixth one indicates that as 
Internal Management and Organisational Requirements increase, ratings are 
generally better. The result stems from signalling as well as asymmetric 
information. As mentioned in other parts of this write-up, ratings agencies are 
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often concerned about asymmetric information. When governments require 
certain organisational structures, apparently ratings agencies view this as less 
risky, probably because of the reduced risk associated with asymmetric 
information. Why asymmetric information? Because requirements on internal 
management and organisational requirements require information in the 
hands or more individuals, which lessens the risk associated with asymmetric 
information in the hands of too few individuals. 
 
Overall, these fascinating results are likely stemmed from asymmetric 
information, where government balance sheets are generally much more 
open than are the activities of private banks. Regulatory variables lower or 
increase the risk associated with private banks. 
 
7.2.3.3 Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Of the nine variables, only one is statistically significant above the 95% level 
for the banks ratings regression, while country ratings model results include 
four statistically significant variables. 
 
Addressing first the bank ratings results, the sole variable with statistical 
significance is the unemployment rate. The results indicate that as the 
unemployment rate rises, bond ratings generally decline. The result is 
unsurprising in light of economic theory suggesting that higher unemployment 
correlates with increased risk of default, something that ratings agencies 
apparently consider in their assessment of a country’s worthiness to issue 
debt. The result is also consistent with theory on asymmetric information, in 
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that there is increased asymmetric information in times of greater uncertainty, 
such as when a country has a higher than average unemployment rate.   
 
Shifting to the results on government ratings, the results indicate that as Real 
GDP Growth increases, ratings are generally lower. In business theory, this 
probably makes little sense. Why would a country with better growth 
experience be punished by lower ratings from the ratings agencies? The 
answer lies in economic theory. Countries with higher Real GPD Growth are 
likely the countries with increased risk of experiencing a sharp downturn in 
economic growth. This economic conditions-induced information asymmetry is 
likely accompanied by moral hazard, where countries with higher economic 
growth have a higher likelihood to take on debt with mispriced risk of default.  
The bond ratings agencies are, obviously, well aware of this and account for 
the economic theories in their ratings. 
 
The second statistically significant variable is GDP in US dollars, this indicates 
a size effect. As GDP becomes larger, bond ratings generally are pushed up 
somewhat, although the 0.01 or 1.01 are very small effects. The results are 
consistent with the economic theory of scale, meaning there is reduced risk to 
bond market investors when a country’s GDP becomes ever larger, with the 
country possessing the ability to repay the debt as well as the likelihood that 
the country is more open about its finances. Both explanations have their 
roots in signalling, moral hazard, and asymmetric information. 
For the GDP per Capita, the results are quite close to indifference in the 
direction, although there is a small positive effect. The direction is consistent 
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with economic theory, in that the wealthier a country, as measured by GDP 
per capita, the lower the risk is of default. 
 
For the fourth variable, the results indicate that as Investment as a 
Percentage of GDP increases, bond ratings generally increase as well. This 
means that investors pay a good deal of attention to investment, a key 
determinant of long-term economic growth. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that ratings agencies really do consider the 
behavioural incentives associated with asymmetric information, adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and signalling, which are more present when 
discussing financial ratios and regulatory environments than with the 
macroeconomics that drive government ratings.     
 
7.2.3.4 Governance Variables 
 
None of the six governance variables were statistically significant in predicting 
ratings, with only one included in the final regression due to multicollinearity. 
This suggests that ratings agencies pay much more attention to hard and fast 
measures such as GDP growth regulatory environments than they do about 
perception variables, such as the rule of law and control of corruption. 
 
Lastly, an interestingly in comparison to the results on banks ratings, the 
results on the government ratings indicate that four of the six governance 
variables are statistically significant. The four are Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and 
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Control of Corruption. The result of Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism indicating that there is a strong effect of political stability 
on government bond ratings. This result indicates that ratings agencies 
consider the probability of a government being overthrown in their 
assessment of default risk. The result is consistent with the effects 
asymmetric information have on bond ratings, in this case asymmetric 
information in the form of government stability. 
 
For the Government Effectiveness, the large magnitude results indicate, as 
with political stability, that government’s ability to control conditions affects its 
bond rating. 
 
For the Rule of Law, as with Government Effectiveness, the results indicate 
that ratings agencies consider a government’s word in keeping bondholder 
covenants, as with the Rule of Law. 
 
With regards to the Control of Corruption, the results provide that this indicator 
makes the risk of default lower. In contrast, the results indicate that as control 
of corruption increases, bond ratings generally decline. This result may stem 
from the economic theory of signalling. Essentially, governments that spend 
significant amounts of money on controlling corruption are likely sending the 




7.3 Practical Implications and Policy Recommendations 
 
7.3.1 Quality Use of Credit Ratings 
 
One of the significant problems that credit ratings agencies have to be aware 
of is asymmetric information. Because of this, credit rating agencies are 
considered as an intermediary between the issuer and investor to minimise 
the possibility of asymmetric risk information. In many cases, rated objects do 
not supply truthful information to credit ratings agencies because they always 
will be looking for having higher ratings. To avoid such asymmetric 
information, the pivotal responsibility of rating agencies is to assign 
professional experts who can deal with quantitative methods when collecting 
the relevant information of the rated objects. By doing so, this will be evident 
in guaranteeing high percentage of accuracy and objectivity of supplied 
information towards the financial institutions like banks as well as countries. 
However, Somerville and Taffer (1995) pointed out that credit rating experts 
tend to be pessimistic about any enterprise situation because of the possibility 
in facing risk and also because credit rating systems contain their personal 
details. As a result, Somerville and Taffer (1995) indicated that credit rating 
agencies do not rely frequently on those experts and they shifted their 
intentions for more objective methods such as quantitative method. 
 
Developing and applying methodologies to predict the performance of 
financial products and underlying assets are involved in credit ratings 
activities. For conducting specific ratings, credit agencies should always use 
historical data that based on the economic theories as well as empirical 
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analysis. An early study by Altman and Saunders (1997) argued that the 
accuracy of credit ratings is not perfect by any means. In terms of the 
variance appearance in each ratings, they concluded that there is no doubt 
that the higher variance is, the lower accuracy rating will be. 
 
Many more implications should be considered to enhance the quality of 
predicting credit ratings. Specifically credit ratings agencies should have a 
synchronous ranking standard for each object such as banks, companies or 
countries. These objects should be ranked separately because of the different 
economic conditions and characteristics. In addition, competition among credit 
ratings agencies is a key factor to improve the development and quality of the 
ratings industry. This is based on the fact that since all the agencies involved 
are desired to be highly appreciated and thus, have more customers and 
good reputation. 
 
Furthermore, Wilson (1994) and Ederington et al. (1987) share their opinions 
regarding the use of credit ratings. They commented that the issuers have the 
right to appeal against the issued ratings by the credit agencies in case it is 
not satisfied in their perspectives, but generally the authors are also confirmed 
that these ratings are granted to reflect the real picture of the issuers itself. In 
another example, Bruskin (1994) argued that financial markets tend to trust 
the rating agencies in the decision of credit support requirements. 
 
Moreover, some researchers argue that policy makers should withdraw the 
financial regulation from the use of ratings whereas others have contrary 
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opinion. The US Treasury (2009) planned to mitigate the dependence on 
credit rating agencies of investors and regulators. Nevertheless, Matthew and 
White (2009) were inclined to think that one policy option makes financial 
institutions have the chance to choose the most reliable sources to take 
advice. Contrary to above opinion, the Turner Review (2009) ascertained that 
there are a lot of factors other than regulation may remarkably affect the use 
of credit ratings. 
 
7.3.2 Risk Sharing Incentives for MENA Banks 
 
In this part, a discussion of the cover of the risk sharing incentives which 
MENA banks enjoy is important. As we know different investors have different 
risk attitudes. Some are risk averse, who continue to follow a conventional 
track by getting lesser return with lesser associated risk, whereas some are 
risk seekers who enjoy higher returns by taking higher associated risk. Family 
owned banks have incentives to take less risk whereas state owned banks 
have higher non-performing loans displaying higher risk. By comparing 
conventional and Islamic banks, the findings suggest that the Islamic banks 
are as stable as conventional banks, the only difference that is created which 
distinguishes the two are the associated risk. Generally, conventional banks 
are more risk seeking in nature than Islamic banks. 
 
In MENA countries, the growth of Islamic banking has been impressive. 
According to Ali (2011), the financing activities of Islamic banks are more tied 
to economical activities than their counterparts. Islamic banks avoid direct 
exposure to more exotic financial derivatives and keep their most of the 
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investments in liquid form as compared to conventional banks. This makes 
them more stable. 
 
As the global financial crisis became a global economic crisis, some banks in 
the UAE (Dubai) and Qatar were affected due to their asset concentration in 
the real estate sector and because they have invested in the previous growing 
equity markets that are facing higher risks and showing higher volatility in the 
second round of crisis (Gamaginta and Rokhim, 2011; Ali, 2011). The 2007 
crisis led to an increased awareness of the importance of the development of 
the financial institutions and the markets. It has been shown that when 
banking systems grow too quickly, crises are likely to follow (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache and Levine, 2008). 
 
Banking sectors in the MENA region have many similarities, but are also quite 
different from each other. Within the region there are also large differences 
among countries, in terms of size, per capita GDP and financial development. 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are classified by the World Bank as lower 
middle income countries, Lebanon as a middle income country (Naceur, Ben-
Khedhiri and Casu, 2011). Despite similarities in the process of financial 
reforms undertaken by the MENA countries, the efficiency level of the bank 
varies. For improvement, banking sector policies should be aimed to improve 





7.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
In the light of the above discussion and having investigated the estimation of 
credit rating models for MENA countries and their commercial banks using a 
wide range of financial and non financial variables, there are some issues that 
need to be addressed or suggested as important factors to be considered in 
future research. 
 
Firstly, although the accuracy of ratings is predicting default is not addressed 
in the current study, it is certainly possible that future studies could address 
accuracy by including default amounts for banks and countries in the 
empirical data sets. 
 
Secondly, it can be said that there is no optimal method or model that is in 
accordance with the international standards and can be applied in estimating 
credit ratings, therefore, credit agencies or analysts should determine specific 
rating criteria, and building models should be consistent with and based on 
characteristics of the economy of each country.  
 
Moreover, the current study contains no evaluation of the differences in 
ratings among the various credit ratings agencies. However, previous 
literature has already discerned variations across these agencies, e.g. Cantor 
and Packer (1997) or Shin and Moore (2003). Still, in connection with the 
constructed data in this thesis, future research on the topic could address the 
differences in credit ratings agencies’ ratings between governments and 
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banks’ ratings. Such a study might address various types of biases among 
ratings agencies. 
 
Thirdly, the importance of banks' environment for their credit ratings is 
stressed by the rating agencies and has also been confirmed in previous 
studies. That is why an inclusion of more country level data indicators will 
prove to be valuable in further studies. For example, better access to sources 
might assemble more important determinant of credit ratings to be included 
such as corporate governance similar to Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and 
LaFond (2006). Additionally, consideration might be given to the market 
structure, covering e.g. government and foreign ownership of banks, similar to 
Pasiouras, Gaganis and Zopounidis (2006). However, other qualitative 
variables in the fields of human resources, strategic and marketing should be 
researched further and considered in the process of estimating sovereign and 
banks credit ratings, as it might have a significant influence on the credit 
ratings industry. 
 
Fourthly, the current study sets out to deduce implications from empirical 
evidence about bank risk. Banks that have adequate capital strength are in a 
strong financial position to weather adverse situations and are less prone to 
risk. Moreover, in order for authorities to control the risk of banks and to 
stabilise the banking system, they may employ a range of devices. Auditing 
and accounting requirements have been shown as effective in reducing risk, 
serving as substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline. 
The combined use of auditing, accounting and capital requirements can 
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counteract risk-taking incentives of banks. Overall, a multitude of diverse, 
often interrelated, factors in the regulatory and supervisory environment have 
been identified as influential for counteracting bank risk and improving credit 
rating. In many cases, previous literature has brought about mixed evidence. 
More research will be required to gain further insight into bank risk and risk-




























Appendix (5 – A): Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Ratings and 








Country Year   
Bahrain 2000 N/A N/A 
Bahrain 2001 N/A N/A 
Bahrain 2002 A- 15 
Bahrain 2003 A- 15 
Bahrain 2004 A- 15 
Bahrain 2005 A- 15 
Bahrain 2006 A 16 
Bahrain 2007 A 16 
Bahrain 2008 A 16 
Bahrain 2009 A 16 
Bahrain 2010 A 16 
Bahrain 2011 BBB 13 
Bahrain 2012 BBB 13 
Egypt 2000 BBB- 12 
Egypt 2001 BBB- 12 
Egypt 2002 BB+ 11 
Egypt 2003 BB+ 11 
Egypt 2004 BB+ 11 
Egypt 2005 BB+ 11 
Egypt 2006 BB+ 11 
Egypt 2007 BB+ 11 
Egypt 2008 BB+ 11 
Egypt 2009 BB+ 11 
Egypt 2010 BB+ 11 
Egypt 2011 B+ 8 
Egypt 2012 B- 6 
Israel 2000 A- 15 
Israel 2001 A- 15 
Israel 2002 A- 15 
Israel 2003 A- 15 
Israel 2004 A- 15 
Israel 2005 A- 15 
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Israel 2006 A- 15 
Israel 2007 A 16 
Israel 2008 A 16 
Israel 2009 A 16 
Israel 2010 A 16 
Israel 2011 A+ 17 
Israel 2012 A+ 17 
Jordan 2000 BB- 9 
Jordan 2001 BB- 9 
Jordan 2002 BB- 9 
Jordan 2003 BB 10 
Jordan 2004 BB 10 
Jordan 2005 BB 10 
Jordan 2006 BB 10 
Jordan 2007 BB 10 
Jordan 2008 BB 10 
Jordan 2009 BB 10 
Jordan 2010 BB 10 
Jordan 2011 BB 10 
Jordan 2012 BB 10 
Kuwait 2000 A 16 
Kuwait 2001 A 16 
Kuwait 2002 A+ 17 
Kuwait 2003 A+ 17 
Kuwait 2004 A+ 17 
Kuwait 2005 A+ 17 
Kuwait 2006 A+ 17 
Kuwait 2007 AA- 18 
Kuwait 2008 AA- 18 
Kuwait 2009 AA- 18 
Kuwait 2010 AA- 18 
Kuwait 2011 AA 19 
Kuwait 2012 AA 19 
Lebanon 2000 B+ 8 
Lebanon 2001 B 7 
Lebanon 2002 B- 6 
Lebanon 2003 B- 6 
Lebanon 2004 B- 6 
Lebanon 2005 B- 6 
Lebanon 2006 B- 6 
Lebanon 2007 B- 6 
Lebanon 2008 B- 6 
Lebanon 2009 B 7 
Lebanon 2010 B 7 
Lebanon 2011 B 7 
Lebanon 2012 B 7 
Morocco 2000 BB 10 
Morocco 2001 BB 10 
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Morocco 2002 BB 10 
Morocco 2003 BB 10 
Morocco 2004 BB 10 
Morocco 2005 BB+ 11 
Morocco 2006 BB+ 11 
Morocco 2007 BB+ 11 
Morocco 2008 BB+ 11 
Morocco 2009 BB+ 11 
Morocco 2010 BBB- 12 
Morocco 2011 BBB- 12 
Morocco 2012 BBB- 12 
Oman 2000 BBB- 12 
Oman 2001 BBB 13 
Oman 2002 BBB 13 
Oman 2003 BBB 13 
Oman 2004 BBB+ 14 
Oman 2005 BBB+ 14 
Oman 2006 A- 15 
Oman 2007 A 16 
Oman 2008 A 16 
Oman 2009 A 16 
Oman 2010 A 16 
Oman 2011 A 16 
Oman 2012 A 16 
Pakistan 2000 B- 6 
Pakistan 2001 B- 6 
Pakistan 2002 B 7 
Pakistan 2003 B 7 
Pakistan 2004 B+ 8 
Pakistan 2005 B+ 8 
Pakistan 2006 B+ 8 
Pakistan 2007 B+ 8 
Pakistan 2008 CCC+ 5 
Pakistan 2009 B- 6 
Pakistan 2010 B- 6 
Pakistan 2011 B- 6 
Pakistan 2012 B- 6 
Qatar 2000 BBB 13 
Qatar 2001 BBB+ 14 
Qatar 2002 A- 15 
Qatar 2003 A+ 17 
Qatar 2004 A+ 17 
Qatar 2005 A+ 17 
Qatar 2006 A+ 17 
Qatar 2007 AA- 18 
Qatar 2008 AA- 18 
Qatar 2009 AA- 18 
Qatar 2010 AA 19 
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Qatar 2011 AA 19 
Qatar 2012 AA 19 
Saudi Arabia 2000 N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2001 N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2002 N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2003 A 16 
Saudi Arabia 2004 A 16 
Saudi Arabia 2005 A 16 
Saudi Arabia 2006 A+ 17 
Saudi Arabia 2007 AA- 18 
Saudi Arabia 2008 AA- 18 
Saudi Arabia 2009 AA- 18 
Saudi Arabia 2010 AA- 18 
Saudi Arabia 2011 AA- 18 
Saudi Arabia 2012 AA- 18 
Tunisia 2000 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2001 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2002 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2003 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2004 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2005 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2006 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2007 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2008 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2009 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2010 BBB 13 
Tunisia 2011 BBB- 12 
Tunisia 2012 BB 10 
Turkey 2000 B+ 8 
Turkey 2001 B- 6 
Turkey 2002 B- 6 
Turkey 2003 B+ 8 
Turkey 2004 BB- 9 
Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Turkey 2006 BB- 9 
Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
Turkey 2008 BB- 9 
Turkey 2009 BB- 9 
Turkey 2010 BB 10 
Turkey 2011 BB 10 
Turkey 2012 BB 10 
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Appendix (5 –B): Transformation and Numerical Score for Capital 
Requirements for MENA Countries 
 
Country Year Capital Requirements      
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Score 
Bahrain 2000 No No No Yes Yes No No No 2 
Bahrain 2001 No No No Yes Yes No No No 2 
Bahrain 2002 No No No Yes Yes No No No 2 
Bahrain 2003 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Bahrain 2004 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Bahrain 2005 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Bahrain 2006 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Bahrain 2007 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Bahrain 2008 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Bahrain 2009 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Bahrain 2010 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Bahrain 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2000 Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 4 
Egypt 2001 Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 4 
Egypt 2002 Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 4 
Egypt 2003 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No No No 3 
Egypt 2004 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No No No 3 
Egypt 2005 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No No No 3 
Egypt 2006 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No No No 3 
Egypt 2007 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No No No 3 
Egypt 2008 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No No No 3 
Egypt 2009 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No No No 3 
Egypt 2010 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No No No 3 
Egypt 2011 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Egypt 2012 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Israel 2000 Yes No Yes Yes N/A No Yes No 4 
Israel 2001 Yes No Yes Yes N/A No Yes No 4 
Israel 2002 Yes No Yes Yes N/A No Yes No 4 
Israel 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No N/A No Yes No 5 
Israel 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No N/A No Yes No 5 
Israel 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No N/A No Yes No 5 
Israel 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No N/A No Yes No 5 
Israel 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes No Yes No 6 
Israel 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes No Yes No 6 
Israel 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes No Yes No 6 
Israel 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes No Yes No 6 
Israel 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Israel 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
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Jordan 2000 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Jordan 2001 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Jordan 2002 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Jordan 2003 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Jordan 2004 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Jordan 2005 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Jordan 2006 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Jordan 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Jordan 2008 Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Jordan 2009 Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Jordan 2010 Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Jordan 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Jordan 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Kuwait 2000 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Kuwait 2001 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Kuwait 2002 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Kuwait 2003 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Kuwait 2004 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Kuwait 2005 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Kuwait 2006 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Kuwait 2007 Yes No Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Kuwait 2008 Yes No Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Kuwait 2009 Yes No Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Kuwait 2010 Yes No Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Kuwait 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Kuwait 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2000 Yes No No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2001 Yes No No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2002 Yes No No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2003 Yes No No Yes/No N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2004 Yes No No Yes/No N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2005 Yes No No Yes/No N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2006 Yes No No Yes/No N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2007 Yes No No Yes/No N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2008 Yes No No Yes/No N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2009 Yes No No Yes/No N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2010 Yes No No Yes/No N/A Yes Yes Yes 5 
Lebanon 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 7 
Lebanon 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 7 
Morocco 2000 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Morocco 2001 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Morocco 2002 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Morocco 2003 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Morocco 2004 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Morocco 2005 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Morocco 2006 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Morocco 2007 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Morocco 2008 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No Yes Yes 5 
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Morocco 2009 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Morocco 2010 Yes No No Yes/No Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Morocco 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2000 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2001 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2002 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2003 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2004 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2007 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2008 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2009 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2010 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Oman 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2003 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Pakistan 2004 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Pakistan 2005 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Pakistan 2006 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Pakistan 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2003 Yes No No Yes/No N/A No No No 2 
Qatar 2004 Yes No No Yes/No N/A No No No 2 
Qatar 2005 Yes No No Yes/No N/A No No No 2 
Qatar 2006 Yes No No Yes/No N/A No No No 2 
Qatar 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 5 
Saudi Arabia 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 5 
Saudi Arabia 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 5 
Saudi Arabia 2003 Yes No No Yes/No No No Yes Yes 4 
Saudi Arabia 2004 Yes No No Yes/No No No Yes Yes 4 
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Saudi Arabia 2005 Yes No No Yes/No No No Yes Yes 4 
Saudi Arabia 2006 Yes No No Yes/No No No Yes Yes 4 
Saudi Arabia 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 5 
Saudi Arabia 2008 Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes 4 
Saudi Arabia 2009 Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes 4 
Saudi Arabia 2010 Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes 4 
Saudi Arabia 2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2003 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Tunisia 2004 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Tunisia 2005 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Tunisia 2006 Yes No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 
Tunisia 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2011 Yes Yes No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A 4 
Tunisia 2012 Yes Yes No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A 4 
Turkey 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 4 
Turkey 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 4 
Turkey 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 4 
Turkey 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No No No No 4 
Turkey 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No No No No 4 
Turkey 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No No No No 4 
Turkey 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No No No No 4 
Turkey 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 









Appendix (5 –C): Transformation and Numerical Score for Deposit 
Insurance Scheme for MENA Countries 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bahrain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Egypt No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jordan No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kuwait No No No No No No No No No No No N/A N/A 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 
Lebanon Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Morocco Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Oman Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pakistan N/A N/A N/A No No No No No No No No No No 
 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Qatar No No No No No No No N/A N/A N/A N/A No No 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 
Saudi 
Arabia No No No No No No No No No No No N/A N/A 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 
Tunisia N/A N/A N/A No No No No N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes 
 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 1 
Turkey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes 














Appendix (5 –D): Transformation and Numerical Score for Restrictions 
on Banks Activities for MENA Countries 
 





  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3   
Bahrain 2000 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2001 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2002 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2003 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2004 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2005 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2006 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2007 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2008 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2009 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2010 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Bahrain 2011 unrestricted prohibited unrestricted 1 4 1 2 2 
Bahrain 2012 unrestricted prohibited unrestricted 1 4 1 2 2 
Egypt 2000 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Egypt 2001 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Egypt 2002 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Egypt 2003 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Egypt 2004 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Egypt 2005 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Egypt 2006 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Egypt 2007 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Egypt 2008 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Egypt 2009 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Egypt 2010 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Egypt 2011 permitted restricted restricted 2 3 3 2.66666667 3 
Egypt 2012 permitted restricted restricted 2 3 3 2.66666667 3 
Israel 2000 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Israel 2001 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Israel 2002 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Israel 2003 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Israel 2004 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Israel 2005 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Israel 2006 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Israel 2007 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Israel 2008 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Israel 2009 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Israel 2010 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Israel 2011 restricted restricted prohibited 3 3 4 3.33333333 3 
Israel 2012 restricted restricted prohibited 3 3 4 3.33333333 3 
Jordan 2000 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
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Jordan 2001 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
Jordan 2002 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
Jordan 2003 unrestricted permitted restricted 1 2 3 2 2 
Jordan 2004 unrestricted permitted restricted 1 2 3 2 2 
Jordan 2005 unrestricted permitted restricted 1 2 3 2 2 
Jordan 2006 unrestricted permitted restricted 1 2 3 2 2 
Jordan 2007 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Jordan 2008 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Jordan 2009 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Jordan 2010 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Jordan 2011 restricted restricted prohibited 3 3 4 3.33333333 3 
Jordan 2012 restricted restricted prohibited 3 3 4 3.33333333 3 
Kuwait 2000 unrestricted permitted prohibited 1 2 4 2.33333333 2 
Kuwait 2001 unrestricted permitted prohibited 1 2 4 2.33333333 2 
Kuwait 2002 unrestricted permitted prohibited 1 2 4 2.33333333 2 
Kuwait 2003 unrestricted permitted permitted 1 2 2 1.66666667 2 
Kuwait 2004 unrestricted permitted permitted 1 2 2 1.66666667 2 
Kuwait 2005 unrestricted permitted permitted 1 2 2 1.66666667 2 
Kuwait 2006 unrestricted permitted permitted 1 2 2 1.66666667 2 
Kuwait 2007 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Kuwait 2008 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Kuwait 2009 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Kuwait 2010 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Kuwait 2011 unrestricted permitted unrestricted 1 2 1 1.33333333 1 
Kuwait 2012 unrestricted permitted unrestricted 1 2 1 1.33333333 1 
Lebanon 2000 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Lebanon 2001 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Lebanon 2002 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Lebanon 2003 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
Lebanon 2004 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
Lebanon 2005 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
Lebanon 2006 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
Lebanon 2007 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Lebanon 2008 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Lebanon 2009 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Lebanon 2010 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Lebanon 2011 unrestricted permitted prohibited 1 2 4 2.33333333 2 
Lebanon 2012 unrestricted permitted prohibited 1 2 4 2.33333333 2 
Morocco 2000 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Morocco 2001 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Morocco 2002 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Morocco 2003 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Morocco 2004 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Morocco 2005 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Morocco 2006 permitted permitted restricted 2 2 3 2.33333333 2 
Morocco 2007 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Morocco 2008 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Morocco 2009 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
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Morocco 2010 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Morocco 2011 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Morocco 2012 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Oman 2000 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Oman 2001 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Oman 2002 permitted prohibited prohibited 2 4 4 3.33333333 3 
Oman 2003 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Oman 2004 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Oman 2005 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Oman 2006 unrestricted prohibited prohibited 1 4 4 3 3 
Oman 2007 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Oman 2008 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Oman 2009 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Oman 2010 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Oman 2011 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Oman 2012 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Pakistan 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2003 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Pakistan 2004 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Pakistan 2005 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Pakistan 2006 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Pakistan 2007 restricted restricted prohibited 3 3 4 3.33333333 3 
Pakistan 2008 restricted restricted prohibited 3 3 4 3.33333333 3 
Pakistan 2009 restricted restricted prohibited 3 3 4 3.33333333 3 
Pakistan 2010 restricted restricted prohibited 3 3 4 3.33333333 3 
Pakistan 2011 permitted restricted restricted 2 3 3 2.66666667 3 
Pakistan 2012 permitted restricted restricted 2 3 3 2.66666667 3 
Qatar 2000 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
Qatar 2001 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
Qatar 2002 unrestricted prohibited restricted 1 4 3 2.66666667 3 
Qatar 2003 unrestricted unrestricted unrestricted 1 1 1 1 1 
Qatar 2004 unrestricted unrestricted unrestricted 1 1 1 1 1 
Qatar 2005 unrestricted unrestricted unrestricted 1 1 1 1 1 
Qatar 2006 unrestricted unrestricted unrestricted 1 1 1 1 1 
Qatar 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2011 permitted permitted prohibited 2 2 4 2.66666667 3 
Qatar 2012 permitted permitted prohibited 2 2 4 2.66666667 3 
Saudi Arabia 2000 permitted permitted prohibited 2 2 4 2.66666667 3 
Saudi Arabia 2001 permitted permitted prohibited 2 2 4 2.66666667 3 
Saudi Arabia 2002 permitted permitted prohibited 2 2 4 2.66666667 3 
Saudi Arabia 2003 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Saudi Arabia 2004 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Saudi Arabia 2005 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
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Saudi Arabia 2006 unrestricted restricted prohibited 1 3 4 2.66666667 3 
Saudi Arabia 2007 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Saudi Arabia 2008 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Saudi Arabia 2009 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Saudi Arabia 2010 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 
Saudi Arabia 2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2003 permitted restricted restricted 2 3 3 2.66666667 3 
Tunisia 2004 permitted restricted restricted 2 3 3 2.66666667 3 
Tunisia 2005 permitted restricted restricted 2 3 3 2.66666667 3 
Tunisia 2006 permitted restricted restricted 2 3 3 2.66666667 3 
Tunisia 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2011 restricted restricted N/A 3 3 N/A 3 3 
Tunisia 2012 restricted restricted N/A 3 3 N/A 3 3 
Turkey 2000 restricted permitted prohibited 3 2 4 3 3 
Turkey 2001 restricted permitted prohibited 3 2 4 3 3 
Turkey 2002 restricted permitted prohibited 3 2 4 3 3 
Turkey 2003 permitted permitted permitted 2 2 2 2 2 
Turkey 2004 permitted permitted permitted 2 2 2 2 2 
Turkey 2005 permitted permitted permitted 2 2 2 2 2 
Turkey 2006 permitted permitted permitted 2 2 2 2 2 
Turkey 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2011 permitted restricted prohibited 2 3 4 3 3 












Appendix (5 –E): Transformation and Numerical Score for Accounting 
and Disclosure Requirements for MENA Countries 
 
Country Year Accounting and Disclosure Requirements    
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Score 
Bahrain 2000 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Bahrain 2001 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Bahrain 2002 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Bahrain 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Bahrain 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Bahrain 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Bahrain 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Bahrain 2007 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Bahrain 2008 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Bahrain 2009 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Bahrain 2010 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Bahrain 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Bahrain 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Egypt 2000 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Egypt 2001 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Egypt 2002 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Egypt 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Egypt 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Egypt 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Egypt 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Egypt 2007 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Egypt 2008 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Egypt 2009 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Egypt 2010 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Egypt 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Egypt 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Israel 2000 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Israel 2001 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Israel 2002 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Israel 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Israel 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Israel 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Israel 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Israel 2007 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Israel 2008 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Israel 2009 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Israel 2010 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Israel 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Israel 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Jordan 2000 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Jordan 2001 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Jordan 2002 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
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Jordan 2003 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Jordan 2004 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Jordan 2005 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Jordan 2006 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Jordan 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Jordan 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Jordan 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Jordan 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Jordan 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Jordan 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Kuwait 2000 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Kuwait 2001 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Kuwait 2002 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Kuwait 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Kuwait 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Kuwait 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Kuwait 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Kuwait 2007 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Kuwait 2008 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Kuwait 2009 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Kuwait 2010 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Kuwait 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Kuwait 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Lebanon 2000 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Lebanon 2001 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Lebanon 2002 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Lebanon 2003 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Lebanon 2004 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Lebanon 2005 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Lebanon 2006 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Lebanon 2007 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Lebanon 2008 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Lebanon 2009 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Lebanon 2010 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 5 
Lebanon 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No No 4 
Lebanon 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No No 4 
Morocco 2000 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Morocco 2001 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Morocco 2002 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Morocco 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Morocco 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Morocco 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Morocco 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Morocco 2007 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Morocco 2008 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Morocco 2009 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Morocco 2010 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Morocco 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
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Morocco 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Oman 2000 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Oman 2001 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Oman 2002 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Oman 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Oman 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Oman 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Oman 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Oman 2007 No No Yes Yes No No N/A N/A 2 
Oman 2008 No No Yes Yes No No N/A N/A 2 
Oman 2009 No No Yes Yes No No N/A N/A 2 
Oman 2010 No No Yes Yes No No N/A N/A 2 
Oman 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Oman 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Pakistan 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2003 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 6 
Pakistan 2004 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 6 
Pakistan 2005 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 6 
Pakistan 2006 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 6 
Pakistan 2007 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Pakistan 2008 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Pakistan 2009 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Pakistan 2010 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Pakistan 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Pakistan 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
Qatar 2000 No Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes No N/A 4 
Qatar 2001 No Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes No N/A 4 
Qatar 2002 No Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes No N/A 4 
Qatar 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Qatar 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Qatar 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Qatar 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 5 
Qatar 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2011 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 5 
Qatar 2012 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 5 
Saudi Arabia 2000 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Saudi Arabia 2001 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Saudi Arabia 2002 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Saudi Arabia 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Saudi Arabia 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Saudi Arabia 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Saudi Arabia 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
Saudi Arabia 2007 No Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes No No 4 
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Saudi Arabia 2008 No Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes No No 4 
Saudi Arabia 2009 No Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes No No 4 
Saudi Arabia 2010 No Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes No No 4 
Saudi Arabia 2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2003 No No Yes Yes No Yes No No 3 
Tunisia 2004 No No Yes Yes No Yes No No 3 
Tunisia 2005 No No Yes Yes No Yes No No 3 
Tunisia 2006 No No Yes Yes No Yes No No 3 
Tunisia 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2011 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Tunisia 2012 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 4 
Turkey 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 5 
Turkey 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 5 
Turkey 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 5 
Turkey 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Turkey 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Turkey 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Turkey 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Turkey 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 












Appendix (5 –F): Transformation and Numerical Score for External 
Auditing Requirements for MENA Countries 
 
Country Year External Auditing Requirements     
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Score 
Bahrain 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Bahrain 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Bahrain 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Bahrain 2003 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 5 
Bahrain 2004 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 5 
Bahrain 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 5 
Bahrain 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 5 
Bahrain 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Bahrain 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Bahrain 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Bahrain 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Bahrain 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Bahrain 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Egypt 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Israel 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No N/A 4 
Israel 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No N/A 4 
Israel 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No N/A 4 
Israel 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 5 
Israel 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 5 
Israel 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 5 
Israel 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 5 
Israel 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Israel 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Israel 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Israel 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Israel 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No N/A 5 
Israel 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No N/A 5 
Jordan 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Jordan 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Jordan 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
 300 
Jordan 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Jordan 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Jordan 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Jordan 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Jordan 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Jordan 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Jordan 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Jordan 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Jordan 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 7 
Jordan 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 7 
Kuwait 2000 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2001 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2002 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2003 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2004 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2005 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2006 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Kuwait 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Kuwait 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Kuwait 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Kuwait 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes N/A 6 
Kuwait 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes N/A 6 
Lebanon 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Lebanon 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Morocco 2000 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No N/A 4 
Morocco 2001 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No N/A 4 
Morocco 2002 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No N/A 4 
Morocco 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Morocco 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Morocco 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Morocco 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Morocco 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Morocco 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Morocco 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Morocco 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Morocco 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 7 
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Morocco 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 7 
Oman 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Oman 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Oman 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Oman 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Oman 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Oman 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Oman 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Oman 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Oman 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Oman 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Oman 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Oman 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Oman 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Qatar 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Qatar 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Qatar 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Qatar 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Qatar 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Qatar 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Qatar 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Qatar 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Qatar 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Saudi Arabia 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Saudi Arabia 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Saudi Arabia 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Saudi Arabia 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Saudi Arabia 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Saudi Arabia 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Saudi Arabia 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Saudi Arabia 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
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Saudi Arabia 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Saudi Arabia 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Saudi Arabia 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Saudi Arabia 2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Tunisia 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Tunisia 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Tunisia 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Tunisia 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Tunisia 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Turkey 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Turkey 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Turkey 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Turkey 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Turkey 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Turkey 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Turkey 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Turkey 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 













Appendix (5 –G): Transformation and Numerical Score for Entry into 
Banking Requirements for MENA Countries 
 
Country Year Entry into Banking Requirements    
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Score 
Bahrain 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Bahrain 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Egypt 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Egypt 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6 
Egypt 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Egypt 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Israel 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Israel 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Israel 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 6 
Israel 2003 No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 3 
Israel 2004 No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 3 
Israel 2005 No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 3 
Israel 2006 No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 3 
Israel 2007 No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 3 
Israel 2008 No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 3 
Israel 2009 No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 3 
Israel 2010 No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 3 
Israel 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Israel 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Jordan 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Jordan 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Jordan 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
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Jordan 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 7 
Jordan 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 7 
Jordan 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 7 
Jordan 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 7 
Jordan 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Jordan 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Jordan 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Jordan 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Jordan 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Jordan 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Kuwait 2000 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 5 
Kuwait 2001 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 5 
Kuwait 2002 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 5 
Kuwait 2003 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2004 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2005 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2006 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kuwait 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Kuwait 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Kuwait 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Kuwait 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Kuwait 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Kuwait 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Lebanon 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Morocco 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
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Morocco 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Oman 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Pakistan 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Pakistan 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2003 Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes 4 
Qatar 2004 Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes 4 
Qatar 2005 Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes 4 
Qatar 2006 Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes 4 
Qatar 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2011 N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 6 
Qatar 2012 N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 6 
Saudi Arabia 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
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Saudi Arabia 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Tunisia 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Tunisia 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Tunisia 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Tunisia 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Tunisia 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Turkey 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 7 
Turkey 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 7 
Turkey 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 7 
Turkey 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Turkey 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Turkey 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Turkey 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Turkey 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 















Appendix (5 –H): Transformation and Numerical Score for Official 
Disciplinary Power of the Supervisory Agency for MENA Countries 
 
Country Year Official Disciplinary Power of the Supervisory Agency     
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Score 
Bahrain 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Bahrain 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Bahrain 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Bahrain 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Bahrain 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Bahrain 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Bahrain 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Bahrain 2007 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 10 
Bahrain 2008 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 10 
Bahrain 2009 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 10 
Bahrain 2010 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 10 
Bahrain 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 
Bahrain 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 
Egypt 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No N/A 10 
Egypt 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No N/A 10 
Egypt 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No N/A 10 
Egypt 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A 12 
Egypt 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A 12 
Egypt 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A 12 
Egypt 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A 12 
Egypt 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 12 
Egypt 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 12 
Egypt 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 12 
Egypt 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 12 
Egypt 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 
Egypt 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 
Israel 2000 No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes Yes N/A 7 
Israel 2001 No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes Yes N/A 7 
Israel 2002 No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes Yes N/A 7 
Israel 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A No No No No Yes No 6 
Israel 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A No No No No Yes No 6 
Israel 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A No No No No Yes No 6 
Israel 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A No No No No Yes No 6 
Israel 2007 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A No No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Israel 2008 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A No No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Israel 2009 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A No No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Israel 2010 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A No No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Israel 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Israel 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Jordan 2000 No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 5 
Jordan 2001 No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 5 
Jordan 2002 No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 5 
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Jordan 2003 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 12 
Jordan 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 12 
Jordan 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 12 
Jordan 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 12 
Jordan 2007 N/A No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes N/A N/A 6 
Jordan 2008 N/A No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes N/A N/A 6 
Jordan 2009 N/A No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes N/A N/A 6 
Jordan 2010 N/A No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes N/A N/A 6 
Jordan 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Jordan 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Kuwait 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 10 
Kuwait 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 10 
Kuwait 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 10 
Kuwait 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 
Kuwait 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 
Kuwait 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 
Kuwait 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 
Kuwait 2007 Yes N/A No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Kuwait 2008 Yes N/A No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Kuwait 2009 Yes N/A No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Kuwait 2010 Yes N/A No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Kuwait 2011 Yes Yes Yes No No N/A Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 
Kuwait 2012 Yes Yes Yes No No N/A Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 
Lebanon 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 11 
Lebanon 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 11 
Lebanon 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 11 
Lebanon 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes No 9 
Lebanon 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes No 9 
Lebanon 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes No 9 
Lebanon 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes No 9 
Lebanon 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No 8 
Lebanon 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No 8 
Lebanon 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No 8 
Lebanon 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No 8 
Lebanon 2011 No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A Yes No 5 
Lebanon 2012 No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A Yes No 5 
Morocco 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Morocco 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Morocco 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Morocco 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 11 
Morocco 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 11 
Morocco 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 11 
Morocco 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No 11 
Morocco 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Morocco 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Morocco 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Morocco 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Morocco 2011 Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 9 
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Morocco 2012 Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 9 
Oman 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Oman 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Oman 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Oman 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Oman 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Oman 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Oman 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 13 
Oman 2007 No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 9 
Oman 2008 No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 9 
Oman 2009 No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 9 
Oman 2010 No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 9 
Oman 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Oman 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Pakistan 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Pakistan 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Pakistan 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Pakistan 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Pakistan 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Pakistan 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Pakistan 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Pakistan 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 12 
Pakistan 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 12 
Pakistan 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 12 
Qatar 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Qatar 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Qatar 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Qatar 2003 Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 9 
Qatar 2004 Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 9 
Qatar 2005 Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 9 
Qatar 2006 Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 9 
Qatar 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes N/A No No No Yes Yes 8 
Qatar 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes N/A No No No Yes Yes 8 
Saudi Arabia 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Saudi Arabia 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Saudi Arabia 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 
Saudi Arabia 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 12 
Saudi Arabia 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 12 
Saudi Arabia 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 12 
Saudi Arabia 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 12 
Saudi Arabia 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 11 
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Saudi Arabia 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 11 
Saudi Arabia 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 11 
Saudi Arabia 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 11 
Saudi Arabia 2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 11 
Tunisia 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 11 
Tunisia 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 11 
Tunisia 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 11 
Tunisia 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2011 Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 7 
Tunisia 2012 Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 7 
Turkey 2000 No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Turkey 2001 No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Turkey 2002 No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 8 
Turkey 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 13 
Turkey 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 13 
Turkey 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 13 
Turkey 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 13 
Turkey 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No N/A N/A N/A No 8 












Appendix (5 –I): Transformation and Numerical Score for Liquidity and 
Diversification Requirements for MENA Countries 
 
  
Country Year Liquidity and Diversification Requirements 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Score 
Bahrain 2000 Yes No Yes 3 
Bahrain 2001 Yes No Yes 3 
Bahrain 2002 Yes No Yes 3 
Bahrain 2003 Yes No Yes 3 
Bahrain 2004 Yes No Yes 3 
Bahrain 2005 Yes No Yes 3 
Bahrain 2006 Yes No Yes 3 
Bahrain 2007 No No Yes 2 
Bahrain 2008 No No Yes 2 
Bahrain 2009 No No Yes 2 
Bahrain 2010 No No Yes 2 
Bahrain 2011 Yes No No 2 
Bahrain 2012 Yes No No 2 
Egypt 2000 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2001 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2002 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2003 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2004 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2005 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2006 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2007 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2008 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2009 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2010 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2011 Yes No Yes 3 
Egypt 2012 Yes No Yes 3 
Israel 2000 No No None 1 
Israel 2001 No No None 1 
Israel 2002 No No None 1 
Israel 2003 Yes No Yes 3 
Israel 2004 Yes No Yes 3 
Israel 2005 Yes No Yes 3 
Israel 2006 Yes No Yes 3 
Israel 2007 Yes No Yes 3 
Israel 2008 Yes No Yes 3 
Israel 2009 Yes No Yes 3 
Israel 2010 Yes No Yes 3 
Israel 2011 Yes No No 2 
Israel 2012 Yes No No 2 
Jordan 2000 Yes No Yes 3 
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Jordan 2001 Yes No Yes 3 
Jordan 2002 Yes No Yes 3 
Jordan 2003 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2004 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2005 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2006 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2007 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2008 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2009 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2010 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2011 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2012 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2000 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2001 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2002 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2003 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2004 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2005 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2006 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2007 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2008 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2009 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2010 Yes No Yes 3 
Kuwait 2011 No No No 1 
Kuwait 2012 No No No 1 
Lebanon 2000 No No Yes 2 
Lebanon 2001 No No Yes 2 
Lebanon 2002 No No Yes 2 
Lebanon 2003 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2004 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2005 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2006 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2007 Yes No Yes 3 
Lebanon 2008 Yes No Yes 3 
Lebanon 2009 Yes No Yes 3 
Lebanon 2010 Yes No Yes 3 
Lebanon 2011 Yes No Yes 3 
Lebanon 2012 Yes No Yes 3 
Morocco 2000 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2001 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2002 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2003 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2004 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2005 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2006 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2007 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2008 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2009 No No Yes 2 
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Morocco 2010 No No Yes 2 
Morocco 2011 No No No 1 
Morocco 2012 No No No 1 
Oman 2000 Yes No Yes 3 
Oman 2001 Yes No Yes 3 
Oman 2002 Yes No Yes 3 
Oman 2003 Yes No Yes 3 
Oman 2004 Yes No Yes 3 
Oman 2005 Yes No Yes 3 
Oman 2006 Yes No Yes 3 
Oman 2007 No No Yes 2 
Oman 2008 No No Yes 2 
Oman 2009 No No Yes 2 
Oman 2010 No No Yes 2 
Oman 2011 Yes No No 2 
Oman 2012 Yes No No 2 
Pakistan 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2003 No No Yes 2 
Pakistan 2004 No No Yes 2 
Pakistan 2005 No No Yes 2 
Pakistan 2006 No No Yes 2 
Pakistan 2007 No No Yes 2 
Pakistan 2008 No No Yes 2 
Pakistan 2009 No No Yes 2 
Pakistan 2010 No No Yes 2 
Pakistan 2011 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2012 Yes Yes Yes 2 
Qatar 2000 Yes No Yes 3 
Qatar 2001 Yes No Yes 3 
Qatar 2002 Yes No Yes 3 
Qatar 2003 Yes No Yes 3 
Qatar 2004 Yes No Yes 3 
Qatar 2005 Yes No Yes 3 
Qatar 2006 Yes No Yes 3 
Qatar 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2011 Yes No No 2 
Qatar 2012 Yes No No 2 
Saudi Arabia 2000 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2001 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2002 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2003 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2004 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2005 Yes No Yes 3 
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Saudi Arabia 2006 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2007 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2008 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2009 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2010 Yes No Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia 2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2003 No Yes Yes 1 
Tunisia 2004 No Yes Yes 1 
Tunisia 2005 No Yes Yes 1 
Tunisia 2006 No Yes Yes 1 
Tunisia 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2011 No Yes No 0 
Tunisia 2012 No Yes No 0 
Turkey 2000 No No Yes 2 
Turkey 2001 No No Yes 2 
Turkey 2002 No No Yes 2 
Turkey 2003 No No Yes 2 
Turkey 2004 No No Yes 2 
Turkey 2005 No No Yes 2 
Turkey 2006 No No Yes 2 
Turkey 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2009 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2011 No No Yes 2 

















Appendix (5 –J): Transformation and Numerical Score for Internal 
Management and Organisational Requirements for MENA Countries 
 
Country Year 
Internal Management and 
Organisational 
Requirements 
  Q1 Q2 Score 
Bahrain 2000 Yes No 1 
Bahrain 2001 Yes No 1 
Bahrain 2002 Yes No 1 
Bahrain 2003 Yes Yes 2 
Bahrain 2004 Yes Yes 2 
Bahrain 2005 Yes Yes 2 
Bahrain 2006 Yes Yes 2 
Bahrain 2007 Yes Yes 2 
Bahrain 2008 Yes Yes 2 
Bahrain 2009 Yes Yes 2 
Bahrain 2010 Yes Yes 2 
Bahrain 2011 Yes Yes 2 
Bahrain 2012 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2000 Yes No 1 
Egypt 2001 Yes No 1 
Egypt 2002 Yes No 1 
Egypt 2003 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2004 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2005 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2006 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2007 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2008 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2009 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2010 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2011 Yes Yes 2 
Egypt 2012 Yes Yes 2 
Israel 2000 Yes No 1 
Israel 2001 Yes No 1 
Israel 2002 Yes No 1 
Israel 2003 Yes Yes 2 
Israel 2004 Yes Yes 2 
Israel 2005 Yes Yes 2 
Israel 2006 Yes Yes 2 
Israel 2007 Yes N/A 1 
Israel 2008 Yes N/A 1 
Israel 2009 Yes N/A 1 
Israel 2010 Yes N/A 1 
Israel 2011 Yes N/A 1 
Israel 2012 Yes N/A 1 
Jordan 2000 Yes Yes 2 
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Jordan 2001 Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2002 Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2003 Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2004 Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2005 Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2006 Yes Yes 2 
Jordan 2007 Yes No 1 
Jordan 2008 Yes No 1 
Jordan 2009 Yes No 1 
Jordan 2010 Yes No 1 
Jordan 2011 Yes No 1 
Jordan 2012 Yes No 1 
Kuwait 2000 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2001 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2002 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2003 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2004 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2005 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2006 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2007 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2008 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2009 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2010 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2011 Yes Yes 2 
Kuwait 2012 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2000 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2001 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2002 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2003 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2004 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2005 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2006 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2007 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2008 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2009 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2010 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2011 Yes Yes 2 
Lebanon 2012 Yes Yes 2 
Morocco 2000 No N/A 0 
Morocco 2001 No N/A 0 
Morocco 2002 No N/A 0 
Morocco 2003 Yes No 1 
Morocco 2004 Yes No 1 
Morocco 2005 Yes No 1 
Morocco 2006 Yes No 1 
Morocco 2007 Yes No 1 
Morocco 2008 Yes No 1 
Morocco 2009 Yes No 1 
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Morocco 2010 Yes No 1 
Morocco 2011 Yes No 1 
Morocco 2012 Yes No 1 
Oman 2000 Yes Yes 2 
Oman 2001 Yes Yes 2 
Oman 2002 Yes Yes 2 
Oman 2003 Yes Yes 2 
Oman 2004 Yes Yes 2 
Oman 2005 Yes Yes 2 
Oman 2006 Yes Yes 2 
Oman 2007 Yes No 1 
Oman 2008 Yes No 1 
Oman 2009 Yes No 1 
Oman 2010 Yes No 1 
Oman 2011 Yes No 1 
Oman 2012 Yes No 1 
Pakistan 2000 N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2001 N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2002 N/A N/A N/A 
Pakistan 2003 Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2004 Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2005 Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2006 Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2007 Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2008 Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2009 Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2010 Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2011 Yes Yes 2 
Pakistan 2012 Yes Yes 2 
Qatar 2000 Yes No 1 
Qatar 2001 Yes No 1 
Qatar 2002 Yes No 1 
Qatar 2003 Yes No 1 
Qatar 2004 Yes No 1 
Qatar 2005 Yes No 1 
Qatar 2006 Yes No 1 
Qatar 2007 N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2008 N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2009 N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2010 N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 2011 Yes No 1 
Qatar 2012 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2000 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2001 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2002 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2003 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2004 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2005 Yes No 1 
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Saudi Arabia 2006 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2007 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2008 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2009 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2010 Yes No 1 
Saudi Arabia 2011 N/A N/A N/A 
Saudi Arabia 2012 N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2001 N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2002 N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2003 Yes No 1 
Tunisia 2004 Yes No 1 
Tunisia 2005 Yes No 1 
Tunisia 2006 Yes No 1 
Tunisia 2007 N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2008 N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2009 N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2010 N/A N/A N/A 
Tunisia 2011 No No 0 
Tunisia 2012 No No 0 
Turkey 2000 Yes No 1 
Turkey 2001 Yes No 1 
Turkey 2002 Yes No 1 
Turkey 2003 Yes Yes 2 
Turkey 2004 Yes Yes 2 
Turkey 2005 Yes Yes 2 
Turkey 2006 Yes Yes 2 
Turkey 2007 N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2008 N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2009 N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2010 N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 2011 Yes Yes 2 













Appendix (6 –A): Fitch Long-Term Issuer Ratings and Linear 
Transformation Scale for MENA Banks 
 






     
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2000 N/A N/A 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2001 N/A N/A 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2002 N/A N/A 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2003 BBB+ 14 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2004 BBB+ 14 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2005 BBB+ 14 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2006 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2007 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2008 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2009 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2010 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2011 BBB+ 14 
Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain 2012 BBB+ 14 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2000 BBB- 12 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2001 BBB- 12 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2002 BBB- 12 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2003 BBB- 12 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2004 BBB- 12 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2005 BBB 13 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2006 BBB 13 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2007 BBB+ 14 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2008 BBB+ 14 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2009 BBB+ 14 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2010 BBB 13 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2011 BB 10 
Arab Banking Corporation B.S.C. Bahrain 2012 BB+ 11 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2000 N/A N/A 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2001 N/A N/A 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2002 N/A N/A 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2003 N/A N/A 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2004 N/A N/A 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2005 BB- 9 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2006 BB 10 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2007 BB+ 11 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2008 BB+ 11 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2009 BB+ 11 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2010 BB+ 11 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2011 BB+ 11 
Banco ABC Brasil S.A. Bahrain 2012 BB+ 11 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2000 N/A N/A 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2001 N/A N/A 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2002 N/A N/A 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2003 N/A N/A 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2004 N/A N/A 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2005 N/A N/A 
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BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2006 A- 15 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2007 A- 15 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2008 A- 15 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2009 A- 15 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2010 A- 15 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2011 BBB- 12 
BBK B.S.C. Bahrain 2012 BBB- 12 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2000 BBB- 12 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2001 B+ 8 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2002 DDD 1 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2003 DDD 1 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2004 DDD 1 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2005 C 2 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2006 CCC 4 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2007 B- 6 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2008 B- 6 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2009 B- 6 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2010 B- 6 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2011 B- 6 
BMB Investment Bank Bahrain 2012 B- 6 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2000 BBB+ 14 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2001 BBB+ 14 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2002 BBB+ 14 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2003 A- 15 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2004 A- 15 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2005 A- 15 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2006 A 16 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2007 A 16 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2008 A 16 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2009 A 16 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2010 A 16 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2011 A 16 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 2012 A 16 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2000 BBB 13 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2001 BBB 13 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2002 BBB 13 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2003 BBB 13 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2004 BBB 13 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2005 BBB 13 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2006 BBB 13 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2007 BBB 13 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2008 BBB 13 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2009 BB+ 11 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2010 BB+ 11 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2011 BB+ 11 
Investcorp Bank B.S.C Bahrain 2012 BB 10 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2000 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2001 BBB 13 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2002 BBB 13 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2003 A- 15 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2004 A- 15 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2005 A- 15 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2006 A- 15 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2007 A 16 
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National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2008 A 16 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2009 A 16 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2010 A 16 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2011 BBB 13 
National Bank of Bahrain BSC Bahrain 2012 BBB 13 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2000 N/A N/A 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2001 BBB- 12 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2002 BB+ 11 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2003 BB+ 11 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2004 BB+ 11 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2005 BB+ 11 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2006 BB+ 11 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2007 BB+ 11 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2008 BB+ 11 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2009 BB+ 11 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2010 BB+ 11 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2011 BB 10 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt 2012 B+ 8 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2000 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2001 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2002 BB+ 11 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2003 BB+ 11 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2004 BB+ 11 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2005 BB+ 11 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2006 BB+ 11 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2007 BB+ 11 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2008 BB+ 11 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2009 BB+ 11 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2010 BB+ 11 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2011 BB 10 
National Bank of Egypt Egypt 2012 B+ 8 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2000 N/A N/A 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2001 N/A N/A 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2002 N/A N/A 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2003 N/A N/A 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2004 N/A N/A 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2005 BB- 9 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2006 B+ 8 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2007 B+ 8 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2008 N/A N/A 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2009 N/A N/A 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2010 N/A N/A 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2011 N/A N/A 
Bank of Industry and Mine Iran 2012 N/A N/A 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2000 N/A N/A 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2001 N/A N/A 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2002 N/A N/A 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2003 N/A N/A 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2004 N/A N/A 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2005 BB- 9 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2006 B+ 8 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2007 B+ 8 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2008 N/A N/A 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2009 N/A N/A 
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Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2010 N/A N/A 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2011 N/A N/A 
Export Development Bank of Iran Iran 2012 N/A N/A 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2000 N/A N/A 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2001 A- 15 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2002 A- 15 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2003 BBB+ 14 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2004 BBB+ 14 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2005 BBB+ 14 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2006 BBB+ 14 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2007 BBB+ 14 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2008 A- 15 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2009 A- 15 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2010 A- 15 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2011 A- 15 
Bank Hapoalim B.M. Israel 2012 A- 15 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2000 A- 15 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2001 A- 15 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2002 A- 15 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2003 BBB+ 14 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2004 BBB+ 14 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2005 BBB+ 14 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2006 BBB+ 14 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2007 BBB+ 14 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2008 A- 15 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2009 A- 15 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2010 A- 15 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2011 A- 15 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM Israel 2012 A- 15 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2000 N/A N/A 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2001 A- 15 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2002 BBB 13 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2003 BBB 13 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2004 BBB 13 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2005 BBB 13 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2006 BBB 13 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2007 BBB 13 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2008 BBB+ 14 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2009 BBB+ 14 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2010 N/A N/A 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2011 N/A N/A 
First International Bank of Israel Ltd (The) Israel 2012 N/A N/A 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2000 N/A N/A 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2001 N/A N/A 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2002 N/A N/A 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2003 N/A N/A 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2004 BBB+ 14 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2005 BBB+ 14 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2006 A- 15 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2007 A- 15 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2008 A- 15 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2009 A- 15 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2010 A- 15 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2011 A- 15 
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Arab Bank Australia Limited Jordan 2012 A- 15 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2000 AA- 18 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2001 AA- 18 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2002 BBB+ 14 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2003 BBB+ 14 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2004 BBB+ 14 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2005 BBB+ 14 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2006 A- 15 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2007 A- 15 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2008 A- 15 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2009 A- 15 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2010 A- 15 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2011 A- 15 
Arab Bank Plc Jordan 2012 A- 15 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2000 N/A N/A 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2001 N/A N/A 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2002 N/A N/A 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2003 N/A N/A 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2004 N/A N/A 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2005 BB- 9 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2006 BB- 9 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2007 BB- 9 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2008 BB- 9 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2009 BB- 9 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2010 BB- 9 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2011 BB- 9 
Bank of Jordan Jordan 2012 BB- 9 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2000 B+ 8 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2001 BB- 9 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2002 BB- 9 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2003 BB 10 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2004 BB 10 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2005 N/A N/A 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2006 N/A N/A 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2007 N/A N/A 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2008 N/A N/A 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2009 N/A N/A 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2010 N/A N/A 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2011 N/A N/A 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (The) Jordan 2012 N/A N/A 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2000 N/A N/A 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2001 N/A N/A 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2002 N/A N/A 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2003 N/A N/A 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2004 N/A N/A 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2005 N/A N/A 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2006 N/A N/A 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2007 N/A N/A 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2008 BB- 9 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2009 BB- 9 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2010 BB- 9 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2011 BB- 9 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 2012 BB- 9 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2000 N/A N/A 
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Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2001 N/A N/A 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2002 N/A N/A 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2003 N/A N/A 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2004 BBB+ 14 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2005 BBB+ 14 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2006 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2007 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2008 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2009 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2010 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2011 A- 15 
Ahli United Bank KSC (Kuwait) Kuwait 2012 A- 15 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2000 N/A N/A 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2001 N/A N/A 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2002 N/A N/A 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2003 N/A N/A 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2004 BBB+ 14 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2005 BBB+ 14 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2006 A- 15 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2007 A- 15 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2008 A- 15 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2009 A- 15 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2010 A- 15 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2011 A- 15 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2012 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2000 N/A N/A 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2001 N/A N/A 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2002 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2003 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2004 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2005 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2006 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2007 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2008 A+ 17 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2009 A+ 17 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2010 A+ 17 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2011 A+ 17 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2012 A+ 17 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2000 N/A N/A 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2001 N/A N/A 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2002 A- 15 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2003 A- 15 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2004 A- 15 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2005 A- 15 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2006 A 16 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2007 A 16 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2008 A+ 17 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2009 A+ 17 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2010 A+ 17 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2011 A+ 17 
Gulf Bank Kuwait 2012 A+ 17 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2000 N/A N/A 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2001 N/A N/A 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2002 N/A N/A 
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Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2003 N/A N/A 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2004 N/A N/A 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2005 N/A N/A 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2006 A 16 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2007 A 16 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2008 A 16 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2009 BBB 13 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2010 BBB 13 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2011 BBB 13 
Gulf Invesment Corporation Kuwait 2012 BBB 13 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2000 N/A N/A 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2001 N/A N/A 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2002 N/A N/A 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2003 N/A N/A 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2004 N/A N/A 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2005 N/A N/A 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2006 A 16 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2007 A 16 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2008 A+ 17 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2009 A+ 17 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2010 A+ 17 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2011 A+ 17 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 2012 A+ 17 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2000 N/A N/A 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2001 N/A N/A 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2002 BBB+ 14 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2003 BBB+ 14 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2004 A- 15 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2005 A- 15 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2006 A 16 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2007 A 16 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2008 A+ 17 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2009 A+ 17 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2010 A+ 17 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2011 A+ 17 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 2012 A+ 17 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2000 N/A N/A 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2001 N/A N/A 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2002 N/A N/A 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2003 BBB+ 14 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2004 BBB+ 14 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2005 BBB+ 14 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2006 A- 15 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2007 A- 15 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2008 A- 15 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2009 A- 15 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2010 A- 15 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2011 A- 15 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2012 A- 15 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2000 N/A N/A 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2001 B- 6 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2002 B- 6 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2003 B- 6 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2004 B- 6 
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Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2005 B- 6 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2006 B- 6 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2007 B- 6 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2008 B- 6 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2009 B- 6 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2010 B 7 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2011 B 7 
Bank Audi S.A.L. Saradar Group Lebanon 2012 B 7 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2000 N/A N/A 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2001 B- 6 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2002 B- 6 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2003 B- 6 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2004 B- 6 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2005 B- 6 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2006 B- 6 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2007 B- 6 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2008 B- 6 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2009 B- 6 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2010 B 7 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2011 B 7 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. Lebanon 2012 B 7 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2000 N/A N/A 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2001 N/A N/A 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2002 N/A N/A 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2003 N/A N/A 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2004 N/A N/A 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2005 N/A N/A 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2006 N/A N/A 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2007 BB+ 11 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2008 BB+ 11 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2009 BB+ 11 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2010 BB+ 11 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2011 BB+ 11 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 2012 BB+ 11 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2000 BB 10 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2001 BB 10 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2002 BB 10 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2003 N/A N/A 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2004 N/A N/A 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2005 N/A N/A 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2006 N/A N/A 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2007 N/A N/A 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2008 N/A N/A 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2009 N/A N/A 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2010 N/A N/A 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2011 N/A N/A 
BMCE Bank Morocco 2012 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2000 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2001 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2002 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2003 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2004 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2005 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2006 N/A N/A 
 327 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2007 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2008 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2009 N/A N/A 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2010 BBB+ 14 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2011 BBB+ 14 
AHLI Bank SAOG Oman 2012 BBB+ 14 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2000 BBB- 12 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2001 BBB- 12 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2002 BBB- 12 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2003 BBB- 12 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2004 BBB- 12 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2005 BBB 13 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2006 BBB+ 14 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2007 BBB+ 14 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2008 BBB+ 14 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2009 BBB+ 14 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2010 BBB+ 14 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2011 BBB+ 14 
Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 2012 BBB+ 14 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2000 BBB- 12 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2001 BBB- 12 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2002 BBB- 12 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2003 BBB- 12 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2004 BBB 13 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2005 BBB 13 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2006 A- 15 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2007 A- 15 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2008 A- 15 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2009 A- 15 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2010 A- 15 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2011 A- 15 
Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 2012 A- 15 
Bank Sohar Oman 2000 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2001 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2002 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2003 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2004 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2005 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2006 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2007 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2008 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2009 N/A N/A 
Bank Sohar Oman 2010 BBB+ 14 
Bank Sohar Oman 2011 BBB+ 14 
Bank Sohar Oman 2012 BBB+ 14 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2000 N/A N/A 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2001 BBB- 12 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2002 BBB- 12 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2003 BBB- 12 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2004 BBB- 12 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2005 BBB- 12 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2006 BBB+ 14 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2007 BBB+ 14 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2008 BBB+ 14 
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HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2009 BBB+ 14 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2010 BBB+ 14 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2011 BBB+ 14 
HSBC Bank Oman Oman 2012 A+ 17 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2000 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2001 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2002 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2003 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2004 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2005 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2006 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2007 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2008 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2009 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2010 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2011 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Oman Oman 2012 BBB+ 14 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2000 N/A N/A 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2001 N/A N/A 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2002 N/A N/A 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2003 BBB- 12 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2004 BBB- 12 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2005 BBB 13 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2006 BBB+ 14 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2007 BBB+ 14 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2008 BBB+ 14 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2009 N/A N/A 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2010 N/A N/A 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2011 N/A N/A 
Oman Arab Bank Oman 2012 N/A N/A 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2000 N/A N/A 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2001 N/A N/A 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2002 N/A N/A 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2003 N/A N/A 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2004 N/A N/A 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2005 N/A N/A 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2006 N/A N/A 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2007 BBB+ 14 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2008 A- 15 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2009 A- 15 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2010 A- 15 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2011 A- 15 
Ahli Bank QSC Qatar 2012 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2000 N/A N/A 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2001 N/A N/A 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2002 N/A N/A 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2003 BBB+ 14 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2004 BBB+ 14 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2005 BBB+ 14 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2006 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2007 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2008 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2009 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2010 A 16 
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Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2011 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 2012 A 16 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2000 N/A N/A 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2001 N/A N/A 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2002 N/A N/A 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2003 N/A N/A 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2004 N/A N/A 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2005 N/A N/A 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2006 N/A N/A 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2007 N/A N/A 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2008 A 16 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2009 A 16 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2010 A 16 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2011 A 16 
Doha Bank QSC Qatar 2012 A 16 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2000 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2001 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2002 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2003 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2004 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2005 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2006 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2007 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2008 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2009 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2010 N/A N/A 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2011 A- 15 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 2012 A- 15 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2000 N/A N/A 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2001 N/A N/A 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2002 N/A N/A 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2003 N/A N/A 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2004 BBB 13 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2005 BBB 13 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2006 A- 15 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2007 A- 15 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2008 A 16 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2009 A 16 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2010 A 16 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2011 A 16 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar 2012 A 16 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2000 BBB 13 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2001 BBB+ 14 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2002 A- 15 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2003 A- 15 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2004 A- 15 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2005 A- 15 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2006 A+ 17 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2007 A+ 17 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2008 A+ 17 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2009 A+ 17 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2010 A+ 17 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2011 A+ 17 
Qatar National Bank Qatar 2012 A+ 17 
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Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2000 BBB+ 14 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2001 BBB+ 14 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2002 BBB+ 14 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2003 BBB+ 14 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2004 BBB+ 14 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2005 BBB+ 14 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2006 A 16 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2007 A 16 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2008 A+ 17 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2009 A+ 17 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2010 A+ 17 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2011 A+ 17 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation Saudi Arabia 2012 A+ 17 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2000 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2001 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2002 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2003 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2004 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2005 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2006 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2007 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2008 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2009 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2010 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2011 N/A N/A 
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia 2012 A- 15 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2000 N/A N/A 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2001 BBB 13 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2002 BBB 13 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2003 BBB+ 14 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2004 BBB+ 14 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2005 A- 15 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2006 A- 15 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2007 A 16 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2008 A 16 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2009 A 16 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2010 A 16 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2011 A 16 
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 2012 A 16 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2000 N/A N/A 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2001 BBB- 12 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2002 BBB- 12 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2003 BBB- 12 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2004 BBB- 12 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2005 BBB- 12 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2006 BBB+ 14 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2007 BBB+ 14 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2008 A- 15 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2009 A- 15 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2010 A- 15 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2011 A- 15 
Bank Al-Jazira Saudi Arabia 2012 A- 15 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2000 N/A N/A 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2001 BBB+ 14 
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Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2002 BBB+ 14 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2003 A- 15 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2004 A- 15 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2005 A 16 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2006 A 16 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2007 A 16 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2008 A 16 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2009 A 16 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2010 A 16 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2011 A 16 
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2012 A 16 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2000 N/A N/A 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2001 BBB 13 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2002 BBB 13 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2003 BBB 13 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2004 BBB 13 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2005 A 16 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2006 A 16 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2007 A 16 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2008 A+ 17 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2009 A+ 17 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2010 A+ 17 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2011 A+ 17 
National Commercial Bank (The) Saudi Arabia 2012 A+ 17 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2000 N/A N/A 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2001 BBB+ 14 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2002 BBB+ 14 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2003 A- 15 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2004 A- 15 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2005 A 16 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2006 A 16 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2007 A 16 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2008 A+ 17 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2009 A+ 17 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2010 A+ 17 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2011 A+ 17 
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia 2012 A+ 17 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2000 BBB+ 14 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2001 BBB+ 14 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2002 BBB+ 14 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2003 A- 15 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2004 A- 15 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2005 A 16 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2006 A 16 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2007 A 16 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2008 A+ 17 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2009 A+ 17 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2010 A+ 17 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2011 A+ 17 
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2012 A+ 17 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2000 N/A N/A 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2001 BBB+ 14 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2002 BBB+ 14 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2003 A- 15 
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Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2004 A- 15 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2005 A 16 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2006 A 16 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2007 A 16 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2008 A 16 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2009 A 16 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2010 A 16 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2011 A 16 
Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2012 A 16 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2000 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2001 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2002 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2003 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2004 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2005 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2006 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2007 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2008 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2009 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2010 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2011 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia 2012 BBB+ 14 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2000 N/A N/A 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2001 N/A N/A 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2002 N/A N/A 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2003 N/A N/A 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2004 N/A N/A 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2005 N/A N/A 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2006 A- 15 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2007 A- 15 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2008 A- 15 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2009 A- 15 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2010 A- 15 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2011 A- 15 
Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2012 A- 15 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2001 N/A N/A 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2002 N/A N/A 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2003 N/A N/A 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2004 BBB- 12 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2005 BBB- 12 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2006 BBB 13 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2007 BBB+ 14 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2008 BBB+ 14 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2009 BBB+ 14 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2010 BBB+ 14 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2011 BBB 13 
Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia 2012 BBB- 12 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2000 N/A N/A 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2001 BB+ 11 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2002 BB+ 11 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2003 BB+ 11 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2004 BBB- 12 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2005 BBB- 12 
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Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2006 BBB- 12 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2007 N/A N/A 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2008 N/A N/A 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2009 N/A N/A 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2010 N/A N/A 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2011 N/A N/A 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates S.A. Tunisia 2012 N/A N/A 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2000 BB- 9 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Akbank TAS Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2003 N/A N/A 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2004 N/A N/A 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2005 B 7 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2006 B 7 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2008 BB- 9 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2009 BB- 9 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2010 B+ 8 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2003 N/A N/A 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2004 N/A N/A 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2005 B+ 8 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2006 B+ 8 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2008 BB- 9 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2009 BB 10 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2010 BB 10 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2011 BB 10 
Alternatifbank AS Turkey 2012 BB 10 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2003 B- 6 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2004 B 7 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2005 B+ 8 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2006 B+ 8 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
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Anadolubank AS Turkey 2008 BB- 9 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2009 BB- 9 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2010 BB 10 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2011 BB 10 
Anadolubank AS Turkey 2012 BB 10 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2003 N/A N/A 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2004 B 7 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2005 B 7 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2006 B 7 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2007 N/A N/A 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
Arab Turkish Bank Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2003 N/A N/A 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2004 N/A N/A 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2005 N/A N/A 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2006 N/A N/A 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Baqnkpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2003 N/A N/A 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2004 N/A N/A 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2005 N/A N/A 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2006 BB+ 11 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2007 BB+ 11 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2008 BB+ 11 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2009 BB+ 11 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A. Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2002 B- 6 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2003 B- 6 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2004 B 7 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2005 B 7 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2006 N/A N/A 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2007 N/A N/A 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
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Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
Burgan Bank AS Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2000 BB- 9 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2001 BB- 9 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2002 B- 6 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2003 B 7 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2006 N/A N/A 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2007 N/A N/A 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
Cellco Finance N.V. Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2002 BB- 9 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2003 BB- 9 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2004 BB- 9 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2005 BB 10 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2007 N/A N/A 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
Demir Halk Bank Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Denizbank AS Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2005 B+ 8 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2006 BB- 9 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2008 BB- 9 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2009 BB- 9 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2010 BB- 9 
Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
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Dogus Holding AS Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2000 BB- 9 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2002 B- 6 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Finansbank AS Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2007 N/A N/A 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
Fortis Bank AS Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2002 B 7 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2003 B 7 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
Garanti Factoring Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2000 B+ 8 
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HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2001 B- 6 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2006 N/A N/A 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2007 N/A N/A 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
HSBC Bank AS Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2001 B 7 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2002 B 7 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2003 B 7 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2006 BB- 9 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2007 BB 10 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
ING Bank A.S. Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2003 N/A N/A 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2004 N/A N/A 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2002 B+ 8 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2006 N/A N/A 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2007 N/A N/A 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
Kocbank AS Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
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Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2003 N/A N/A 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2000 BBB 13 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2001 BBB 13 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2002 BBB 13 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2003 BBB 13 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2004 BBB 13 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2005 BBB 13 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2006 BBB 13 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2007 N/A N/A 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2011 N/A N/A 
Sabanci Bank Limited Turkey 2012 N/A N/A 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2003 N/A N/A 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2004 B- 6 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2005 B- 6 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2006 B- 6 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2007 B 7 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2008 B 7 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2009 B 7 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2010 B+ 8 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2011 BB- 9 
Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey 2012 BB- 9 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2003 B- 6 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2004 B 7 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2005 B 7 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2006 B 7 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2007 B 7 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2008 B 7 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2009 B 7 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2010 B+ 8 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2011 B+ 8 
Tekstil Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2012 B+ 8 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
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Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2005 BB+ 11 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2003 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2004 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2005 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2006 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2007 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2008 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2009 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2010 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2000 BB- 9 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2000 BB- 9 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2006 BB- 9 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2008 BB- 9 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2009 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2010 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2011 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2000 BB- 9 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2001 B 7 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2002 B 7 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2003 B 7 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2006 BB 10 
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Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Turkiye ls Bankasi - lsbank Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2006 BB- 9 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2008 BB- 9 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2009 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2010 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2011 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2002 B 7 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2006 BB- 9 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2009 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2010 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2011 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi AS Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2000 BB- 9 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2001 B 7 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2002 B- 6 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2003 B 7 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2006 BB- 9 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2008 BB- 9 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2009 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2010 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2011 BB+ 11 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2000 N/A N/A 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2001 N/A N/A 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2002 N/A N/A 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2003 B- 6 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2004 B- 6 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2005 B- 6 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2006 B- 6 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2008 BB 10 
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Turkland Bank Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Turkland Bank Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2000 BB- 9 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2001 B 7 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2002 B- 6 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2003 B 7 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2006 BB 10 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2007 BB 10 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2008 BB 10 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2009 BBB- 12 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2010 BBB- 12 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2011 BBB- 12 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS Turkey 2012 BBB 13 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2000 BB- 9 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2001 B 7 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2002 B 7 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2003 B 7 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2004 B+ 8 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2005 BB- 9 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2006 BB- 9 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2007 BB- 9 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2008 BB- 9 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2009 BB+ 11 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2010 BB+ 11 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2011 BB+ 11 
Ziraat Bankasi A.S. Turkey 2012 BBB- 12 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2001 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2002 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2003 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2004 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2005 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2006 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2007 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2008 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2009 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2010 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2011 A+ 17 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 2012 A+ 17 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2001 A- 15 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2002 A- 15 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2003 A- 15 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2004 A- 15 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2005 A- 15 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2006 A 16 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2007 A+ 17 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2008 A+ 17 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2009 A+ 17 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2010 A+ 17 
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Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2011 A+ 17 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 2012 A+ 17 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2001 BBB+ 14 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2002 BBB+ 14 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2003 BBB+ 14 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2004 BBB+ 14 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2005 BBB+ 14 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2006 A- 15 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2007 A- 15 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2008 A- 15 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2009 BBB+ 14 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2010 BBB+ 14 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2011 BBB+ 14 
Bank of Sharjah UAE 2012 BBB+ 14 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2000 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2001 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2002 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2003 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2004 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2005 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2006 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2007 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2008 A 16 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2009 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2010 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2011 A- 15 
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE 2012 A- 15 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2001 N/A N/A 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2002 N/A N/A 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2003 N/A N/A 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2004 N/A N/A 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2005 N/A N/A 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2006 N/A N/A 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2007 A 16 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2008 A- 15 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2009 BBB- 12 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2010 BBB- 12 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2011 BBB- 12 
Dubai Bank (PJSC) UAE 2012 BBB 13 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2001 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2002 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2003 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2004 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2005 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2006 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2007 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2008 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2009 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2010 N/A N/A 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2011 A 16 
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 2012 A 16 
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Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2001 A 16 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2002 A 16 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2003 A 16 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2004 A 16 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2005 A 16 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2006 A+ 17 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2007 AA- 18 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2008 AA- 18 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2009 N/A N/A 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2010 N/A N/A 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2011 N/A N/A 
Emirates Bank International PJSC UAE 2012 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2001 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2002 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2003 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2004 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2005 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2006 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2007 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2008 N/A N/A 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2009 A+ 17 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2010 A+ 17 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2011 A+ 17 
Emirates NBD (PJSC) UAE 2012 A+ 17 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2001 N/A N/A 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2002 N/A N/A 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2003 N/A N/A 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2004 N/A N/A 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2005 BBB+ 14 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2006 A 16 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2007 A+ 17 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2008 A+ 17 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2009 A+ 17 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2010 A+ 17 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2011 A+ 17 
First Gulf Bank UAE 2012 A+ 17 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2001 A- 15 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2002 A- 15 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2003 A- 15 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2004 A- 15 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2005 A- 15 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2006 A 16 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2007 A+ 17 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2008 A+ 17 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2009 A 16 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2010 A 16 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2011 A 16 
MashreqBank PSC UAE 2012 A 16 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2001 A 16 
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National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2002 A 16 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2003 A 16 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2004 A 16 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2005 A 16 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2006 A+ 17 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2007 AA- 18 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2008 AA- 18 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2009 AA- 18 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2010 AA- 18 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2011 AA- 18 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 2012 AA- 18 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2001 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2002 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2003 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2004 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2005 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2006 A- 15 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2007 A- 15 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2008 A- 15 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2009 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2010 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2011 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah PSC UAE 2012 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2001 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2002 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2003 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2004 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2005 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2006 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2007 N/A N/A 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2008 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2009 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2010 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2011 BBB+ 14 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC UAE 2012 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2000 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2001 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2002 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2003 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2004 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2005 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2006 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2007 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2008 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2009 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2010 N/A N/A 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2011 BBB+ 14 
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2012 BBB+ 14 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2000 A 16 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2001 A- 15 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2002 A- 15 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2003 A- 15 
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Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2004 A- 15 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2005 A- 15 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2006 A 16 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2007 A+ 17 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2008 A+ 17 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2009 A+ 17 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2010 A+ 17 
Union National Bank (PJSC) UAE 2011 A+ 17 
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